

MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF UKRAINE
INSTITUTE OF HISTORY OF UKRAINE OF THE
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BABYN YAR NATIONAL HISTORICAL MEMORIAL PRESERVE

CONCEPT
for the
MEMORIALIZATION OF THE BABYN YAR
NATIONAL HISTORICAL MEMORIAL PRESERVE
Second revised and expanded edition

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INTRODUCTION

1. Babyn Yar: History and the Present

Babyn Yar is known throughout the world as one of the most prominent and distinctive symbols of the Holocaust. However, as a place of memory it has a number of significant differences from other places of mass destruction of Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War.

First of all, during the Nazi occupation of Kyiv in 1941–1943, Babyn Yar became the site of execution and burial of not only Jewish people, but also of other groups that were the object of Nazi persecution for racial, political, and other motives: Roma, Ukrainian nationalists, communists, Soviet prisoners of war, mental patients, civilian hostages, Ukrainian and Soviet underground fighters, and prisoners of the Syrets concentration camp. Non-Jewish victims, Kyivites and residents of other regions of Ukraine, accounted for about a third of the total number of about 70 to 100 thousand victims of Babyn Yar. Secondly, in the postwar Soviet period, Babyn Yar was the site of the technological Kurenivska disaster of 1961, which also claimed the lives of about 1,500 people.

Subsequently, Babyn Yar became an arena of constant conflict. On the one hand, the conflict occurred between members of the primarily Jewish, but also Ukrainian and Russian communities, who sought to honor the memory of the Holocaust victims. On the other hand, the Soviet authorities, who at first tried to destroy the ravine itself and the memory of its Holocaust victims, later attempted to turn it into a component of the myth about the “nameless victims,” the prisoners of war, and “peaceful Soviet citizens.” At the same time, attempts were made by certain marginal groups to deny the tragedy of Babyn Yar in general and to present it as a “Jewish myth.”

Finally, during the period of independent Ukraine, Babyn Yar became a place of formation for a number of separate historical narratives of various ethnic, political, religious, and other social groups and public organizations representing the descendants of various victims of Nazism and Communism. This has led to the fragmentation of memory and complications in the common understanding of the tragic pages of the past, which is evident in the numerous memorials dedicated to these victims (both groups and individuals). It should also be noted that Babyn Yar already during the pre-First World War Russian imperial era was surrounded by a number of cemeteries that formed a kind of multi-religious necropolis. In postwar times, it was almost completely destroyed, and then to a large extent built up. Unfortunately, this process continues nowadays.

Consequently, the actual history of Babyn Yar is much longer than the Holocaust and Nazi occupation period, something that should be taken into account and reflected in any memorialization projects.

Today, Babyn Yar and the adjoining necropolis consist for the most part of a disordered space that includes a public park and forest area with more than 30 monuments and memorial signs representing various groups, all of which have been erected chaotically and without consideration for architectural or landscape unity. Moreover, the number of these memorial signs increases annually.

The territory of Babyn Yar and the historical necropolis that is yet undeveloped is part of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve and the Lukianivskyi State Historical Memorial Preserve, including the Military Cemetery, the Kyrylivskyi Grove site of landscape art, and an object of the Nature Preserve Fund Repiakhiv Yar.

At present, public and state initiatives have shifted from establishing separate monuments to museums, large memorial complexes, as well as bringing complete or partial order to the memorial space. It should be noted that there is still no separate museum or permanent exhibition in any of the existing Kyiv museums that would be dedicated to the history and the tragedy of Babyn Yar and the history of the Holocaust.

2. The Memory of Babyn Yar: Systemic Challenges

The above described state of the commemoration of Babyn Yar is a consequence of much more complex issues related to the development of Ukrainian society. These include:

- uncertainty about the ultimate civilizational choice of Ukraine, radical differences in views on its further development in society as a whole and among certain ethnic communities, first of all, Ukrainians and major ethnic minorities;
- a lack of the formed holistic vision and policy of historical memory, a struggle between different memory models, and the domination of political instrumentalization;
- a lack of a coherent and consistent ethnic and national policy of the state to reach, in particular, systematic integration of various ethnic communities into a single political nation;
- the lack of a complex vision of the history of Ukraine in the European and universal contexts;
- the lack of a holistic urban development policy, in particular, in Kyiv – the capital of the Ukrainian state;
- the lack of social solidarity and an experience of cooperation between the state and the civic

society;

- a lack of a desire to take into constructive consideration the contemporary experience of other societies and states in their memory policies and memorialization of tragedies of a comparable scale.

Without solving these problems, it is probably impossible to come to an ultimate resolution of the comprehensive memorialization of such a significant space in international and Ukrainian dimensions as Babyn Yar. At the same time, consistent efforts to resolve Babyn Yar memorialization problems will significantly contribute to the resolution of more wide-ranging issues of the politics of memory and the development of Ukraine in general.

The authors believe that the leading pledge to solve the problem of the complex memorialization of Babyn Yar is deliberate constructive cooperation of all government institutions, scientific institutions, public organizations, as well as ethnic and religious communities that have the task of preserving historical memory. Thus, the first step towards the realization of this concept is to consolidate efforts of all parties sincerely interested in honoring the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar.

3. The Goal and the Tasks of the Concept

The goal of the Concept is to present to Ukrainian and international audiences a coherent vision of the memorialization of Babyn Yar as a special place of memory. By integrating the existing array of knowledge about the history of the Holocaust and the mass murder of Jews and others by the Nazis on the territory of Babyn Yar, the authors sought to demonstrate the main idea behind the memorialization of Babyn Yar, and on the basis of the existing National Historical Memorial Preserve “Babyn Yar,” in the form of a universal place of memory consisting of three layers. A multifaceted structure of the Concept can be explained by the desire of its authors to fully represent the memorialization of Babyn Yar as a highly important and complex phenomenon of a civilizational nature, and as an integral part of the general transformation of Ukrainian society during the last few decades.

It seems crucial that future visitors to the memorial preserve, by receiving information about the place and role of Babyn Yar in the history of Kyiv, could grasp the focal points in the history of Ukraine, reflect on the shared living experience of different ethnic and religious communities on the territory of today’s Ukraine, and contemplate the problems of the transformation of a “premodern” Ukrainian society into a “modern” version during the last quarter of the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries. According to our vision, visitors to the future memorial preserve should begin their passage through Babyn Yar with the realization of the fact that they have come to a place of memory with a rich and complex history, a place which, in the few prewar decades, had gone through Bolshevik “modernization.” This resulted in

the degrading of traditional social relations, the mass murder of the intelligentsia, and the genocidal destruction of the peasantry.

The next (second) layer of history, according to the idea of the authors of the Concept, should immerse visitors in thinking about the realities of the Holocaust as a global phenomenon, gradually disclosing to their eyes a practice of mass murder of civilians during the years of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine, of which Babyn Yar has been the epicenter and the most striking symbol. Undoubtedly, the core and the main climax of the second layer should become the memory about the Jewish victims of Babyn Yar, which comprised roughly 70 percent of all those murdered by the Nazis on its territory. At the same time, on the orbits equidistant from this core of memory, visitors should be able to access associated memory complexes of Babyn Yar – devoted to the murdered patients of the mental hospital; the Roma; the murdered Soviet POWs; the executed hostages; and the Communist and nationalist underground fighters tortured to death. Such an inclusion of group memories, in our opinion, will open the way to their reconciliation through mutual commemoration centered on the respect for human life, the realization of a shared responsibility of the citizens of one country for each other's fate, and the value of creating a tolerant social space in the democratic state.

A role of the catalyst in the process of shaping the ideas of tolerance, civil society, and democracy will be accorded to the third layer of memory – the memorialization of the postwar history of Babyn Yar. The authors of the Concept are certain that the truth about the horrors of mass executions committed by the Nazis will become all the more vivid and acquire new shades of meaning if visitors are able to understand the truth about the Kurenivka tragedy and reflect on the prolonged and brave struggle of the dissidents to preserve the memory about the victims of Babyn Yar in the postwar Soviet Union.

From the above defined goal arise the following tasks:

- Create a synergetic vision of the Memorial Space Babyn Yar which will include the Memorial park “Babyn Yar”; the Ukrainian museum of the Holocaust; and Memorial museum of Babyn Yar; disclose its structure, mission, and philosophy; describe the main principles of the future exhibits in memorial museums;
- Place the space of Babyn Yar and the related tragic events within a wider framework of world and Ukrainian history, a memorial landscape of Ukraine and Europe, and a multifaceted commemorative context of different ethnic and social groups by linking it with the civilizational choice of today's Ukraine;
- Draft the working recommendations for the urban-planning, financial-judicial, and administrative-economic realization of the idea of Memorial space and National Historical Memorial Preserve “Babyn Yar.”

4. Philosophical Foundations of the Concept

Memorialization of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar has a number of dimensions. The phenomenology of the Catastrophe and Babyn Yar is not limited to such dimensions as memory locations, topography, and memorial space of one of the largest places of mass murders. In fact, it is wider in terms of time, events, and meaning, and it includes all these and other aspects.

In the words of American scholar Michael Berenbaum, “in the world of moral relativism, the Holocaust has become a symbol of absolute evil, and thus a cornerstone of all values.” The new dimension of violence raises the question about the meaning. The all-encompassing, total genocide of the Jews was rooted not in political reasons, nor in the considerations of territorial expansion, but rather in the Nazi proclamation of the mass murder as the purification of humanity.

At the same time, Babyn Yar became a place of murder of other categories of Nazi victims. As a result, Babyn Yar today stands for a common necropolis, one of the largest places of acute pain that does not subside over time.

While not ignoring the differences between the Holocaust and other forms of genocide, one should note that from the perspective of the victims there was no precise differentiation of the reasons behind their sufferings and deaths. This circumstance, in the view of the Ukrainian human rights advocate Myroslav Marynovych, calls for an adherence to “appropriate balances and mutual compatibility of symbols...The truth about Babyn Yar demands that everybody who had met their death here was mentioned. In the same way as they would stand in front of God, where there would be no divisions into confessions and nationalities. [These were] people of the horrible times on our bitter soil.”

A scholarly comprehension of the political, social, and religious phenomenology of genocide and the Holocaust is taking place within a broad context of political theory. But this does not exclude different interpretations and assessments of the past events. Israel Charni, an American-Israeli sociologist, combined a purely academic responsibility of the scholars of genocides with the ethnical one and raised a few questions they should face: “Does an author share a sincere and unlimited realization that any genocide is tragic and amoral? Is there an impression that an author is more inclined to evoke the memory of his/her own people about the genocide it experienced rather than express a disquiet about all human victims as such?”

At the same time, the unparalleled nature of the Holocaust takes an understanding of this phenomenon over the line between the rational and spiritual-transcendental. Moreover, a comprehensive knowledge of the Catastrophe seems little productive without a deep spiritual understanding and an active empathy.

As regards an issue of empathy in the context of the saving the victims of Nazis, it is worth emphasizing a spiritual and cultural tradition and social solidarity as the underlying

motives in the behavior of the rescuers. Without considering a sacral attitude towards life and death it is impossible to convincingly explain the actions of people who rescued others from death, thus exposing themselves to a mortal danger.

The authors of the Concept attempt to assert liberal-democratic values as the broadest and most open worldview and confession of universal value markers within the framework of civilizational discourse.

In order to avoid narrating scholarly facts for the sake of particular ideological goals, a research paradigm has been chosen that is based on contemporary methodology on the one hand and on universal values of democracy and human rights on the other hand. It is important to note that the “Ukrainian” vision of the Holocaust is by no means at odds with the global/universal one, but rather supplements it and builds on it, giving it new dimensions. Such a vision is based on the systemic retrospective of genocidal and violent actions carried out by different political regimes on Ukrainian soil during a relatively short period of time.

State terror and genocide as policies and practices of totalitarian regimes belong to the category of crimes against humanity, as did the Holocaust as the most brutal expression of the total negation of fundamental human rights, according to which all people are equal in dignity and rights.

By treating Babyn Yar as the place of mass murders, the authors of the Concept reveal different contexts of understanding and taking responsibility for the Holocaust and other crimes. This does not mean that Soviet and Nazi crimes were identical, but rather that there were both principal differences and numerous similarities between them from the ethical and humanist points of view.

The problem of responsibility has other dimensions, in particular moral and political.

First, the existential conditions, common to anyone who had to live under totalitarian regimes, transformed a problem of choice between good and evil, fear and bravery, self-interest and self-sacrifice into an inexorable, enforced necessity. For the most part, this choice was individual, but in some cases – communal/corporate, national, or political. Human actions had different motivations. At any rate, it seems unfair to apply the principle of collective responsibility to those groups or institutions which lacked well-defined, officially declared intentions to commit crimes against humanity.

Second, instead of an external reminder to another group about its collective responsibility, it is imperative to create an internal need and conditions for a realization of one’s responsibility for certain historical actions aimed at other groups, that is, interiorize the responsibility. The Concept is intended to help citizens develop an ability to collectively overcome the traumatic experience of the Holocaust and all forms of mass persecutions.

Third, there is a growing expectation that the state and political class will assume an active responsibility for taking concrete steps regarding the memorialization of Babyn Yar, as well as the commemoration of all victims of totalitarian regimes.

The authors are well aware of the existence of different visions of Ukraine's future, which are linked to the diversity of ethno-political, ethno-cultural, and religious identities. Representatives of different ideological systems and political orientations, the believers and the atheists, while recognizing the Holocaust and other forms of mass persecutions as an inexcusable evil, might view differently how these tragedies have impacted society overall and individual citizens in particular and to what social and humanitarian consequences they have led.

The memorialization of Babyn Yar certainly belongs to the instruments which shape civil society and unite the Ukrainian political nation and state-building. Aside from this, the memorialization is an important means to teach individual qualities and personal competences, including the rejection of violence, critical thinking, the sense of responsibility, empathy, tolerance, and interethnic and interreligious understanding.

5. The Commemorative Objects of the Memorial

The commemorative objects of the memorial belong to four categories: victims, rescuers, champions of memory, and historical events related to the history of Babyn Yar.

Victims of Babyn Yar

- Above all these are the victims of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Roma. Jews comprise the most numerous group of victims of Babyn Yar. It is with the mass shootings of Jews on 29–30 September 1941 that a symbolic history of this location as the place of mass murder has begun. The persecution and murder of Jews based on racial and ideological motives lasted as long as did the Nazi occupation. The Roma also were murdered in Babyn Yar based on their ethnicity, a circumstance that differentiated these two groups from all others.

Babyn Yar also became the place of executions and burial for non-Jewish victims of the Nazi regime, who experienced a systemic persecution during the occupation. A similar situation with the victims of different nationalities, social, and political groups was typical of many places of mass execution during the Second World War, and most notorious among them were the concentration camps located on the territory of Poland – Auschwitz-Birkenau and Majdanek. The memorialization of all victims without exception demonstrates the specificity of the Nazi occupation, the war in Ukraine, and Babyn Yar as a particular place of memory.

Other victims of Nazism

- Patients of the Pavlov mental clinic located in the vicinity of Babyn Yar. They were killed due to considerations of race hygiene theory as the unable to work and excess

mouths to feed. The first victims to be executed were Jewish patients in October 1941, while the rest were gassed in several phases in special vehicles known as *Gaswagen*;

- Civilian hostages (initially Jews) became the first victims of Babyn Yar, even before the start of mass executions in late September 1941. Random Kyivites who were caught in the “prohibited zone” turned out to be the last victims executed in late October 1943 on the slopes of the ravine. During the entire occupation the ravine functioned as a regular site for executions, and it is here where the dead bodies of prisoners from Kyiv’s prisons and camps, including the sites of detention of the General District of “Kyiv,” were transported in special *Gaswagen* vehicles;
- Soviet POWs, whose fate in Kyiv was closely linked to Babyn Yar. The first victims of Babyn Yar had the status of POWs, who were executed as early as 20 September, the day after the Nazis had entered Kyiv. Starting on 27 September the next group of victims included the captives of the camp on Kerosynna Street – mostly Jews and Soviet regime functionaries. POWs from this camp were forced to flatten the earth on the spot of mass executions of Kyiv Jewry in the autumn of 1941. In the spring of 1942 the surviving POWs were transferred to the new camp (near the ravines of Babyn Yar) that became known as the Syrets camp. Former Red Army soldiers comprised the so-called “suicide team” (*komanda smertnykiv*) that was in charge of digging out and burning the bodies in the ravine in the fall of 1943;
- Communists and Soviet underground members, who were the ideological opponents of the Nazis, were methodically searched for by the Nazi intelligence service and taken, along with the first hostages, to Babyn Yar for execution. For decades the names of the members of the Soviet underground were unfairly forgotten, and many of them are still unknown today;
- Ukrainian nationalists, the activists of the different factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and adherents of other political organizations became objects of Nazi persecutions in July 1941. The arrests of the OUN members in Kyiv started in December 1941. Prior to this many supporters of the nationalist movement took part in the work of various institutions permitted under the Nazi occupation, including the civil administration, police, press, and civic organizations, as a way of rebuilding the institutions of the future Ukrainian state. The history of the executed nationalists in Babyn Yar shows a different connotation of the status of a victim during the war;
- Victims of the Kurenivka tragedy of 1961. The residents of the neighborhood of Kurenivka together with the workers of the streetcar depot who perished in the landslide point to the tragic consequences of the criminal Soviet policy of a conscious erasure of the “unfavorable” memory of Babyn Yar.

Rescuers

The rescue of Jews and other victims of Nazism entailed a lethal danger for the rescuer and his/her family. Therefore, the memorialization of these people and their personal heroism

raises an important question about personal choice in the face of totalitarian violence and reveals an existence of such an inner need inside many people.

Often, in the uncertainties of war and occupation, people were not able to follow a chosen strategy, and so, yesterday's persecutor could end up helping victims, while a potential rescuer could betray them. Roles could switch even over the course of a single day. The commemorative objects of Babyn Yar listed above well demonstrate such ambiguous life scenarios and reflect all the complexities of the history of this place of memory.

Champions of memory

These are representatives of different social and national groups who, in different times and in different ways, fought for the preservation of memory of the Babyn Yar victims by collecting artifacts and testimonials; attending rallies; devoting to this cause their works of art, etc. This shows a possibility and necessity of a personal opposition to any authoritarian or totalitarian regime while standing up for one's own dignity and the dignity of your own people, and defending humanist values, among them the respect for death and the rights to the memory of victims and human rights in general.

Events

- Tragic events pertaining to the history of Babyn Yar under Nazi occupation, particularly the incessant executions at different times of different categories of victims; the activities of Nazi prisons and a camp operated by the Nazi security service SD; "action 1005"; the digging out and burning of dead bodies murdered in Babyn Yar. These events reveal what happened in Babyn Yar and why we should remember it;
- The tragic events of postwar years demonstrate why Babyn Yar's historical landscape was destroyed. Among such events is the Kurenivka tragedy, as well as the destruction and redevelopment of adjacent cemeteries and the territory of the ravine itself;
- Postwar rallies under Soviet rule and various types of civic engagement in independent Ukraine which have demanded a dignified commemoration of the victims of Babyn Yar, thus revealing a mnemonic history and tradition on the territory of Babyn Yar;
- Events linked to the Holocaust outside of Kyiv and Ukraine, in Europe overall, which provide a necessary transnational context for Babyn Yar.

6. The Concept's Structure

The Concept consists of three parts and appendices.

Part I: "The Memorial Space of Babyn Yar," outlines the ideas of creating on the territory of Kyiv a massive place of memory devoted to Babyn Yar. It will ensure a real conceptual unity

in representing a history of this particular territory, as well as the wider context of events, thus offering to society a certain variant of collective memory and commemoration.

Part II: “Humanitarian Contexts of the Memorialization of Babyn Yar,” considers in detail the contexts of the memorialization, which give rise to some challenges that should be overcome in the process of creating the memorial. This part explains why such a memorial has not been realized until today – 80 years after the historical events. It faces specific difficulties of a historical, social, ideological, and memorial nature, in addition to some contradictions that are near impossible to resolve in the immediate future. The subsections of this part serve as a contextual background, which explains the issues pertaining to the creation of the memorial without defining its content.

Part III: “Practical Aspects of the Realization of the Concept,” contains proposals for solving different issues facing the realization of the concept in various contexts – judicial, administrative, financial, and urban-planning.

Finally, the Concept is supplanted with thematic appendices, including a thematic plan of the future museum exhibits and thematic maps of the memorial space Babyn Yar serving as an illustration to Part I of the Concept and its urban-planning section. A separate appendix contains key terms of the Concept, among them “Holocaust,” “genocide,” “nation and nationalism,” “ethnic historical memory,” “national and ethnic,” “civilization,” “Soviet,” “collaboration or cooperation,” “resistance,” “terror,” “totalitarianism,” and “the Righteous or rescuers.”

The Concept does not contain a comprehensive section for musealization, but only offers a creation of museum objects inside a general memorial complex in Babyn Yar. The authors recommend that concrete issues of museology (i.e., what should exhibits show and how one should do it) be addressed and a specific plan of work drafted only after the Ukrainian government approves of the general Concept of the memorialization of Babyn Yar.

It is important to note that the proposed Concept is not a historical narrative; rather it contains a brief overview of historical contexts which explain the selection of themes and topics for the future museum exhibits. The Concept does not include the detailed thematic plans of these exhibits, except for general thematic structures of the exhibits. The Concept is a preliminary working document that reflects a general vision of its authors.

PART I. THE MEMORIAL SPACE OF BABYN YAR

1. General Considerations

1.1. The Structure of the Babyn Yar Memorial Space

The Concept views the Babyn Yar memorial territory as a multi-level space that includes sites of various periods of its history, among them:

- the territory of existing and ruined cemeteries with historical buildings, in particular: Kyrylivskiy Orthodox, Lukianivskiy, Jewish, Muslim, Karaite, Bratske, German prisoners of war, military cemeteries; the zone of shootings during the Nazi occupation;
- the territory of the camp for Soviet prisoners of war at the Zenit stadium (today's Start stadium), where Jews, communists, and political workers were imprisoned;
- the road the Jews walked to their place of murder on 29 September 1941;
- former tank-repair garages where victims were kept the night before being shot;
- the territory of former Syrets camp / the camp for German prisoners of war;
- the territory and historical buildings of the Pavlov Mental Hospital (currently Pavlov Kyiv City Mental Hospital № 1);
- the zone of the Kurenivska catastrophe of 13 March 1961 in Babyn Yar and on the territory of the Krasin Tram Depot (currently the Podil Tram Depot);
- all the monuments and memorial signs related to the history of Babyn Yar.

The Babyn Yar memorial space is an example of commemorative activities by various parties/participants in honoring the memory of victims of the Second World War and the Holocaust in Ukraine. Today, more than 30 monuments and memorial signs are erected in its territory reflecting various memorialization traditions:

- Babyn Yar is an example of Soviet memory policy. Almost completely distorted and built up, this historical territory illustrates attempts by the Soviet government to destroy the memory of the massacre of the Jews during the Nazi occupation. Soviet mythology is reflected in the first Babyn Yar memorial – a multi-figure monument of 1976 officially called the “Monument to Soviet Citizens and Prisoners of War, Soldiers and Officers of the Soviet Army Shot by German Fascists in Babyn Yar”;
- Jewish memory is represented primarily by the Menorah – a monument in the form of the most ancient symbol of Judaism; it was unveiled on 29 September 1991, almost immediately after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence;
- Roma memory was properly represented only in 2016 when the Roma Wagon monument, created back in the beginning of the 1990s, was returned to Babyn Yar and unveiled there;

- members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground executed here are commemorated in the granite Memorial Cross and three granite stones with the names of 62 victims along with the monument to Olena Teliha. The figure of the poetess at full height symbolically echoes the sculptural composition commemorating a Soviet underground fighter of Jewish origins named Tetiana Marcus set in the opposite corner of the park;
- a number of memorial signs are dedicated to the victims of the war, who are not directly related to the Babyn Yar tragedy. These are crosses erected in 1999 in the territory of the cemetery for German prisoners of war who were kept at the Syrets camp. The 2005 memorial sign to *Ostarbeiters* or forced civilian workers “Memory for the sake of the future,” proves that society views this entire site as a symbol for all civilian victims of World War II;
- a number of memorial signs point to the “outside influence” on memorialization of the Holocaust, reflecting a general view, first of all, by Jewish public organizations, that memorialization always involves magnificent structures. First came the American project of 2001 for the creation of a Heritage Jewish public and cultural center in the upper part of Babyn Yar. In 2005, a new idea arose for the construction of a memorial-religious center in the Jewish cemetery. Jewish businessmen united under the Babyn Yar Memorial Foundation offered to build a museum along with a religious-educational complex on the site of an unfinished building that once was to become part of the Avanhard sports complex. In 2016, this initiative moved ahead when Russian oligarchs of Jewish origin founded the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center. This organization promised to create a Holocaust museum in Babyn Yar in the next few years.

The Concept views the Babyn Yar memorial space as united memorial complex that should bind all of the existing and future objects in a common body of elements connected by a single idea. This body will unite all the museums, monuments, and various traditions of memorialization. It should define the method/formula of integration of Babyn Yar as a symbolic element into a common national historical and memorial heritage and turn it into a national and European place to commemorate the victims of the Nazi and Soviet regimes, and to warn against the dangers of totalitarianism. This memorial complex should include:

- The Memorial park Babyn Yar, which is to create an aesthetic and emotional space for meditation and recognition of the expressions of extraordinary brutality, the tragic events which took place here, and unite all existing memorials. The park is to form an environment which would ensure the necessary conditions for concentrated, serious contemplation and an adequate response of visitors to the expositions of the two museums: the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum and the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust;
- the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum is to provide comprehensive and systematic museal coverage of numerous tragedies and the entire history of Babyn Yar, and their place in the memory of individuals, communities, and Ukrainian society;

- the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust which is to integrate Babyn Yar into a pan-European tragedy of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people with an emphasis on events that took place on Ukrainian territory and which should represent a Ukrainian vision of the history of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian historical memory about it;
- memorial sites, monuments, and signs related to the Babyn Yar history that remain outside the memorial park boundaries.

The Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust and the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum should have their own missions. The latter is unable to show the entire tragedy of the Holocaust, while the former – the history of Babyn Yar that continues today as a special place embodying the tragedy of the Jews of Kyiv and other tragic events. At the same time both museums should comprise a single architectural complex, complementing each other, through two separate exhibits in a single building. The point of their physical, thematic, and emotional intersection should be the story of the shooting of the Jews in Kyiv on 29–30 September 1941. United in a common museum space, the exhibits of these two museums will form a comprehensive idea of the history of the place, as well as the memory of events which took place here (Memorial Museum of Babyn Yar) in their global context (The Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust). They will ensure an uninterrupted link between what happened and how it is being remembered.

The Memorial Museum of Babyn Yar and the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust should become separate units of a single administrative structure under a common leadership and with common research, exhibition, and educational activities.

The proposed opening of Memorial Museum of the victims of Babyn Yar in the historical office of the former Jewish cemetery in 44 Illienko Street should only be a temporary location due to its very limited space until the complete museum complex is built. This pilot project should briefly present personal stories of different victims of Babyn Yar, a mass execution of Jews in September 1941, the plight of non-Jewish victims of the Nazis, the Kurenivka tragedy of 1961, the Soviet and post-Soviet commemorations of victims, etc. The practical outcome of this particular project might be achieved during a relatively short period of time and on a modest budget. This pilot project will serve as the core of a future exhibit which will bear a different title: Memorial Museum of Babyn Yar. After its opening, the building of the former Jewish cemetery's office might be used as an information center.

The site of the 1941–1943 shootings should become the center of the landscape planning of the future memorial park and the nucleus of the content of the entire memorial complex. It is extremely important to mark on the ground the locations of mass burials to defend them against possible redevelopment.

1.2. The Mission of the Babyn Yar Memorial Space

The mission of the Babyn Yar memorial space is to combine the existing narratives about the dramatic periods of history, to become a symbolic element of the historical and cultural

heritage of the Ukrainian state, a nationwide and pan-European place of commemorating the victims of the Nazi and Soviet regimes in comparisons with the victims of other genocides and the periods of the deliberate distortion of the memory about them, and a safeguard against the dangers of totalitarianism in the future.

Such a complex and multilevel place as Babyn Yar does not have a single symbolic meaning (although the most famous one is certainly the tragedy of Kyiv's Jews in late September 1941). It includes all the various meanings of many processes and post-tragedy temporal "layers" that accumulate one upon another. Unlike monuments, memorials, commemorative ceremonies/practices that create clear symbolic semantic constructions and form the "identity of the victim" and "the image of heroes," this historic location is complex and lacks a unity of meanings. A place of memory contains everything people are looking for in it, everything visitors are aware of, everything that connects them to this place. Despite all the material specificity, it becomes meaningful in greater variety than could be designed by artistic or scientific means, allowing one to see it from a variety of perspectives.

During the Nazi occupation of Kyiv, Babyn Yar was the site of execution and burial of not only Jews but of other groups as well. In the postwar Soviet era Babyn Yar was at the epicenter of the man-made Kurenivska disaster of 1961. Later, it was a place of constant struggle between the public and the authorities. Finally, in the independence of Ukraine, Babyn Yar became the arena of a certain competition of memories between different groups and public organizations. Consequently, given the complexity of structure and variety of meanings, the task of this memorial space is to try and merge them all into a single homogeneous unit, but to combine them and present them as an entity that is an integral part of the historical and cultural heritage of modern Ukraine, with the emphasis on the symbolic importance of embracing the lessons of a difficult past and overcoming the collective trauma of the past to form a modern forward-looking identity.

In view of social, ethical, and cultural norms, it will be important to try and preserve – after all the destruction and transformations of the Babyn Yar and Dorohozhychi necropolis territories – at least the remains of the original landscape that exist to this day and to safeguard this space from further changes and destruction, as well as assist visitors in understanding its historical and symbolic significance. In practical terms, this means arranging and consolidating the public park and the forest park area where 31 monuments and memorial signs have been chaotically erected.

In light of the above, the mission of the Babyn Yar memorial space is:

- for the state (above all the President, the Supreme Council, and Cabinet of Ministers) and civil society – to help create a sense of their own primary responsibility for the memory of Babyn Yar as a symbolic space of all-Ukrainian and universal meaning and to set up a comprehensive approach to honoring memory and arranging the memorial space;

- for the representatives of ethnic, religious, and urban communities – to help provoke an internal need to create an inclusive model of a shared memory, a willingness to honor the memory of “alien” tragedies, and a realization of the absolute inadmissibility of any construction on the territory of executions and burials.

This mission, as an embodiment of an unbiased scholarly representation of different variants of historical memories and their consolidation in contemporary cultural and political contexts, without intentions to manipulate historical memory for whatever reason, will help resolve much wider problems of the development of the Ukrainian society, in particular:

- the resolution of radical differences in views on its further development in the society at large and among certain ethnic communities;
- the formation of a coherent vision and cultural and historical memory policy, putting an end to the struggle of different models of memory and historical narratives, with an emphasis on humanist values in a democratic public space;
- the emergence of a comprehensive vision of Ukraine's history in European and universal contexts;
- the formation of a comprehensive urban planning and heritage policy, in particular, in Kyiv – the capital of the Ukrainian state;
- the establishment of public solidarity and experience of cooperation between the state and civil society;
- the integration of the Ukrainian political nation into the system of civilizational and humanistic coordinates that advanced democratic countries are oriented at.

1.3. The Philosophy of the Babyn Yar Memorial Space

The extraordinary nature of such events as the Holocaust, Babyn Yar, and the historical context with which they are inextricably linked, requires non-standard approaches to their comprehension and reflection through museumification and architectural and landscape design.

The main starting points for these approaches are:

- an awareness and scholarly verified wording of the view on the Holocaust and Babyn Yar as unique phenomena and at the same events comparable with other terrible manifestations of totalitarianism, first of all, genocides of the 19th to 21st centuries;
- the need for their interpretation in a broad historical retrospective and a multidimensional system of coordinates: moral, ideological, religious, political, socio-cultural, economic, mental, etc.;
- their perception as phenomena of a universal civilizational level that are of great importance both for Ukraine and for the entire world.

The philosophy of these phenomena includes the following aspects:

- the scale of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar tragedies dictates an urgent need to form a shared memorial space that would be integrated as an organic component into the world's memorial firmament;
- a combination of the three elements of the space – the Memorial Park, the Holocaust Museum, and the Babyn Yar Museum – will create a holistic museum and memorial complex – an intricate and to a large extent unique memorial location with the highest concentration of informational resources, sources and means of emotional influence, and commemoration practices;
- reconstruction of the events related to these issues is based on the unconditional recognition of the value of human life, the inadmissibility of wars, military, and terrorist means of solving any social antagonisms, on the negation of any totalitarian regimes or practices of genocide and state terror in all possible forms;
- the humanization of scholarly knowledge and the formation of a democratic civil society are impossible without a constant reminder of such global catastrophes and their lessons for humanity, the need for unconditional adherence to the principles of universal morality, tolerance, and mutual respect for representatives of all social, ethnic, and religious communities;
- expressive postulation of balanced approaches to interaction in the “person – society – state” triad, in which the protection of rights and freedoms is provided for the individual, along with all conditions for self-realization, self-identification, the possibilities of influence on authorities within the framework of democratic procedures, and the creation of reliable barriers against attempts of violence and repressions in any form;
- formation of a memorial space must demonstrate the political will of the state, the awareness of society and its political elite of their own responsibility to remember these events as an integral part of Ukrainian history, the ability to consciously develop and implement a state memory policy that is in line with the best international standards;
- the memorial space should become a unique museum and landscape portal to help comprehend, empathize, realize, and actualize the experience of the tragedies of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar.

The leading slogans of the philosophy of the Memorial space might become thoughts of two prominent thinkers of the past – one Jewish, another Ukrainian. One of them is a quote from the great Jewish scholar from the twelfth century rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Rambam): “He who kills a man, destroys the entire world. He who saves a man, saves the entire world” (*Sanhedrin*, 12:3). This moral maxim embodies a general symbolism of Babyn Yar, which, being centered on the Jewish tragedy, commemorates all victims and provides the events that happened there with a universal human dimension.

The philosophical basis of the Memorial is also reflected in the thoughts of the prominent Ukrainian religious and civic leader Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: “A common good makes people into one body, and it is this common good that is the basis of all love. The

sense and awareness of this common good, which unites people, leads a person towards understanding that common good is one's own good and that one's neighbors are like oneself!" The awareness of a common good, respect, and love for every person and humanity in general facilitated unity in the face of the Nazi regime and gave an opportunity to rescue those who were subjected to extermination. A unity in counteracting the Soviet regime ensured the preservation of memory about the victims of Babyn Yar during the Soviet era. This very unity is lacking today in order to finally stop the "war of memories" and organize with dignity the Memorial space of Babyn Yar. One should listen to the thoughts and ideas of great moral authorities which serve as guides to the complex labyrinths of memory and historical policy.

1.4. Tasks of the Memorial Complex

According to the mission of the Memorial space, the main tasks of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex include:

- providing a museal means of objective, well-balanced, and systematic coverage of the history and the tragedy of Babyn Yar, their place in the memory of individuals, communities, Ukrainian society, and humanity;
- the formation of a system of formal and informal education on the basis of modern values that combine humanism, tolerance, patriotism, and interethnic and interreligious understanding;
- honoring the memory of victims of state, socially caused and ideologically motivated crimes, cooperation with victims, their families and other witnesses;
- the formation of a new historical memory and modern memorial culture in Ukraine, in particular, an inclusive history by including into it the memory of the Holocaust, other Nazi and Soviet genocides, repressions, persecutions and resistance to them;
- the accumulation, preservation, and dissemination of objective scientific information on the Holocaust, other genocides, Nazi and Soviet terror, resistance to them, the history of Babyn Yar and Kyiv, the history of Kyiv Jews, Ukrainians, Roma, and other ethnic groups as well as Soviet prisoners of war;
- the formation of public opinion on an effective responsibility for this world, for its destiny and the fate of mankind, and awareness of the limited human mind that is capable not only of improving the world but also of destroying it;
- the conviction that under any circumstances moral norms and values born by world religions regulating the life of society for more than a thousand years must be respected;
- participation in common efforts to prevent the revival of totalitarianism, the spread of xenophobia, in particular, anti-Semitism, Roma- and Ukrainophobia, repetition of genocides and mass terror against any ethnic, religious, social, or any other groups;

1.5. Target Audiences of the Memorial Complex

The main target audience of the Museum, in line with its mission, should become the Ukrainian youth, future active citizens free of xenophobia and stereotypes of the totalitarian past, who can deliberately build an open tolerant civic society and their own democratic state. In particular:

- students of secondary and tertiary general and specialized educational establishments;
- military, servicemen, and cadets who are to consciously defend an independent democratic Ukraine.

An important target group of the Memorial Complex consists of foreign tourists, official delegations, and diplomats. In working with them, the Museum is to deliver scholarly tested facts free of ideological burdens, a narrative about the complicated and unique history of Ukraine of the 20th and early 21st centuries, demonstrating its will for mutual understanding and open cooperation between nations and states. It is also important to make sure that visits to the memorial space and museums are as comfortable as possible, that English translation is provided for all the navigation elements and the exhibits along with auxiliary premises of the museums, and that audio-guides and phone apps are developed in the most widely used languages of the world.

The Memorial Complex should also actively work with other target groups:

- educators;
- former victims of the Holocaust and other Nazi persecutions, participants of the Second World War, victims of Soviet persecutions, the Righteous among the nations, and their relatives;
- members of ethnic, religious, political, and other social groups that suffered from the Holocaust, Nazi and Soviet persecutions;
- activists of ethnic, religious, political and other civic organizations that speak on behalf of the social groups that have suffered;
- local residents, inhabitants of Kyiv, citizens of Ukraine;
- journalists and politicians;
- researchers, museum workers, archive workers, area researchers;
- intellectuals and the public of culture at large.

All these groups are also to be encouraged to share their experience with Ukrainian youth and foreign visitors and to use their own professional skills in an effort to advance the mission and the tasks of the Memorial Complex.

2. Babyn Yar Memorial Park

2.1. Memorial Park Territory

The Babyn Yar Memorial Park should cover the territory around the site of mass shootings of the Jews of Kyiv and other victims of Nazism. The territory around it includes numerous cemeteries that emerged here over the course of the past two centuries. Therefore, the Memorial Park must include the following historical objects:

- the territory of mass shootings and burials during the Nazi occupation of Kyiv in 1941–1943;
- the location of the destruction of the Pavlov mental hospital patients;
- the Kyrylivskyi Mounds;
- the Kyrylivskyi Christian Orthodox cemetery;
- the Lukianivskyi Christian Orthodox cemetery;
- the Jewish cemetery;
- the Karaite cemetery;
- the Muslim cemetery;
- the Bratske cemetery;
- the Military cemetery;
- the Cemetery of German prisoners of war;
- the area of the Kurenivska catastrophe of 1961;
- historical buildings, memorials and memorial signs erected in this territory.

Today, these historical objects are located in the territories of:

- the National Historical Memorial Preserve Babyn Yar;
- the Lukianivskyi State Historical Memorial Preserve;
- the “Kyrylivskyi Hai” memorial park of landscape art;
- the Babyn Yar park of the Shevchenkivskyi district;
- the “Repiakhiv Yar” natural preserve fund;
- “Kyivzelenbud” municipal company;

- the Dorohozhychi subway station;
- the Kyiv Television Tower;
- the Kyiv Television Center;
- the Avanhard sports complex;
- a park for decommissioned buses;
- the Motto gas station;
- the Herzen Park residential complex;
- the Kyrylivskyi Hai residential complex;
- the State Archive of Kyiv Oblast;
- the State Labor Inspection in the Kyiv Oblast;
- the Military cemetery.

2.2. The Philosophy and Tasks of the Memorial Park

As a result of the general physical abandonment of the site and the uncoordinated increase in the number of competing monuments, Babyn Yar and the adjacent necropolis have become a chaotic space, which in no way reflects the meaning and the significance of the tragic events that took place here.

Today, it is primarily a place of unorganized and mostly not too cultivated recreation activities by the residents of the surrounding residential districts of Kyiv. At the same time, Babyn Yar is a place of pilgrimage for Ukrainian Jews, representatives of the Jewish Diaspora, and guests from all over the world who come to pay homage to the victims of the Holocaust. It is also a place of commemoration for all the citizens of Ukraine and Kyiv who remember the crimes of the Jewish Catastrophe as well as other horrors of the Nazi occupation and Soviet totalitarian rule.

Therefore, the main goal of the Memorial Park is to create a holistic place of memory. It should transform what is now a cluttered forest park and a recreational park into a place that promotes reflection and respect for the victims. On the other hand, this space should remain open for further memorialization as a result of a dialogue and cooperation between different communities and parts of society.

Therefore, the Memorial Park must accomplish the following tasks:

- in the spatial sense – the creation of a clearly marked space in which those who come specifically to honor the memory of the dead, ordinary local residents, or students of the surrounding colleges and universities would immediately feel connected to the history of the Holocaust and other tragedies that occurred at this site;
- in the humanitarian sense – the creation of a space for reflection and awareness of the manifestations of exceptional inhumanity and tragic events that occurred here in the past and unity for modern Ukrainian citizens of any ethnic background on the basis of mutual empathy for past sufferings, the assertion of the value of individual human life, and aspirations to create a just and humane society;
- in the memorial architecture sense – to invite the public, the state, and experts to create a holistic memorial space as an alternative to the chaotic placement of individual monuments and memorials;
- in the urban-planning sense – the creation of a modern public memorial complex integrated into the structure of the city through landscape design and monumental art;
- in the educational sense – the creation, through landscape design and interpretation, of spatial models that could help visitors (including people with no personal or family connections to this place) embrace the value of being aware of the past, as well as ideas of universal morality, humanism, tolerance, democracy, civil society, human rights protection, and natural and spiritual ecology that offer life-affirming answers to the evil embodied in the Holocaust and other tragedies that occurred in this place;
- in the social sense – to provide the public an example of a high-quality integrated organization and streamlining of an urban area of socialization, communications, and recreation that has international historical and memorial significance.

2.3. Possibilities and Restrictions of Interference in the Memorial Space

In view of the complex and conflicting historical and memorial contexts of the memorial space, as well as the fact that almost the entire territory of the Memorial Park is the site of shootings and the burial and destruction of corpses, one should observe the following principles and restrictions during its creation:

- to preserve objects of cultural heritage as well as all the existing memorial objects and other structures in the territory of the Memorial Park;
- to refrain from the design of any new buildings or large structures;
- to create a space with the possibility of future development where new monuments could be installed in due time;

- to develop rules for the development of the territory, including the outlining of parameters for new monuments and the zones for their possible installation, taking into account the need for the rational use of land and compositional coordination with the environment;
- to refrain from installing and designing new monuments until the Memorial Park is completed;
- to preserve and display as much of the existing natural landscape as possible in its historical context;
- to minimize the use of new ethnic, religious, and political symbols in the design of the Memorial Park;
- to allow the territory of the Memorial Park remain public and create comfortable conditions for people with disabilities;
- to mark the places identified as sites of executions and burials and to take into account the prohibition for walking on graves in organizing the pedestrian territory scheme;
- to create no fences or fenced areas in the territory of the Memorial Park;
- to develop approaches to the memorialization of historical objects, plaques, and monuments that are part of the Babyn Yar memorial space outside the Memorial Park;
- to create convenient navigation through the Memorial Park and the memorial space outside in the form of informational stands and signs;
- to adhere to the approved modes of utilization of the territories of both historic memorial preserves and territories of the approved security zones of the Babyn Yar Historical Memorial Preserve and the monument of national importance Kyrylivska Church;
- to adhere to the principles of Sustainable Development (see Urban Development Context in Chapter 7);
- use economically sound solutions and give priority to environmentally friendly technologies.

3. Babyn Yar Memorial Museum

3.1. Babyn Yar as a Historical Symbol

Babyn Yar is a complicated historical space of long and multifaceted memories. In a symbolic sense, Babyn Yar is first and foremost a representation of the tragedy of the war and Nazi occupation, of the struggle to maintain the memory of those events on the national level, and a potent symbol of warning for the future. Its centerpiece is the mass killing of the Jewish residents of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities during the Holocaust. The memory of all other Nazi victims surrounds it. At the same time, Babyn Yar is also a symbol of fighting to keep the memory of those events during the Soviet era, and the competition of different memories in an

independent Ukraine. Its memory refers to the crimes of Nazi occupation, especially to the killings of tens of thousands of innocent people, and to an effort to preserve the memory of this tragedy, of keeping the murdered safe from another – spiritual – annihilation, and of remembering all categories of victims, while preventing such crimes and tragedies from happening in the future.

Babyn Yar reflects in the broadest sense the tragic and dramatic sides of Ukraine's modern history, stateless and colonial as it was, as well as the history of the struggle against enslavement, for human dignity, and the dignity of all ethnic and religious groups and nations.

This is not currently a widespread view. It is publicly expressed only by some in the public and scholarly circles – those interested in forming a common history and inclusive memory. This vision became fundamental for such collective works as *Babyn Yar: Man, Power, History* (by the Civil Committee for Commemoration of Babyn Yar Victims, the History Museum of Kyiv, and others, 2004), *Babyn Yar: History and Memory* (by the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter charitable initiative and others, 2016), a concept to create a national historical memorial Babyn Yar Preserve (by the Civil Committee for Commemoration of Babyn Yar Victims and others, 2006), the international competition of architectural ideas to create a Babyn Yar Dorohozhychi Necropolis memorial park (by the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter and others, 2015–2016), and the multimedia exhibition *Babyn Yar: Memory against History's Background* (by the History Museum of Kyiv, the Ukrainian Institute for National Memory, and others, 2016).

Meanwhile, the authors believe it wrong to ascribe to one of the most popular views of Babyn Yar today, such as:

- Babyn Yar is a symbol exclusively of the Holocaust. This is a Jewish and international view (common in the West, and among liberal circles in Russia and other post-Soviet countries) shaped over the decades when only the Jewish people were actively working on honoring the memory of the victims. In some manner this the way it is commonly viewed in Ukraine outside of Kyiv.
- Babyn Yar is a place of murder of civilians and prisoners of war. This was the Soviet view that has been largely maintained among the residents of Kyiv and Ukraine.
- Babyn Yar is a place of Nazi terror against different groups of the population. This is an adapted version of the Soviet view to meet contemporary challenges and claims.
- Babyn Yar is a place of mass burial of victims of the Holodomor and Soviet political repressions. This is a revisionist position that aims to decrease the meaning of Jewish victims or to deny Jewish murders at all, and used as a defensive response when Ukrainians are accused of shooting the Jews.
- Babyn Yar is a place of several different tragedies. This is the position of ethnic and religious communities and public organizations that are willing to “share” Babyn Yar but unwilling to integrate their memories.

- “Ukrainian Babyn Yar” is first of all the place where Olena Teliha and other activists of Andrii Melnyk’s wing of the OUN were shot. This is the position of some nationalists in Ukraine and in the diaspora.
- Babyn Yar is the place of the Kurenivska catastrophe. This is the position of some local residents.

The authors believe that each of these views either reflects only a facet of local history and focuses on the memory of one group only, or fully divides group memories, or, on the contrary, mechanically unites them by fully ignoring separate groups of victims, or deliberately distorts historical facts.

3.2. The Mission of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum

The authors of the Concept believe the principal mission of the Museum is to provide the knowledge and understanding of humanitarian values that are to become the basis of a modern democratic Ukrainian state to Ukrainian society and every citizen. The point at issue is not just the values of the post-war western world that have been named “common human values” (first recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), but also those that have a much older origin and are linked to the world’s leading monotheistic religions. Among them include:

- the absolute value of human life;
- the equality of all people, benevolent acceptance and tolerance of “the other”;
- the realization of one’s personal responsibility for one’s actions and the future of one’s country;
- the priority of common human morals and humanitarian values over ideological dogmas and political interests;
- the value of social solidarity and cooperation of citizens, nations, and social groups for the sake of preserving life, peace, and interethnic unity;
- the realization of the danger of returning of totalitarianism and the importance of democratic freedoms;
- a critical attitude towards the propaganda of xenophobia, intolerance, racial, ethnic, religious, or “class-based” superiority;
- the realization of the need for social cooperation in order to overcome the traumatic experience of individuals, ethnic, religious, social and other groups.

3.3. The Philosophy of Exposition of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum

The main problem in creating a standing exposition is keeping a thematic balance that, on the one hand, would adequately reflect the need for certain topics in the symbolic and real history of Babyn Yar and, on the other hand, would best advance the main mission of the Museum.

Therefore, the exposition has to:

- reflect three levels of history and memory united by the integral history of Babyn Yar: individual (personal and family), group (of certain ethnic, religious, social, political groups), and general Ukrainian (related to the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian political nation);
- reflect several concentrated layers of history: the mass shooting of the Jews of Kyiv on 29–30 September 1941; the Nazi terror against various groups of the population in the course of the occupation from 1941 to 1943; the fight to keep this memory alive during the Soviet period; the general history of Kyiv and of this memorial space from the late 18th to early 21st centuries;
- present global historical events through an everyday history of Kyiv and the individual destinies of its participants;
- emphasize those topics that, along with their historical meaning, are of moral and ethnic importance: the fates of victims, especially children, the heroism of the Righteous Among the Nations, the fighters for memory, and problems of individual choice;
- view the sacrifice of the innocent victims and heroism of civilian resistance as two poles – despair and hope, crime and humanity – between which the entire history of Babyn Yar rests in this symbolic space;
- reveal the true history of co-existence of various ethnic and religious communities in Ukrainian lands from the end of the 19th century, emphasizing its positive examples and tendencies, but not disregarding the painful points of historical memory;
- constantly remind people that all the events that took place in Ukraine, Kyiv, and directly in this memorial space from the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 through to the advent of Ukraine's independence in 1991 were developing under the influence of one and in the most tragic moments of history as two criminal totalitarian regimes with the common characteristic of ideologically-conditioned mass terror victimized certain groups for racial, ethnic, religious, social, and political reasons;
- reflect the double symbolism of Babyn Yar as not only a sign of Nazi terror but that of the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime;
- use specific events related to the persecution and destruction of Jews, Roma, Ukrainians and other groups and communities in Kyiv to reveal the mechanisms of genocide in general;
- demonstrate the varieties and specificities of the communist and Ukrainian resistance movements as well as their political causes, the practical methods and means they used, and the ambiguous consequences of their activities and confrontation;
- encourage a critical attitude to the national history and avoid its idealization; not ignore the negative pages of history in relation to collaborationism with the totalitarian regimes and participation in their crimes, but also to remember the difficulty of personal choice under such conditions and in the context of the struggle for survival and avoid generalizations on ideological rather than factual grounds;

- find, despite the tragic nature of the history of Babyn Yar, an optimistic ending to the Museum's narrative that would inspire its audience to find answers to the question of how the stories and the memories of Babyn Yar are important and relevant to their peers and future generations, how to prevent a repetition of this tragedy, and how to remember it.

3.4. The General Structure of Exposition of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum

In developing the structure of the standing exposition, we must resolve the following key issues:

- the content of the introductory and final sections;
- the general historical periodization of exposition;
- the main and background themes.

Based on the proposed mission of the Museum and the philosophy of the exhibition, it seems appropriate to construct it as a holistic narrative with an organic beginning and end, that is, to create, in fact, not a general chronological subject exhibition, but a conceptual thematic exhibition. It will be given an integrity not by events, but by the symbolic unity of the history of Babyn Yar.

The beginning of this storytelling in the exhibition must bring visitors at once to the main agenda of the Museum, and introduce them to the events that have turned Babyn Yar into a historical symbol: shootings and burials under Nazi occupation and with its most infamous event in particular – the mass killing of the Jews of Kyiv on 29–30 September 1941. The visitor in this manner faces the immediate question: “How was it possible?” and search for an answer in the further unfolding of the history of this place against the wide historical background. By the end of the exposition, the visitor is to find answers to two more questions that would arise at once: “How can it be prevented?” and “How can it not be forgotten?” The answers are found in the stories of those who rescued the persecuted during the Nazi terror and fought to preserve their memory during the Soviet era.

Such a design of the exposition will help resolve the problem of emotional influence on visitors. They will first find themselves in total despair. They will hear the voices of all the victims of Babyn Yar, beginning with those who died in the Holodomor and all the way to those who perished in the Kurenivska catastrophe. They will march the streets of Kyiv along with the Jewish people to their place of execution on 29 September 1941, and get fully immersed in the human tragedy. Having passed through the history of Babyn Yar, told at the second and third chapters of exposition, they will step into a space of hope where they will encounter the people who had preserved their human dignity under the circumstances, who opposed the totalitarian regime not with weapons, but in spirit. They will inspire visitors to reflect on their own positions

and conduct in contemporary difficult times. Crosscutting topics that must connect the exposition will include the history of the locality as a topographic space – to provide the physical unity of the story, and the faces of all the children or victims of Babyn Yar – to provide its symbolic wholeness. The exposition ends with the “Hall of Memory” interactive space where visitors will be able to leave their own memories of the events or the impressions from visiting the Museum, as well as commemorate victims via contemporary mnemonic means or symbolic act.

The general structure of the purely historical part of the exposition should be based upon two levels of periodization. The first will correspond to three stages in Babyn Yar history: prehistory (the time of the emergence of a multi-religious necropolis); history (two years of Nazi terror); and post-history (the time of struggle for memory that continues to this day). At the second level, these periods should be divided into sections in keeping with the political history of Ukraine, especially during the reign of different empires here, for the general situation had a defining influence on the course of events at different intervals in the history of Babyn Yar.

It is also important to outline the chronological boundaries of the historical narrative itself. The top boundary clearly comes all the way to today and moves along with the current history of Ukraine and changes in the topography of the memorial space. As far as the bottom boundary is concerned, there can be different views of it, depending on what is most crucial here: the history of this space or the history of the symbol. It is clear that the history of Babyn Yar as a physical space must be subject to symbolical history. The exposition might offer visitors brief excursions into a history of Ukraine, which would help integrate more events related to this locality and find a certain symbolism. The use of chronological markers only strengthen the perception of the memorial space.

The mutual relationship and balance between main and background themes are equally important. It is obvious that the contextual background should be a general narrative of the peculiarities of ruling regimes and political movements, their ideology and politics, above all in the humanitarian realm (propaganda, repressive politics, ethno-national and social policies, politics of memory, etc.). Likewise, a background should comprise a narrative about particular communities, and the social and political groups that became the victims of political regimes and objects of memorialization in Babyn Yar. Both backgrounds should find their reflections in Kyiv-based materials to demonstrate general Ukrainian processes on local examples. The exposition will integrate approaches dealing with the experience of victims and the related biographic sources, including letters, diaries, and oral interviews with the victims and their relatives. In this manner, we can form a background of many levels that will consist of the general political history, the history of communities, and the history of this city.

The main themes will be related to specific events in and around Babyn Yar. They must be organically linked to the general processes, perceived as their direct embodiment in certain events and the fates of specific individuals. This will let us make the topic of the entire exposition integral, its content profound, and its presentation concise.

4. Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust

4.1. The Holocaust in Historical Perspective

The Concept views the Holocaust as an ideologically motivated, organized, and deliberate total murder of Jews committed during the Second World War by Nazi Germany, with the help of its allies and accomplices. At the same time, there are other important aspects that should be considered. First, it is Nazi anti-Jewish politics that, from a certain point, became known as the Final Solution of the Jewish question and included a number of different measures aside from a deliberate murder. Second, the tragic fate of Jews, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, was not limited to the persecution by the Nazis and to the period of the war. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the Holocaust as a historical event should include the following considerations:

- persecutions of the Jews in Nazi Germany and in the occupied territories before the start of the physical annihilation in summer of 1941 part of the Holocaust?
- mass persecutions and annihilation of the Jews by other states and military formations that took place independently at the same time according to their own ideologies and political ends.
- mass persecutions and annihilation of other ethnic, religious, and social groups: Sinti and Roma, Slavs, Jehovah Witnesses, mental patients, and homosexuals.

A broader perspective will have to provide answers to the principal questions:

- What were the ideological and political preconditions of the Holocaust?
- What was the historical reason for the Holocaust?
- What is the place of the Holocaust in the history of the world?

It should also be stressed that, from a subjective point of view of victims, the mass murders committed by the Nazis are hard to distinguish from the tragic events that befell Europe's Jews in the middle of the 20th century. These include:

- prewar persecutions and discrimination of the Jews in Central Europe (first of all, in Germany, Romania, and Poland);
- the deportation and ghettoization of the Jews during the war (by the Third Reich and the USSR in the occupied Polish lands; in Romania and the Romanian-occupied part of the USSR; by Japan on the occupied territory of China);
- physical annihilation of the Jews during the war by other participants (first of all, Croatian, Lithuanian, Polish, Soviet, and Ukrainian non-state or non-regular military formations);
- discrimination and deportation to the Nazi death camps of the Jews from the Third Reich's allied and satellite countries (Bulgaria, France, Slovakia, Denmark, Italy, Hungary) made under the Nazi influence;

- various forms of persecution of the Jews after the war (first of all, in Poland and the USSR).

The general effect of these events was the destruction of a Central East European Jewish community and the disappearance of the European center of the Jewish civilization.

At the same time, two pitfalls should be avoided, among them:

- a understanding of the Holocaust as some kind of an anti-climax of Jewish history and thus the transformation of Ukraine's museum of the Holocaust into a museum of the history of Jews in Ukraine.

The Holocaust undoubtedly has made a huge impact on the postwar history and consciousness of Jews in the entire world. However, the history of the Jewish people in general, and in Ukraine in particular, includes not only many great tragedies, but also great achievements on the world scale. Therefore, to reduce this history to only one, even if such a horrible, event would be degrading thousands of years of prior Jewish civilization.

- considering the Holocaust as exclusively an apogee of a centuries-long European anti-Semitism, as a collective attempt to get rid of Jews at last as a part of European society.

If we focus on the European context of the history of the Holocaust, attention must be drawn not only to anti-Semitism, but to a number of wider phenomena of modern history:

- the development of positivist science as a method of unrestricted learning about the universe and the systematization of history, in particular, on the basis of the racial theory;
- the invention of rational means of transformation and "improvement" of the society through eugenics, modernization, social engineering, etc.;
- imperialism and colonialism as general political factors behind both world wars;
- nationalism as an ideological and political basis not only for the creation of independent states, but also for oppression and persecutions on ethnic grounds.

Special characteristics of the history of each country, during the Second World War in particular, must also be reflected in one's view of the Holocaust. This approach is a must for it rejects the very need for a unified history of the Holocaust. On the contrary, each country and each nation must propose their own view of this pan-European or even worldwide phenomenon. One must note that we are not talking about the regional stories of annihilation of the Jews, but the national contexts of the general European history of this genocide. This approach alone can ensure that Holocaust is truly integrated into any national history; otherwise it will become an abstract scheme.

Ukraine also must propose its own view of the Holocaust, especially as any attempt at creating a simple narrative of the Holocaust in Ukraine immediately runs into the fact that there was no Ukraine during the Second World War. Ukraine was neither a political subject nor an

administrative and territorial unit. The war broke out when Ukrainian lands were part of the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. During the German-Soviet military conflict and the Holocaust per se, these lands found themselves parts of Germany, Romania (Bukovyna, and the Transnistria governorship), or Hungary (Transcarpathia). In fact, the German-occupied zone was divided between the General Governorship (the Galicia District), Reichskommissariat Ukraine (the rest of the Right Bank), and the military administration territory (Left Bank and the Crimea). The fate of the Jews in these lands varied and did not make up a single history.

In the twentieth century, just as in previous periods of its history, Ukraine was at the crossroads of civilizations, which accounts for the peculiarities of its history, in particular, during the Second World War. Unlike the rest of Europe that either knew nothing of the Communist terror or experienced it in quite a softened way, the territory of Ukraine suffered two Nazi genocides – that of the Jews and of the Roma, as well as two Soviet genocides – of Ukrainians and of Crimean Tatars. Another peculiarity of Ukraine, unlike other European countries, was the fact that these genocides took place against the background of mass shootings and persecutions of millions of residents of Ukraine of various ethnic background. One should not and must not ignore this context, for it is the factor that lets us see the Holocaust from a universal point of view as a horrendous example of a moral crisis, as well as a crisis of attempts to fetishize the scientific and technical progress as a safeguard against dehumanization. The history of Ukraine in the 20th century is a clear confirmation not only of the limitations of human ability, but also of the falsehood of the very idea of reconstructing the world and society at one's own discretion, of inventing artificial morality, and of dividing people into "useful" and "harmful" states or groups.

4.2. The Holocaust in the Perspective of Memory

Such a significant historical phenomenon as the Holocaust can carry various forms of symbolic weight, forms that also depend on the historical and memorial context in which we examine the Holocaust.

The dominate Jewish historical memory of the Holocaust is that of a generalized symbol of anti-Semitism and its destructive effects. Remembrance is imperative both for Jews and for all other nations. For Jews the Holocaust demonstrates the importance of the existence of the State of Israel as a shelter for all the Jews of the world in case of new persecutions. For non-Jews it prompts the realization of one's responsibility for being involved in the Nazi genocide (directly or through a refusal to help the Jews) and can become a safeguard against the revival of mass anti-Semitism and a guarantee of political and social support of Israel against the background of the fierce confrontation with the radical part of the Islamic world, which denies the very right of Israel to exist.

For modern Europe, the Holocaust is a symbol of the danger of aggressive nationalism and xenophobia, and of the denial of democratic values and the violation of human rights. In this sense, it serves to build a society based on the values of multiculturalism, tolerance, protection of

the rights of different ethnic, gender and religious groups, especially minorities, in which the task of the state is primarily to meet the needs of each individual.

In the context of a specifically Ukrainian historical experience of the Nazi and Communist genocides, there exists an urgent need to emphasize another, principal, aspect of the Holocaust symbolics. The Holocaust must be viewed as a universal symbol of all genocides committed from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 21st centuries. This does not turn the Holocaust into “just another” genocide, but neither does it leave it, de-facto, “outside history” as a completely unique and even unprecedented phenomenon. Just as the Great French Revolution is an archetype of all previous and subsequent revolutions, so the Holocaust is to be viewed as an archetype of all the genocides that took place before or after.

The very example of the Holocaust demonstrates the dangers of several key processes in modern history:

- proclaiming the human mind to be unlimited and omnipotent in learning about the world and in finding ways to re-construct it “for man’s benefit”;
- inventing social ethics whose only source is a “scientific” worldview, which provides a moral basis for totalitarian terror and genocides;
- proclaiming the right for violence for the sake of creating an “ideal society”;
- the denial of democracy and freedom, and a contempt for human individuality.

This path has already led humankind to multimillion hecatombs of Nazism and Communism, which, for the sake of creating “just,” “rational,” and “prosperous” societies, did not hesitate to destruct entire nations and “classes” of “enemies.”

The Enlightenment rejected the Christian civilization as “dark centuries.” However, it proved unable to create effective safety devices against mass murders and genocides, of which the Holocaust is to be considered the general symbol. Or was it an inborn vice of a civilization of Pure Reason? Is it capable of rethinking its difficult history and prevent future humanitarian catastrophes?

The history of the Holocaust should call us to take an active responsibility for this world, for its fate, and for the future of humankind. It must include an understanding of the limited capacity of human mind that is able not just to “improve” but also to destroy the world.

4.3. The International Experience of the Memorialization of the Holocaust

Millions of people annually attend memorial places and museums connected to the history of the Holocaust. In the second half of the 20th century, especially in its last decades, such museums opened in many Western and Central European capitals as well as in North America, Australia, and South Africa – in general in those places where the principles of Western civilizations with liberal-democratic values at its core are used as a model (or at least

proclaimed). With them as centerpiece, the history of the Holocaust is viewed as one of the cornerstones of historical consciousness.

Such institutions can be described as “memorial museums.” According to the official definition of the International Committee for Memorial Museums in Honor of Mass Crimes (ICMEMO, 2007):

“Their goal is to commemorate the victims of state and socially conditioned and ideologically motivated crimes. [...] Since these institutions interact with victims and other contemporary witnesses, their work is also psychosocial in nature. Their efforts to transfer information of historical events are morally substantiated and aim to establish certain links with the present without abandoning the historical perspective.”

According to their reflection of the Holocaust, such museums can be divided into three groups:

1. Those specially created to provide a narrative of the Holocaust as the tragedy of the Jewish people. These include, first and foremost, the Yad Vashem National Memorial of the Holocaust and Heroism of the Jewish People established in Jerusalem in 1953, whose museum exposition from the very beginning focuses on conditions, the reasons behind, and the aftereffects of the Holocaust and which presents this event in the context of the history of the Jewish people. Similar (but not identical) institutions were opened in Paris (Memorial de la Shoah that was started as the Contemporary Jewish Documentation Center set up back during the Holocaust in 1943 and was joined in 1956 by the Memorial of the Unknown Jewish Martyr that in 2005 was turned into the Shoah (Holocaust) Memorial Museum) and in Berlin (Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe).

2. Those devoted to the Holocaust and the tragic events of other groups. The tendency to ascribe memorial meaning to other victims of National Socialism that remained beyond any scholarly or social attention for a long time is now prompting some institutions to add materials to their permanent exhibitions (or to add temporary exhibitions) to present the fate of the Roma, homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and political opposition to Nazism. In some cases, this leads to a conceptual revision of the very term “Holocaust,” expanding its content and proposing to interpret it not only as the fate of the Jews during Nazism, but also as Nazi policy towards other groups of victims “undesirable” from the racial-ideological and sociopolitical perspectives (for example, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington opened in 1993 on the basis of findings of the United States Presidential Commission on the Holocaust). The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe Foundation created in Berlin in 2005 by the Bundestag resolution of 1999 also deals with the recently erected Memorial to the Sinti and Roma victims of National Socialism and the Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted under Nazism.

3. Some museums have the history of the Holocaust as a part of their exposition on wider issues, such as human rights (Kazerne Dossin – Memorial, Museum and Documentation Center

on Holocaust and Human Rights, Mechelen, Belgium), tolerance (Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles), the history of the Jewish community of the country (Jewish Historical Museum in Amsterdam, Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews, and many others), or the history of religious groups and minorities (the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in Oslo), etc.

In recent decades, along with the integration of the countries of the former Soviet bloc into the European Union (and consequently to this association's dominating cultural-historical discourse), such memorial museums have appeared or are planned in a number of capitals (Budapest, Bucharest, and Warsaw). At the same time, the form of financing the construction and maintenance of museums can become an indicator of governments' striving to join this Western European understanding of the importance of the Holocaust as an integral historical component. While the creation of European Holocaust museums was funded by governments or partner agreements between governments and private or international donors, the Jewish Museum and Tolerance Center (Moscow), the Memorial Synagogue at Poklonnaya Hill (Moscow), and the Jewish Memory and Holocaust in Ukraine Museum (Dnipro) were created and exist at private expense.

One of the features of the Holocaust memorial museums is their ability to exist both directly on the site (in the country) where these events took place, and in those states where the Holocaust ever occurred, but where cultural and public space is aware of the need to remember.

According to the forms of architectural solutions and intervention in the memorial space, museum institutions are also **divided into 3 groups**:

1. Memorials on the sites of murders and burials. In many European countries institutions were built on the sites of former collection points, concentration camps and prisons, called "places of memory." They are usually considered to be something other than a monument or a museum, even if they resemble both. They include not only original objects, such as former concentration camps, but also newly built memorials. They have the following characteristics:

- they are crime scenes;
- they are places of sufferings;
- they are often cemeteries – both symbolically and physically;
- they are political monuments;
- they are places of learning;
- they are "places of memory" on the site of the historical event; they are also palimpsests in the sense that these places have a history that is not limited to the events of 1933–1945, and therefore they are ambiguous;

– they are places for individual and collective reflections, especially in contemporary society with the huge role of media.

Such is the memorial unveiled in 2004 on the site of the Belzec death camp in Poland. It consists of a properly arranged burial area of more than 400,000 Jewish victims of Operation Reinhard, a large monument, and a museum with an educational department. Such a factor as an authentic place of crime and suffering (namely the mass burials of victims) in principle determines the appearance and the concept of “places of memory.” The presence of mass graves requires appropriate architectural and landscape solutions. In the case of the Belzec Memorial, rigorous noninvasive archaeological and topographical research was conducted, the burial area was protected and safeguarded from interference and dissolution, while the newly formed memorial complex successfully added the burial grounds to the memorial landscape.

2. Memorials in historic buildings (the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, which preserves and presents authentic camp buildings – barracks, fences, the ruins of gas chambers and crematoria, all the while replenishing the actual buildings with exhibits and presenting historical information through tours).

3. Memorials created in “clean places.” If formed outside the sites of tragic events, the authors of their concepts and architects can choose any layout for their ideas (the Yad Vashem Memorial (Jerusalem), the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, or the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington).

Different Holocaust memorials reflect different views of this phenomenon depending on the context and national space in which they appeared. In many cases, “places of memory” evolve a long way between the initial initiative and the final implementation of the project. This concerns above all those places that saw suffering and deaths of more than one group of victims. Discussions can be lengthy and the battles bitter in an attempt to find a balance in the representation of each voice in the memorial space. This may be complicated by the competition of memories of various groups of victims, the influence of established political-historical myths, or discrepancies between local and national or international memory patterns that are beginning to play their role in decision making. Such memorials can be **divided into 4 groups**:

1. Memorials reflecting one vision of the Holocaust (Yad Vashem, Jerusalem). They present a narrative of the tragedy of the Jewish people. The museum exposition focuses on the preconditions, the course and aftereffects of the Holocaust, and presents this event in the context of the history of the Jewish people.

2. Memorials that reflect many visions of the Holocaust (Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum). A good example is the history of formulating a memorial landscape and an exposition in a symbolic place – the former death-camp Auschwitz. Over the last few decades, this process has traveled a difficult path – from the place of death of “peaceful citizens” from the hands of “German fascist invaders” that had become a set view in the socialist space, to the complex and

polyphonic in sentiment place of shared memory of the Holocaust, genocide of the Roma, Polish religious and ethnic victims, and victims from different countries who opposed Nazism or were considered “undesirable.” This also allows for the coexistence of a diversity of national historical presentations in one memorial space.

3. Memorials that reflect national visions of nations/countries where the Holocaust occurred (Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin).

4. Memorials that reflect national visions of nations/countries where no Holocaust occurred (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, etc.).

There is, therefore, no single model of honoring Holocaust victims around the world. In presenting this topic in museum expositions, in architectural solutions on site, in the degree of inclusion of the national context(s) of countries into the narrative of the circumstances of the destruction of the Jews, and in the balance of representing the voices of other victims of Nazism in the memorial space – all Holocaust memorials vary and have their own specifics.

4.4. The Ukrainian Context of Holocaust Memorialization

The memory of the Holocaust in Ukrainian lands that until 1991 were part of the USSR was formed in isolation from international memorial processes. The peculiarities/problems of this memory in Ukraine are influenced by a number of phenomena associated, first of all, with the specifics of the Second World War here and their memorialization.

In present-day Ukraine, most public memory of this war is mainly associated with the commemoration of the perished Red Army soldiers and victorious soldiers, in contrast to the Western democracies where the Holocaust symbolizes the horrors of the war against civilians, in particular Jews. In Ukraine, just as in the former USSR at large, the scale of losses, including prisoners of war, was by an order higher than in West European countries. On the other hand, Ukrainian society continues to feel the powerful influence of the Soviet concept of the “Great Patriotic War” that focuses on honoring the “heroic Red Army” that had “brought victory.” Under these circumstances, the memory of any non-military losses was considered secondary and not important, while remembering the mass killings of the Jewish people in occupied Ukraine was unofficially forbidden.

The same situation applies to losses among the civilian population. In the West, these are primarily victims of the Holocaust, while in Ukraine and in other Soviet territories that fell under the German occupation these were incomparably higher. The Soviet authorities could not completely ignore these losses in their memory policy, so two decades after the war was over, the USSR began to erect monuments and hold official memorial ceremonies in honor of “victims of fascism.” At the same time, any mention of their ethnic identities was silenced, while inscriptions on those monuments used the euphemism “peaceful Soviet citizens.” Another

characteristic is that the victims of Nazism at that time, mostly Soviet prisoners of war, were heroized as some kind of “antifascist fighters.”

The context of Holocaust memorialization in Soviet Ukraine would be incomplete without mentioning the activities of dissidents, Jewish activists, and Zionists, for whom memory of this tragedy was an important point of self-identification. They were enthusiasts who under those circumstances in the postwar period dared to demand a worthy commemoration of the Jewish people who were shot and who collected materials about these events at their own risk. Therefore the memory of the Holocaust here was closely intertwined with fighting for human rights, freedom of speech, democracy, against totalitarianism, and for Jewish ethno-national revival. On the other hand, official academic neglect of research of the Holocaust and the secrecy of archives led to the emergence of various myths, speculations about crime sites, their participants, and the number of victims. Some of these myths have not been completely refuted to this day. Likewise, the Holocaust was not studied by historians from the Ukrainian diaspora, whose works have had a great impact on shaping a metanarrative of Ukrainian history after the collapse of the USSR.

From the mid-1980s, a public discussion started in Ukraine on the interpretation of the events of the Second World War. This discussion in fact relates to the choice of the general memory model and questions of a civilizational choice – whether to head towards the creation of an independent, Europe-oriented, democratic Ukrainian state or to a political formation in Russia's orbit with nostalgia for the Soviet past and preservation of the concept of the “Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War.”

An important role in this debate has been played by previously forbidden groups of war participants and those who wished to commemorate them. On the one hand, they were “war heroes,” such as participants of the Ukrainian independence movement. On the other hand, they are various categories of “victims” (*Ostarbeiters*, Soviet prisoners of war, prisoners of Nazi concentration camps, juvenile prisoners whose numbers also ran into millions). These created an objective (given their numbers) competition to the victims of the Holocaust. This was especially noticeable in from 1996 to 2007 when the German government started humanitarian payments to former victims of National Socialism. They became a powerful stimulus for the creation of public organizations, political and social activities of these categories of war participants in Ukraine, and their inclusion into official commemoration events.

There are still other groups of victims of genocide in Ukraine, people who also suffered repressions (from the Nazi or Soviet authorities) for ethnic reasons. First of all, these are Ukrainians – victims of the Holodomor, the Roma, and Crimean Tatars who compete, to some extent, with Jewish victims for the attention of society and the authorities. Among the victims of national actions of the NKVD in 1937–1938 were Germans, Poles, Romanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, and other peoples. Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians were the main targets of deportations from the West Ukrainian lands annexed by the USSR in 1939. Poles and Ukrainians

were the victims of mass murders in Volhynia in 1943 and during the forced deportations from 1944 onward. In 1941–1942 Germans and Italians were deported from Crimea, followed by Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians in 1944. The native Ukrainian population of eastern Poland, such as Lemkivshchyna, Nadsianina, Kholmshchyna, Pidliashshia, Liubachivshchyna, and Western Boikivshchyna were forcefully deported in 1944–1951. In 1948 Jews became the object of a state-led persecution in the USSR.

The greatest conflict comes from honoring the memory of the perished Jews and Ukrainian nationalists, associated with the problem (both real and artificially exaggerated, primarily in Soviet and Russian propaganda) of OUN representatives' collaboration in the crimes of National Socialists against the Jews in Ukrainian lands. Moreover, the process of memorialization of the Ukrainian national liberation movement had a much more intense pace (especially in the regions of UPA and OUN underground activities) than events of the Holocaust.

Victims of National Socialism were not the only ones whose memory was for a long time ignored in the USSR. Honoring the memory of millions of multi-ethnic victims of Stalin repressions and the Holodomor took an important place in the modern commemoration policy of the Ukrainian state.

The rethinking of the events of the Second World War, especially the Holocaust in Ukraine, happened under the external pressure of researchers, the establishment of Russia, countries of the West, Israel, and the United States, which have their own fixed view backed by academic research on this subject that is an important component of the domestic and international policies of these states.

All of the previously mentioned details indicate that Ukraine has its own history that is different from other countries, and its own tragic experience (including the times of war) that cannot be ignored either at the level of mass consciousness or at the level of state policy. The competition for memory in Babyn Yar, differences in commemorative strategies of different social groups, among them the supporters and opponents of the exclusive model of Ukrainian collective memory, serve as a warning against a mere mechanical borrowing of the Holocaust memorialization experience from other countries. Holocaust memory in Ukraine should be shaped on the basis of (post) traumatic experience of the citizens of today's Ukrainian state – the victims of 20th century genocides, including the Holocaust, on Ukrainian ethnic territories.

4.5. The Mission and Tasks of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust

The creation of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust near Babyn Yar, after many decades of deliberate oblivion, desecration, and falsification of Babyn Yar history, as well as the silencing and distortion of the history of the Holocaust, should memorialize this phenomenon on a national scale. The creation of the museum should:

- provide a comprehensive and detailed presentation of the causes, essence, the course and aftereffects of the Holocaust in Europe as a whole and in the territory of Ukraine in particular;
- facilitate the search for conceptual answers to the questions of significance, causes, and consequences of the wartime persecution and murder of Jews, Roma and other groups viewed by the Nazi ideology as “harmful” in the context of world history, and events in Nazi Germany and other war countries;
- demonstrate, given the important place that this phenomenon occupies in the memory of the Jewish and Roma communities, the importance of remembering the Holocaust in Ukraine, its causes and consequences for these ethnic minorities, and their lives today;
- help, in the context of the view of the Holocaust as a universal symbol of all genocides, Ukrainian society comprehend the dangers of totalitarianism, xenophobia, in particular anti-Semitism, Roma- and Ukrainophobia, repetition of genocides, and mass terror against any ethnic, religious, social or other groups;
- take into account not only the many-sided international experience of Holocaust memorialization, but also to present the Ukrainian context and the Ukrainian vision of its history as a universal symbol of all genocides;
- help integrate the Holocaust into the Ukrainian historical memory and the history of Ukraine into the history of the world;
- help form an inclusive culture of memory in Ukraine through bringing Ukrainian society to an awareness that the history of ethnic minorities who have lived in the lands of modern Ukraine for centuries and made a significant contribution to its history and culture should become an integral part of the Ukrainian nationwide historical narrative, that is, its story of the past;
- contribute to the transformation of the Holocaust from a factor of interethnic conflicts into a factor of interethnic understanding through a mutual commemoration of victims, and the rethinking and forgiveness of historical faults;
- encourage research and teaching of the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine and various forms of commemoration of this phenomenon in accordance with international and European political resolutions, beginning with the International Holocaust Memorial Forum in Stockholm in 2000, and the corresponding resolutions of the Ukrainian authorities;
- help implement resolutions to incorporate the history of the Holocaust into curricula of institutions of secondary and tertiary education of Ukraine and thus help form the system of formal and informal education and enlightenment based on modern values that combine humanism, tolerance, respect for human rights, patriotism, and interethnic and interreligious accord.

4.6. The Philosophy of Exposition of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust

The exposition of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust must reliably and carefully address the tragic and complex events of the past, but at the same time it must not lose the main goal of the museum's mission.

The suggested name – the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust – reflects the main areas of its activities, which are (1) devoted to research and coverage of the Holocaust as a cohesive historical phenomenon of European and international scale; and (2) strive for organic integration of the history of the Holocaust into the entirety of Ukrainian history of the 20th century and thus help integrate Ukrainian history into general European and universal history.

The exposition of the Museum should:

- integrate the history of the Holocaust into the history of the world, the history of individual countries and nations while preserving its unique tone;
- reflect the uniqueness of the Holocaust as an extraordinary historical phenomenon and at the same time its universality as a symbol of all genocides;
- create a multidimensional nonlinear narrative that would organically combine various thematic and story lines related to the place of the Holocaust in different historical contexts;
- demonstrate the influence of the Holocaust on the modern world, and the real role of its memory in shaping the future of Ukraine;
- provide assessments of historical events and parties regardless of the stereotypes established by post-war political agreements and social prejudice;
- bring the history of the Holocaust closer to visitors by appealing to personal/family memory regardless of their ethnic/national background;
- abandon the strict imposition on the visitor of certain historical “roles” in the memorial model depending on their ethnic/national identity;
- develop a delicate and fair dialogue with any visitor by giving them opportunities to temporarily identify themselves conditionally with various historical actors;
- emphasize as much as possible the ethical aspect of the tragedy of the Holocaust associated with the conscious abolition of all generally accepted norms of morality;
- evaluate any political concepts, regimes, or movements first and foremost from the moral point of view;
- constantly remind visitors of the need to make responsible moral choices in difficult personal or social situations.

4.7. The General Structure of Exposition of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust

In developing the structure of the exposition of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust, one should proceed from a clear understanding that the Holocaust, just like any other complex and large-scale historical phenomenon, did not have a linear one-dimensional history to be

described in an unequivocal scheme of “causes-course-consequences.” The causes of the Holocaust are ideological, political, and ethical. Its course varied in different countries and territories. In addition, the Holocaust took place against the background of a series of directly related events and wider contexts. Finally, the results of the Holocaust are not only immediate human losses but also radical postwar ideological and political changes that have occurred, first of all, in western countries, and subsequently spread to the east of Europe, South America, etc.

Thus, the structure of the exposition, on the one hand, should take into account the purely physical architectural and planning constraints that require the development of a certain sequence of narratives, in particular, for holding guided tours; and on the other hand, it should allow the construction of several such sequences that can sometimes run in parallel and sometimes intersect. In addition, a certain super-task lies in creating points of content and physical intersection with the exposition of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum, with which, according to this Concept, the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust should form a single architectural complex.

In view of all of this, we propose the following structural solutions for the exposition of the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust.

The thematic-chronological structure of the exposition consists of three large blocks – Prehistory of the Holocaust, History of the Holocaust, and Consequences of the Holocaust. The prehistory of the Holocaust is divided into the history of ideologies and political history. The history of the Holocaust has three semantic “concentric circles” of the narrative – Persecution of the Jews by the Third Reich, The Fate of Jews outside Nazi Domination, and the Holocaust in the Context of the History of Modern Totalitarianism and Genocide. Finally, the effects of the Holocaust are the only block that will reveal ideological and political changes in the post-war world.

This thematic-chronological structure has a cross-cutting division into four national/civilizational lines – the history of the West, the history of Germany, the history of Jews, and the history of Ukraine. Such a division should ensure a consideration of the entire history of the Holocaust from different perspectives: from the perspective of the civilization within which the Holocaust ripened and happened; from the perspective of the state and people who committed the Holocaust; from the perspective of the nation who became its victim; from the perspective of a country that became one of the epicenters of the Holocaust. Given the fact that Ukraine until the end of the 20th century had no statehood of its own, its history will also be considered in the context of the history other states that Ukrainian lands were a part of at different times.

At the same time, we should emphasize that the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust should become neither a museum of the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, nor a museum of the history of Ukrainian Jews. The principal tasks are to integrate Ukrainian and Jewish

narratives into a common context of the history of the Holocaust without reducing the entire Ukrainian-Jewish history to the history of anti-Semitism.

The general cross-cutting theme that underlines the main issue related to the symbolism and contemporary significance of the Holocaust, the one that should knit together the entire exposition, will be the Holocaust and Moral Choice. This will appear in various aspects in each section, and examples of concrete fates will demonstrate the complexity of that situation and personal choices of people in times of social catastrophes. An important ethnical and memorial problem is the question of the need/unsuitability of the memorialization of executioners and criminals. On the one hand, they are clearly not worthy of memory. On the other hand, evil always had and has a name and biography. There is also as much a risk of becoming an executioner as becoming a victim of mass violence if humanity fails to prevent it in the future. Therefore, an exposition of a “dark side” might become a warning, a repentance, and a social sentence to evil.

Finally, the compositionally central theme of the exposition and the point of its intersection with the exposition of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum will be the story of the mass shootings of the Jews in Kyiv on 29–30 September 1941.

This Concept should not give detailed recommendations with regard to the concrete museum tools with which to represent the topics mentioned above. However, some general principles can be suggested.

1. Content of the exposition.

The concept of the museum offers to a large extent a new view on historical events to which it devoted. Here the main problem to solve will be a presentation of extensive and diverse materials in a manner as concise as possible in order to familiarize a visitor with the exhibit within a limited time period. This challenge can be overcome by a highly economical use of traditional means of representation with all additional information available in the virtual museum, also accessible remotely.

In view of a large number of controversial issues related to the history and memory of the Holocaust, it is obvious that neither this Concept, nor a future museum exhibition, are able to fully resolve them. In these circumstances it seems reasonable to make it clear in the exposition immediately which issues remain controversial or unresolved. It is important also to find the way to demonstrate such issues in the exposition from the contemporary point of view and then improve and adapt the content of the exposition according to changes of these views. The memorial complex might become a space for debates on such issues with the help of resources of the leading museums of the Holocaust.

The exposition should be built in such a way that it could be oriented towards people of different age, education, ethnic, religious, or national identity. Partially, it could be done through

different versions of the exposition (above all, virtual), but also through different versions of the museum guide.

2. Means of representation.

A balance should be preserved between the three traditional aspects of a museum exposition (artifact, text, and design), as well as contemporary multimedia instruments. Neither of them should dominate over others.

A wide use of such visual artifacts as documentary photo and video should not turn an exposition into a photo-exhibition. Three-dimensional objects should be given a central role. Such objects should not necessarily be unique, as it often is not possible. A typical museum piece or even an artificial copy (provided with an adequate explanation) can be equally effective in illustrating a certain event.

In order that three-dimensional objects could play their role, there should not be too many of them, so that each of them could attract a visitor's attention.

Text (written or oral) should be succinct, so that a visitor could in fact learn the entire volume of the offered information.

The design of the exhibition hall should create a coherent space, without breaking it up into separate units (showcases).

3. Ways of influence on the visitor.

It is evident that the most rewarding is an emotional influence, but overusing it, especially through an excessive use of contemporary multimedia technologies, will transform a museum visit into a difficult, if not outright traumatic, experience. Such an approach appeals not so much to one's consciousness, as to one's emotions.

On the other hand, a purely rational presentation of information, even if illustrated with some artifacts (including photos and footage), will be not only unable to reach out to a visitor's heart, but also will likely lead to a reluctance to perceive this dry martyrology of horrors.

A balance between emotional and rational influences, adherence to a psychological boundary, and a diversification of the ways of representation for different categories of visitors is a guarantee of the exposition achieving its goals. At the same time, one historical paradox should be taken into consideration and reflected in the exposition. This is the fact that the absolutely irrational and horrific mass murder of millions of people in the middle of the 20th century was rooted in fully rational arguments of scientific theory of the previous century. Meanwhile, a rational restructuring of contemporary society on the principles of tolerance and human rights was based on the extraordinarily emotional experience of an unprecedented tragedy of the

middle of the 20th century. These dialectics should be acknowledged in the structure of the museum's exposition.

PART II. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXTS OF THE MEMORIALIZATION OF

BABYN YAR

1. Historical Context

1.1. Ukraine in European History

Three main issues need to be taken into account in covering the history of Ukraine in the context of European history: the traditional separation of the study of historical processes in Ukraine from the pan-European context; the consistent thesis of the “uniqueness” and “originality” of Ukraine’s national history, on the one hand; and the counter-thesis about the “absence” of any history separate from Russia and Poland, on the other. In light of this, we propose to uncover the past of Ukraine as part and parcel of Central and Eastern European history with extremely distinct parallels to the history of the neighboring countries, while at the same time retaining its own distinct features. It would be important to present the following theses:

- from the early Middle Ages the territory of present-day Ukraine was included in all-European migration routes and the formation of states thanks to the interaction of local and alien elements, which made Ukraine’s past similar to that of dozens of other countries of Europe;
- Christianization of the Rus according to the Byzantine model and its influence on the development of culture, politics, state system, and the worldviews of elites and commoners;
- during the medieval period Kyivan Rus showcased general European trends of state-building: from feudal fragmentation to the formation of the late medieval Galicia-Volhynia kingdom;
- peculiarities of the political, economic, administrative, cultural, and religious life of Ukraine’s modern lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish and Hungarian kingdoms, the Moldavian principality, the Moscow tsardom (from the early 16th to early 17th century), the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire: European tendencies and regional differences;
- Cossacks and their special role in Ukrainian and Central-Eastern European history, representatives of various ethnic groups among the Ukrainian Cossacks;
- the multiethnic and multi-religious nature of the Ukrainian population of the early modern era, formation of a unique “urban space” (compare with the neighboring states to the west and to the east);
- formation of the modern Ukrainian nation in the 19th to early 20th centuries in the context of the shaping of modern nations in Europe (common and different in comparison with neighbors);

- the role of the Russian Empire in the formation of interethnic stereotypes and the instigation of inter-ethnic violence;
- economic and social modernization of Ukraine in the “long 19th century,” its differences from and similarities to its neighbors;
- the role of the First World War in the history of Ukraine, its influence on the political, economic, ethno-national life of the population, on the growth of violence and the brutalization of everyday life;
- the era of revolutions, Ukrainian liberation struggles in the national, social, and global dimensions (Ukrainian experience compared to neighbors);
- the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic / the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic: from war communism via indigenization to genocide and terror (survival, inter-ethnic relations, economic “revolution,” the Holodomor);
- the realities of “Versailles Europe”: the lands of today’s Ukraine outside the Bolshevik state and Ukrainian political emigration;
- Ukraine's lands during the Second World War: the division of Central and Eastern Europe between dictatorships, the experience of forced Sovietization, the frontline and Nazi occupation, the fight for the national state and the Soviet resistance movement, extermination and survival, the Holocaust and the Righteous Among the Nations, the role and place of Ukraine and Ukrainian people in the victory over Nazism, new Stalin Sovietization and its consequences;
- Ukrainian lands in the first post-war decade: global and Eastern European tendencies and peculiarities of post-war reconstruction in Ukraine (borders, population transfers, mass repressions, hunger, resistance to Sovietization, fight against “rootless cosmopolitanism,” state anti-Semitism), involvement in the Cold War and the armaments race;
- Ukraine during relative liberalization of the Soviet system, fight for the rehabilitation of victims of terror and the restoration of memory of tragedies, shaping a new cultural and intellectual space, and the emergence of new forms of non-violent resistance;
- the policy of shaping the “Soviet people,” processes of Russification among the largest ethnic groups of the non-Russian population of Ukraine; the ideological fight against “bourgeois nationalism,” “Zionism,” etc.;
- the collapse of the Soviet system in Ukraine – general trends and local peculiarities;
- main vectors of the socio-political, socio-cultural, economic, and ethno-religious life of Ukraine in recent decades: the problems of shaping a civil society, interethnic relations, overcoming interethnic prejudices, the restoration of memory of the tragedies of the 20th century, fight against the consequences of Soviet ideological experiments, the struggle for state independence.

These contexts will provide a deeper understanding of the national historical burdens, the course of the Holocaust in the territory of Nazi-occupied Ukraine, and its characteristics and similarities to the Holocaust in Central and Western Europe.

1.2. The History of Ukraine's Peoples, Interethnic and Interreligious Relations and Ethnonational Policy

The impact of the previous history of interethnic relations and national politics of the states that included Ukrainian lands upon the events of the Second World War and the Nazi occupation is perhaps the most controversial and tedious not only in scholarly but also in socio-political discourse. Moreover, this issue concerns not only the Holocaust but also the general aggravation of all ethnic conflicts and repressions on ethnic grounds. It is very important here to go beyond the history of the Holocaust, for this will make it possible to find common reasons for similar events, as well as notice differences between them.

Concerning the course of the Holocaust, these are more or less widely spread versions (some bordering on stereotypes) of the pre-existing history of national co-existence:

- coexistence of Jews and Ukrainians (Russians, Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, Crimean Tatars, etc. depending on the region) for centuries has been absolutely friendly and cloudless until the coming of Nazis with their policy of total extermination and their destruction of this idyll;
- throughout their time in Ukrainian lands, Jews were the object of zoological hatred and persecution (first and foremost, by Ukrainians) with frequent massacres and pogroms; therefore, the Holocaust became a natural extension of this anti-Semitic tradition, while the local (first of all, Ukrainian) population played an almost leading role in the implementation of the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination;
- throughout the entire history of their residence in Ukrainian lands, Jews collaborated with oppressors of the Ukrainian people (primarily Polish and Russian, but also with Austrians, Hungarians, and Romanians), and in the interwar years they became almost the leading link of the Bolshevik regime, which provoked natural hostility against them, which in different ways manifested in the behavior of the local (albeit primarily non-Ukrainian) population during the Holocaust;
- Jews and Ukrainians for centuries were objects of persecution and repressions by the ruling powers (primarily Poland and Russia) who deliberately cultivated anti-Semitic and anti-Ukrainian stereotypes, provoked pogroms, stirred hostility between the two peoples, affecting the minds of the local population and causing their cooperation with the Communists during the period of the Holodomor and other anti-Ukrainian repressions, as well as collaboration with the Nazis during the Holocaust.

All these conceptions are marked with clear one-sidedness, a tendency to absolutize the significance of one historical factor and a distinct division of actors into “good” and “bad.” Such an approach is typical of historical mythology, but at the same time absolutely unacceptable for historical analysis. Similar versions of explanations and appraisals of historical events accompany interpretations of no less complex Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Russian, Polish-Jewish, and other interethnic relations.

A correct and scholarly balanced approach to the history of such relationships in Ukrainian lands should take into account different components, such as:

- the influence of the ideological factor, in particular, the domination of the ideas of ethnic nationalism and religious exclusivity in the state, public-political, and general social life, or, on the contrary, the ideas of religious tolerance and national equality;
- the influence of the state factor, that is, the ethno-national policy of the states that Ukrainian lands were part of, in particular, the extraordinary increase of this factor during the period of domination of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Ukrainian lands;
- the influence of the social factor, that is, the lack of synchronicity in the processes of social modernization in the 19th and first third of the 20th century among peoples which lived on Ukrainian lands, as well as in different states, to which these lands belonged at the time;
- a continuous worsening of interethnic relations during revolutions and wars; the collapse of empires and emergence of new states; ideological and economic crises; and political and socioeconomic transformations during the first half of the 20th century;
- variability of strategies of group-based social, economic, and political behavior of different peoples and religious communities under conditions of state domination or, on the contrary, non-statehood;
- the degree of autonomy and closure of political organizations and movements that formally claim to represent certain ethnic communities as a whole;
- subjectivity, selectivity, and selfishness of the long-term historical memory of ethnic communities and its influence on behavior in turning historical points;
- the incorrect attribution of moral, political, or legal responsibility to an entire ethnic community for the acts of individuals, prominent figures, political and public organizations, even states.

Such a consideration of the history of interethnic and interdenominational relations in Ukrainian lands will let us create a multidimensional picture and discover the real problems while avoiding one-sided and groundless generalized allegations.

1.3. Babyn Yar in the History of Ukraine

Babyn Yar went down in the history of Ukraine first of all as the symbol of the Holocaust. The history of Babyn Yar, however, cannot only be reduced to the war period.

A significant point of reference for this place is the well-known late Paleolithic Kyrylivska camp. The princely era is represented with the history of the Kyrylivskyi Monastery and Kyrylivska Church. Due to the difficult landscape, this area remained poorly populated for a long time. Babyn Yar became part of Kyiv only in the 19th century. At that time, a multi-religious necropolis is formed around it (Kyrylivskyi and Lukianivskyi Orthodox, Lukianivskyi Jewish, Mohammedan, Karaite, and Bratske cemeteries). In the 20th century, Babyn Yar became

a well-recognizable place of memory. The Second World War, Nazi executions that lasted throughout 1941 to 1943, and subsequently the Kurenivska disaster of 1961, as well as the pressure of the Soviet totalitarian system on the historical memory of Babyn Yar, became the tragic pages of the past and of the history of crimes that made it infamous throughout the entire world.

The history of Babyn Yar reflects different aspects of the 20th century history of Ukraine and includes the following elements:

- the Jewish pogroms of 1905–1907 (burials and monument to victims were in the Jewish cemetery);
- the “Beilis Case” (Andrii Yuschinskyi, whose tragic death was used by the Russian authorities to accuse the Jews of “ritual murder,” was buried in the Lukianivskyi cemetery);
- the First World War (the Bratske cemetery was established to bury the soldiers who died in the hospitals of Kyiv);
- the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 (some of its participants are buried in the Lukianivskyi cemetery);
- The “Red” terror instigated by the Bolshevik troops headed by Mikhail Muraviev in 1918 (the victims are buried in adjacent cemeteries);
- Pogroms during the Ukrainian Revolution (in particular, those that took place in the Kurenivka area after the White Guards entered Kyiv in autumn 1919 – their victims were buried in the Jewish cemetery);
- the Holodomor (bodies of people who died of starvation were collected from the streets of Kyiv and buried in the common grave at the Bratske cemetery);
- Soviet terror (shootings and burials took place at the Lukianivskyi cemetery or in nameless graves nearby);
- the Holocaust (shooting of the Jews in Babyn Yar in 1941 is the key event that made this place infamous to the whole world);
- Nazi terror (shootings of Roma, Ukrainian nationalists, Soviet prisoners of war and underground fighters, communists, mental patients, hostages, prisoners of the Syrets camp);
- the Second World War (Soviet soldiers are buried at the Military cemetery; German prisoners of war – at a separate cemetery; victims of the Soviet bombing of Kyiv in the early hours of 11 May 1943 – at the Lukianivskyi cemetery);
- the Kurenivska catastrophe of 1961 (aftermath of the industrial washing down of Babyn Yar, the result of a purposeful destruction of the place of memory);
- the struggle for memory around Babyn Yar (Soviet official policy concerning the “Great Patriotic War” and Babyn Yar, events of state security bodies, history of dissidence, the international community and history of international relations in connection to Babyn Yar);

- the “war of memories” in independent Ukraine; the continuous redevelopment of Babyn Yar and historical cemeteries; the erection of dozens of monuments and memorial signs which commemorate different aspects of tragic events and victims; the creation of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve; construction of a number of memorial projects not supported by the state.

1.4. The Holocaust in World History

When one considers the place of the Holocaust in world history, one must realize that this history itself remains Eurocentric, or to put it more broadly – West-centric. The modern core of western civilization is comprised not only of the countries of the “old Europe,” but also states created by white settlers, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. A belonging to this civilization is determined by the imagined common history of ideas and events that stems from Greco-Roman antiquity to the Catholic-feudal Middle Ages, the Renaissance, humanism, Reformation, the Enlightenment, and up to the modern age of postmodernism.

It is within this context that reasons emerge to view the Holocaust as one of the landmark events in world history. Therefore, our attitude to the Holocaust today is one of the markers of belonging to modern western civilization. This is especially important for countries that are at the crossroads of the “old West,” particularly in the Far East, in Central and South America, and in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, as the newest developments demonstrate, a change in collective memory due to communication across the former boundary between Europe’s East and West has not been a one-directional movement from west to east. Compared to the 1990s, Western European societies have gained more knowledge about Soviet and Communist crimes. This opens possibilities not only for a comparative scholarly and legal analysis of these events, but also for an organic coexistence of Nazi and Soviet crimes in collective historic memory. However, one must realize that outside of western civilization the Holocaust has different meanings, providing groups that suffered from injustice and violence with reference points in their attempts to achieve recognition and receive indemnities from the perpetrators, even if the injustice and violence were not linked to the Second World War.

A separate issue is the place of the Holocaust in Jewish history. It is tightly interwoven with the general view of Jewish history in its interaction with the world and the modern State of Israel in its relations with the western world.

Therefore, it is worth examining several contextual threads of Holocaust history.

1. The Holocaust in the history of the West:
 - the Holocaust and the history of Christianity and Christian-Jewish relations;
 - the Holocaust in the history of creating a modern society (positivist knowledge, socioeconomic modernization, social engineering);
 - the Holocaust in the history of racial theory and political racism;

- the Holocaust as a manifestation of the crisis of the western civilization in the first half of the 20th century;
- the Holocaust and the German National Socialism as political theory and practice;
- the Holocaust in the context of the history of political nationalism of the 20th century;
- the Holocaust as a collision of traditional and modern ethics;
- the Holocaust factor in creating a modern post-modern society;
- the Holocaust factor in creating modern Christianity;
- the Holocaust as a memory of the general cultural European space.

2. The Holocaust in world history:

- the Holocaust in the history of the 20th century;
- the Holocaust in the world history of violence;
- the Holocaust in the context of the history of genocides;
- the Holocaust in the context of the history of totalitarianisms in the 20th century;
- the Holocaust in the context of mass violence in the second quarter of the 20th century;
- the Holocaust in the context of history of the Second World War;
- the Holocaust in the context of history of ethnonational policy and interethnic relations of the modern times;
- the Holocaust and the unique “experience” of the peoples of Eastern Europe in their attitude to the Jews that emerged out of the policy of their discrimination in the Russian Empire, the “Black Hundred” organizations, anti-Semitic propaganda, pogroms, etc.;
- the Holocaust in the system of globalization coordinates;
- the Holocaust factor in creating a modern world religious space;
- the Holocaust and the problem of personal choice and free will.

3. The Holocaust in Jewish history:

- the Holocaust in the history of anti-Semitism;
- the Holocaust in the context of the mystical history of relations between the Jewish people and God;
- the Holocaust in the context of Jewish political movements, ideologies, and political parties of Social-Democratic, Communist, and Zionist orientations;
- the Holocaust and the end of the East European period of the Jewish history;
- the Holocaust in the context of history of the modern State of Israel;
- the Holocaust factor in today’s Jewish world;
- the Holocaust factor in the creation of modern Judaism.

1.5. The Holocaust in Ukrainian History

In examining the phenomenon of the Holocaust in the context of Ukrainian history, one must rely on this history’s characteristics, especially in the first half of the 20th century. During this period, the Ukrainian lands were not only scattered among several states, but they also

became an arena of ideological and armed collisions between Soviet Communism, German National Socialism, Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian nationalisms, as well as a Ukrainian national liberation movement of different ideological stripes. It should be noted that during the Second World War, after the destruction of the Polish and Czechoslovak states, there was no democratic force left on Ukrainian lands that could participate in this ideological battle. A large number of Ukrainian residents of various ethnic backgrounds faced the problem of national and personal choices with especial acuteness. To this day, Ukraine has not yet overcome this history, and its aftereffects are felt not only in the “memory wars,” but also in the actual problems of reforming and developing the state, society, economy and culture. The disclosure of the history of the Holocaust in this context should be particularly well-considered and comprehensive. In view of this, we can offer this series of considerations:

- the Holocaust in the context of Nazi Eastern politics;
- the Holocaust in the context of the German-Soviet war;
- the Holocaust in the context of the history of the German occupation regime;
- the Holocaust in the context of the ethno-national policy of the allies of Germany;
- the Holocaust in the context of Nazi and Soviet genocide and mass persecutions;
- the Holocaust in the context of forced Soviet modernization, and the destruction of traditional society and its fundamental moral standards;
- the fate of the Jews in the context of the ethno-national policy of the USSR;
- the fate of the Jews in the context of the ethno-national policy of Eastern European countries in the interwar period;
- the fate of the Jews in the context of the ethno-national policy of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the first half of the 20th century;
- religious denominations in Ukraine and the Holocaust;
- the Holocaust in the context of the history of anti-Semitism, interreligious and interethnic relations in the Ukrainian lands from the early 17th to the 21st centuries;
- the conduct of the non-Jewish population during the Holocaust – the problem of personal choice under conditions of statelessness;
- the Holocaust factor in the history of the Jews in Ukraine in the second half of the 20th to the early 21st century;
- the impact of the Holocaust on Ukrainian society: losses and changes;
- the impact of the Holocaust on societies in Central and Eastern Europe: comparative analysis.

In viewing the history of the Holocaust, it is impossible to avoid moral assessments of historical events. At the same time, one should always strive to accept that:

- generalized moral assessments cannot precede an objective historical study;
- in providing assessment of human behavior during the Second World War and the Holocaust, one should abstract one’s mind from contemporary knowledge of the history to come;

- a moral assessment of actions and conduct should not be influenced by current or inherited political preferences, values, and stereotypes about one's own and other ethnic communities.

Only the removal of these subjective layers that are inherent not only to ordinary people but also to professional researchers will enable us to draw lessons from the history of the Holocaust that will truly benefit us and our descendants.

2. Memorialization Context

2.1. Means and forms of memorialization of tragic events of the past

Memorials and monuments dedicated to the tragic events of the past and honoring the memory of victims of massive violence have relatively recently become part of the cultural space and tradition. Despite the centuries-old cult of the dead in the history of most peoples and the world's largest religions, the massacres of civilian populations rarely became places of memories. Massive violence during two world wars, the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the war in Vietnam, and the rise and fall of Communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe became a certain catalyst to bring awareness of the necessity of public memorialization of innocent victims through memorials, museums, monuments, and the introduction of commemorative ceremonies and other practices.

Cemeteries were the place to honor civil victims of wars or catastrophes until the middle of the 20th century. A respect to the dead was shown through religious services, pilgrimage, or the construction of various religious buildings: chapels, churches, grave monuments. The main forms of honoring the dead in world culture were developed through the erection of monuments to soldiers, individual outstanding heroes (crowned persons, commanders, etc.), memorials on the sites of battles and mass burials, and military cemeteries. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), rank and file soldiers began to be mentioned on military memorials for the first time in European history. This was a common response that meant to provide some sense to mass death. With the rise of civic states, a political cult of the dead arose; it turned the death of a soldier into a mission of national importance. The death of a single fallen citizen had been associated with an entire nation that recalls and remembers everyone who died in the war.

But after the First World War it became evident that a traditional “monument” had significant limitations with regards to symbolic representation. During the interwar period there was a sharp awareness of the shock that humanity had just experienced, and so artists began representing the pain of losses and trauma instead of the usual glorification of the victors as the justification for war. The traditional set of artistic means was subjected to a serious criticism and revision. After the Second World War a new idea emerges – to express the “inexpressible,” with an understanding that traditional means were unsuitable for this task. As a result, the monuments changed from the heroic, self-aggrandizing icons of the late 19th century, which glorified national

ideals and triumphs, to antiheroic, often ironic, and self-critical conceptual installations emphasizing national ambiguity and the uncertainty of the world in the late 20th century.

It was the Holocaust that became the main factor of changes in the culture of commemoration and approaches to the ways and forms memorialization. The notion of “trauma” in particular, influenced a further development of the forms of memorialization of the exceptional events of the past and the very understanding of what can be considered such events. Trauma and the Holocaust are linked with the concept of a “counter-monument” (*Gegendenkmal* in German) – as an opposition to the existing grand monuments (usually created by totalitarian states or devoted to the events now deemed controversial, such as colonial conquests). In another sense, the counter-monument is a monument that does not glorify events of the past, but rather calls for recognizing the pain and sufferings caused by these events. Among the most famous examples of counter-monuments is the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, the Memorial on Jewish Square in Vienna, the Memorial of the Vietnam War Veterans in Washington DC, and the National September 11 Memorial Museum in New York. In the context of search for new forms, the concept of “places of memory” – symbolic objects with which a certain group of people associates their memories and values – gained special significance over the last decades. In a wider sense, this includes any artifacts that store information about a particular event, phenomenon, or idea. “Places of memory” can be people, objects, buildings, books, songs, etc. However, the lack of a traditional monument in the place of memory requires the presence of people who know something about these places and events. It is museums and educational institutions that play an important role in the preservation of our memory and the history of these places even fifty or one hundred years later.

Contemporary museums have also changed. Museums, memorial centers, and other institutions of historical legacy use different strategies in order to enable an understanding of the historical past. This requires an emotional interaction as much as the knowledge of historical context. Such museums are known as “sensitive museums.” An example of such museums is the human rights museum. They have two goals: to educate and to warn. They explore the examples of crimes against humanity and commemorate those who suffered. However, their main peculiarity is that they evoke compassion and empathy. Empathy is a key part of preventing injustice in the future. Among the most famous human rights museums is the Canadian human rights museum in Winnipeg, the Armenian museum-institute of genocide in Yerevan, the Memorial museum Auschwitz-Birkenau in Oświęcim, and the Anne Frank House museum in Amsterdam.

So today, the following basic forms of memorialization of tragic events of the past exist in the world:

- the preservation and conservation of authentic places (of shootings, tortures, burnt villages, territories of camps and ghettos), locations of victims' burial, preservation of buildings, barracks, fences or their elements, etc.;

- the erection of monuments at authentic places of mass murders;
- the preservation, conservation, memorialization, and marking of the place of residence of a victim (Gunter Demnig's "stumbling block");
- the placement of monuments to various categories of victims in the administrative centers of states;
- the creation of thematic museums of sensitive/emotional history ("sensitive history project") and human rights museums;
- the conducting of mourning ceremonies, educational, and other socially significant measures in places of tragedies;
- a combination of the above forms of memorialization, and the creation of memorial-educational and research centers.

Today's forms of the memorialization of traumatic events are not intended to overload or frighten people. As Susan Sontag once wrote, "under an avalanche of images of horrors and violence that have shaken us and evoke indignation, we gradually are losing ability to react. Compassion, which is overloaded without measure, grows dumb." The main language of the places of memory today is the ability to speak to people, and to create a sense of grief, emptiness, and the impossibility to recover what happened.

2.2. Babyn Yar in the System of Memorial Complexes of National Significance

The system of protection of cultural heritage in Ukraine consists of various objects of memorialization: historical memorial, historical cultural preserves, memorials, museums, monuments, and memorial signs. The overwhelming majority of historical and cultural objects of the 20th century are related to the events of the Second World War. As of 1 January 1990, out of 53,501 historical monuments, 80 percent (42,220) were monuments of the war period, including more than thirty thousand burials. More than 1,000 of these, according to very rough estimates, are related to places of execution and burial of the Jews. The Babyn Yar memorial space occupies an important place in this system for it includes various forms of presentation of the traumatic past and contains conditions for broad prospects of development.

The Ministry of Culture of Ukraine is currently in charge of 25 nature preserves with national status, in particular, the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, with some objects of the Babyn Yar memorial space in its territory. The lists includes preserves with similar themes of mass violence, such as Stara Uman State Architectural and Historical Preserve, which in addition to many other objects includes the Sukhyi Yar memorial on the site of the shooting of the Jews and the territory of the camp for Soviet prisoners of war (Uman Pit). There is also the Bykivnyanski Graves preserve. It was created on the site of the shooting of a multi-ethnic group of victims of the Stalin repressions by NKVD members in 1937–1941. The rest of the preserves in charge of the Ministry of Culture are created on the sites of architectural complexes of the past: fortresses, religious buildings, urban houses, etc. In this context, Babyn Yar acts as a unique

place of memory – the embodiment of the tragedy of the times of war, Nazi occupation, and the fight for memory of those events – that has state protection and funding.

Today, Babyn Yar is the only place of memory of the victims of the Holocaust in Ukraine with the official status of a national protected territory, while most of the memorials in other places of execution of the Jews have local monument status (for example, the Drobytskyi Yar in Kharkiv).

The Concept of a comprehensive Babyn Yar memorialization involves the creation of two museums devoted to the history of the Holocaust and the history of Babyn Yar. As of today, Ukraine has three museum establishments with a national status devoted to the events of the Second World War. These are the National Museum of History of Ukraine in the Second World War, the Lontsky Street Prison Memorial Museum in Lviv, and Marshal Konev's Height National Military Complex. None of these institutions reveals the full history of either the Holocaust or the Nazi occupation in general.

Non-governmental and municipal institutions provide examples of the representation of the Holocaust in Ukrainian museums. The largest regional museum depicting Holocaust events was created in Dnipro – the Jewish Memory and the Holocaust in Ukraine museum. In Lviv, the museum complex "Territory of Terror," located on the site of the former ghetto (1941–1943) and the Soviet transit jail (1944–1955), in 2020 opened an exposition that tells the stories of different people during the rule of totalitarian states, including those who were persecuted, their rescuers, and the abettors of crimes. There is also the Museum of Jewish Culture and History of the Holocaust in Kryvyi Rih, the Chernivtsi Museum of the History and Culture of Bukovinian Jews, and the Museum of the Holocaust in Odesa.

The Concept implies that Babyn Yar acquires national significance as a place of mass executions of various victims of the Nazi occupation regime during the Second World War. No place of memory of Nazi crimes against civilians or prisoners of war in Ukraine has such an official status. For example, the memorial to the Koryukiv tragedy, where nearly seven thousand locals were killed during an anti-partisan punitive action, has the status of a local monument.

The contemporary multi-vector monumentalization of memory in Ukraine is evidence not only of the diversity of historical views of historical events of the past – of the Second World War, in particular – but also reflects the difficult process of finding a national symbol of memory for it in our society. It is in this role that Babyn Yar and the memorial space of Kyiv as the capital of the country may serve as a format for transformation of a place of a major tragedy into a place of common historical memory of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Babyn Yar memorial complex can become part of a much wider symbolic complex to include:

- the Ukrainian Museum of the Holocaust and the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum that will primarily present the Nazi terror and its victims;
- the Bykivnianski Graves National Historical Memorial Preserve and the Memorial to the Holodomor Victims National Museum devoted to Soviet terror;
- the National Museum of History of Ukraine in the Second World War that will tell about the collisions of two totalitarian regimes;
- the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred National Memorial Complex – Museum of the Revolution of Dignity that would symbolize the modern overcoming of the totalitarian past of Ukraine.

The coordination of the activities of all these institutions by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance would mean the elevation of state policy of memory to a fundamentally new semantic, communications, and administrative-managerial level.

3. Memory Context

3.1. *National Memory*

National memory is one of the manifestations of collective memory, whose study was initiated by the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in 1925. The scholar described it as a peculiar collective and cultural phenomenon formed under the influence of family, religion, language constructs, everyday practices, as well as public and state institutions.

The field of memory studies currently generalizes and distinguishes two main approaches to collective/national memory. The first approach outlines it as a reality that is always inherent in the community. History determines what this memory is going to be. History-memory must be preserved and revived in case of oblivion. The second approach was formed by supporters of the view of national memory as a social construct, a project: it is an endless process of creating cultural meanings, aimed at shaping the future even more than at the reproduction of the past.

National memory is closely linked with such concepts as national identity and national consciousness. National memory contributes to the formation of national identity and consciousness, and they in turn are reflected in national memory. National memory is a prerequisite for the existence of a nation. It plays one of the leading roles in the process of the unification of a society, ensures its existence and functioning, as well as its ability to communicate. An awareness of a common past, its co-ownership, and the sharing of identical myths creates an empathy among members of the nation, makes it possible for the state to exist, and consolidates it for acting for the sake of the future.

All totalitarian states – from the USSR and Nazi Germany to China and North Korea, in particular during the “cultural revolution” or the rule of Kim Jong-il – carefully regulated and controlled the process of creating collective/national memory. In such cases, a counter memory arises – an alternative, opposing, or “repressed” memory. Examples of a counter memory in the

USSR were the memories of victims of the Holodomor and Babyn Yar, although each of them had its own specific characteristics. The taboo on remembering the Holodomor permeated the entirety of Soviet society: the prohibition was active even at the level of family memory, when older relatives kept silent and did not tell younger people what happened in 1932–1933 with their families, settlements, or in Ukraine as a whole. The Soviet policy of memory did not single out Jewish victims, in particular, of the Babyn Yar tragedy, during the Second World War. It was all about the “Soviet citizens,” or “peaceful Soviet citizens.” However, attempts to completely “repress” this memory failed. During the 1960s and 1980s, Jews were unofficially forbidden to gather in Babyn Yar to commemorate their dead relatives, friends, and compatriots. However, Babyn Yar continued to remain a place of memory that also became a symbol of disobedience and a manifestation of dissent.

After the proclamation of independence, a controversial process of creating national memory began and continues in Ukraine. Along with the fact that many topics of history previously banned in the USSR emerged from “underground” in order to be introduced into official representations and commemorations, a lot of negative tendencies arose as well. First and foremost, this relates to the situational and at times chaotic creation of collective/national memory, devoid of strong perception by authorities; the absence of a general concept (the so-called “national idea”); and any balanced, consistent, purposeful, and flexible policy in the field of integration/consideration of regional and ethnic characteristics (that is, targeting the Ukrainian ethnic group instead of targeting the modern Ukrainian political nation). All of these problems were particularly acute during the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, and they also become visible in the context of today’s war with Russia, which broke out in 2014.

Babyn Yar as a place of memory clearly embodies all of the above-mentioned tendencies. For a long time, authorities only mentioned it situationally (via participation in commemorative practices on anniversaries), while the main commemorative initiative came from Jewish public organizations. A powerful step in shaping the Ukrainian political nation in 2014 opens the way for a new historical narrative to frame the memory of the Babyn Yar tragedy. The situation began to change in 2016, since Russian oligarchs have been trying to “privatize” this important place in the memory of the Ukrainian national vision of the past, and this will lead to another division. In this respect, the leadership of the state must pay higher attention to this problem of a global nature and resonance and of strategic interest to the Ukrainian political nation and state building.

The state project of commemorating the memory of Babyn Yar victims is currently under control of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, under whose auspices a professional ad hoc group at the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine has developed this Concept.

Babyn Yar as a symbol of the Holocaust and a common grave of Nazi terror victims, as well as a reminder of a terrible crime and a nationwide place of memory, should become a priority vector in shaping the policy of national memory of the Ukrainian state.

3.2. The Memory of Ethnic Communities

A common historical memory is one of the main features inherent in stable communities. It is the characteristic that makes communities what they are, building a common identity and requiring individuals to be aware of their belonging to the symbols and values recognized as dominant in their community. To characterize it by its content, it is a way of preserving and transferring historical information, a set of views of the social past that exists at the group level, including cognitive, figurative, and emotional aspects. Its key elements are information about significant events and figures of the heroic and tragic past, whose activities are considered “good” for this ethnic community at different historical stages (from survival to domination over others, from the foundation of fundamental myths – to remarkable cultural achievements).

Since each person in one’s life is a member of numerous communities, one is logically a bearer of many aspects of different identities pertaining to these communities (taken together, they form a complex structure of a person’s identity). It is obvious that these identities are not equal and that in the case of each person one or another identity can dominate – whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, professional, political, or gender. Within stable societies, the content and the hierarchy of identities of most people not only remain unchanged over a lifetime, but they are also passed down within a family from one generation to another. However, in those societies which are undergoing radical ideological or socio-political transitions (including today’s Ukraine), this characteristic is not only an inter-generational rupture in self-identification but also a change of self-identification on an individual level. This often affects not only the hierarchy of identities of different types, but also the character of particular identities. Thus, yesterday’s atheists become pious Christians, the Communists – ardent Ukrainian nationalists, and the cosmopolites – the “true” Jews.

One should note that belonging to a community is defined not only by a free choice of an individual, but also by the readiness of the community to recognize this individual as its member. In order for this to happen, the individual should meet a number of criteria, which the community considers markers of belonging to it. Among such markers are external physical features, origins, religion, culture and language, or citizenship. Depending on the time and circumstances, the role of one or another marker might vary and the content of some markers might also change. One such marker is a model of historical memory.

As each person usually identifies oneself with different communities, one’s volume of historical memory is multilayered and multidirectional. It is clear that the models of memory belonging to different groups might complement each other, but also exist separately or even contradict each other. This might pose a major problem for a person, forcing him or her to decide

on one's own identities in order to avoid the situation of internal memory discomfort. A problem like this most frequently comes up in transitional societies.

In as much as the memory of a community is not a mechanical sum of individual memories, the community is able to “digest” personal memories of individuals and bring them to one or several standard models.

One of the most noticeable groups, inside of which a perception and attitudes towards events past and present are taking place, is an ethnic community. It can be treated as any other social group, and therefore, the memory of ethnic communities is characterized by the same properties as social memory in a broader sense:

- the memory of ethnic communities perceives the past irrespective of how stereotypes in it correspond to historical reality, and simplifies complex historical phenomena;
- it is not formed once and for all, but is undergoing constant transformations and replenishing;
- it is selective, and the information it stores gets updated according to modern tasks and challenges. Some “inconvenient” components of the historical past can be deliberately “forgotten” by such a memory;
- it always contains not only historical information but also their assessment and emotional coloration, and because of this, it is suitable for educational purposes, for socialization of new generations, and ultimately for the consolidation of the ethnic group;
- it combines and interacts with other dimensions of memory – first of all, individual and family, and as a result it forms specific images, views, and stereotypes;
- interest in and appeal to it is not always constant, it grows during breakthrough times of finding identity and crisis periods of loss of stability;
- in the end, it also always contains not only information about its own past, but also the experience of interaction with other ethnic communities; this experience may include examples of not only positive but also negative interactions – confrontations and conflicts.

Ukraine is home not only to Ukrainians, but also a few dozen ethnic groups – native peoples and national minorities. This means that simultaneously with many other dimensions of social memory, Ukrainian public space also contains a diversity of types of ethnic group memory, and consequently, visions and interpretations of the past. Of course, many of them may, to some extent, coincide or be similar, but some of them contain mutually exclusive components, especially when it comes to views of the offences that one community in the past caused to another.

Concerning the memory of certain ethnic communities or their representatives who perished in Babyn Yar, two things should be noted. First, under the rule of the Soviet ideology, their presence and representation in Babyn Yar memorial space had been impossible for a long

time, which led to the increased number of activities in this field of those who associated themselves with these victim groups when ideological prohibitions were lifted. Secondly, the memory of different communities can be either co-existing or contradictory and competing with each other for the exclusive interpretation of certain events of the common past. Reality shows that the latter model prevails.

Major ethnic communities whose history is tangent to Babyn Yar may have their own visions of key historical events such as the Holocaust, World War II, the Soviet era, and the Ukrainian national-liberation movement. First of all, it is natural for every ethnic community to perceive the traumatic phenomena of their group as critical and through the prism of which they tend to perceive the suffering of other groups, even if they occurred in the same space and time. For example, for the Jewish community and memory, the history of the Holocaust remains exceptional in the sense that contemporary representatives of the group tend to perceive the symbolic significance of Babyn Yar exclusively as a place of Jewish suffering and memory. At the same time, an ambivalent attitude is possible to the Soviet totalitarian heritage (due to the once embraced conviction that the USSR liberated the world from the Nazi regime that threatened the Jews with complete extermination). This is manifested in the reluctance of some in this community to recognize the “Soviet” component of Babyn Yar history as manipulative and corrupting.

In the memory of the Roma community, this model looks somewhat different. For the most part, the Roma, in honoring the memory of their community, decided to follow the example of the “Jewish” model. Convinced of the racial and ethnic grounds for their own genocide, they believe it important that in the space intended for perpetuation of memory, their presence is “similar to the Jews”.

As for representatives of the Ukrainian community, it is important for them to “win” a place to represent the voice of their memory in the space that by default and under the influence of other factors was for a long time considered “Jewish,” and therefore “alien” for them. This memory model must include figures of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement, knowledge of whom had contradicted the Soviet memory model. Therefore, the Ukrainian community remains in opposition to the latter.

The Russians also feel connected to the history of Babyn Yar, but in an indirect way, which is rather rooted in the past (but still active) Soviet myths that any population, regardless of their ethnicity, was doomed and that the occupants killed “everyone” in Babyn Yar. Besides, a significant number of prisoners of war had a Russian ethnic background (this characteristic is also present in some of the Ukrainian memory).

In this context, the process of forming a single memorial zone – the Babyn Yar Preserve – may face significant difficulties if based only on the principle of representing certain memories

of affected communities – ethnic communities in particular – which, at the level of mass notions nourished by deliberate manipulations of radical politicians, continue to make mutual claims.

Instead, the principle of representing the experience of the political nation's past should be chosen as the underlying basis for shaping a holistic memorial space. One should take into account not only the memory of ethnic communities, but also the fact that people in the past belonged to many other communities, which today define the identities of their descendants and potential visitors to the museum. It is also important to consider not only what identity the victims themselves had but also how they were seen by the perpetrators. A meaningful feature of what is happening in Ukraine is precisely the process of forming the political nation – that is, a community of equal citizens regardless of their social status, language, religion, origin, and other social and group-based differences. This comes with the emergence of one more type of identity and thus its own historical memory. Accordingly, a holistic memorial space to represent the tragic experiences of various groups that perished for a variety of reasons, but all in one place, will best suit the content of modern processes and serve as a guarantee of avoiding such tragedies in the future.

3.3. Personal and Family Memory

The notion of “personal” and “family” memory occupies a significant place in the conceptual apparatus of modern memory studies. In general, researchers contrast “personal” (or “individual”) memory (whose bearer is one person) to “collective” memory, which is then examined as a social construct and used in describing the phenomenon of memory of the past with more than one person involved. In this case, if we talk about family being the smallest social group, “family” memory is perceived as bordering on “individual” but already a socially defined category.

This memory is what makes a person – a person. Several characteristics of personal memory can be outlined: 1) it is perspective-oriented, it cannot be transferred to another, and with its help one determines one's place in the world; 2) it is connected with memories of others and therefore has a unifying force with them; 3) it is fragmented, and only the narrative helps it acquire form and structure; 4) it is ephemeral and varies throughout life.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to believe that the personal memory of an individual is not influenced by social factors such as communication, surrounding ideology, acquired knowledge, etc.

Researchers emphasize the interaction of individual and collective experience in shaping memory. They insist that some memories are based on individual experience while others are transmitted by others – our closest environment and outsiders. Memories of the most important historical events can be characterized as collages formed from many sources and subject to changes in the process of communication, retaining, however, their emotional significance. There is also a problem of “false memories,” when experience of the past incorporates

information from books, stories, etc., but all these events are reproduced in the memories of individuals brightly and colorfully, which makes true and false information in memory indistinguishable.

Events experienced at a young age have an incredibly strong emotional coloring and are able to define the future life path of a person. Meanwhile, our memory of the past does not always contain objective and factual information, and is often complemented by fictional details. As researchers point out, history and memory are two totally different things. When embraced by an individual, they get mixed up and generate unique conclusions, sometimes even contrary to the conclusions of academics if the latter contradict their personal experience (nonetheless, it is worth noting that academics themselves are not immune to the illusions of collective memory).

Personal memory closely borders on family memory in the following manner. The lifetime of personal memories is bound to the change of generations, the period of simultaneous coexistence of several generations (usually three of them). Through direct communication they form a circle of common experience, memories, and narratives. Narrations extend the radius of one's own memories. Children and grandchildren include some of the memories of older family members into their own experiences, where everything they hear and experience gets mixed. This "memory of three generations" is the horizon of personal memories that influences one's own orientation in time. It dissipates over eighty to one hundred years to give way to the memories of the next generations.

Collection and analysis of both personal and family memories, the critical analysis of these sources, and the study of the influence of historical events on carriers of these memories, are all part of a special direction of historical science – oral history

Given that nearly 80 years have passed since the crimes committed by the Nazi occupying regime in Babyn Yar, there are almost no carriers of personal memory of these events left alive. However, many of their testimonies were recorded after the war and in recent times. Meanwhile, there are still many eyewitnesses who took personal part in various processes of Babyn Yar memorialization after the war, including in the period of independence – from relatives of those who perished, to party and state functionaries or public activists and artists. As for the carriers of family memory of these phenomena, no large-scale work on collecting their testimony has ever been done (which is particularly relevant now, in view of the above mentioned "life expectancy" of personal and family memory).

Taking into account the properties of both types of memory, personal and family memories should be given the widest possible opportunity to be presented in the general memorial space of Babyn Yar because personal "first-hand" evidence has considerable emotional value and the potential for empathy. On the other hand, for decades after the war, personal and family memory of many victims and witnesses of crimes was pressurized and reformatted in line with the dominating vision of the war in the USSR, and the vision of the

composition of Babyn Yar victims. Therefore, these memories, in order to be used in the memorial space, should be presented after critical examination, taking into account all the subsequent layers and influences their carriers experienced from other types of collective memory, as well as ideology or political context.

3.4. Memory and Memorialization: Contemporary International Experience

The authors of the Concept think it necessary to follow valuable experience already accumulated in the international memorial sphere over the last few decades and reflected in the respective document. Above all this is the International Memorial Museums Charter (approved on the 10th annual assembly of International Committee for Memorial Museums in Remembrance of the Victims of Public Crimes (ICMEMO) in October 2011 (hereafter – Charter). Also, conclusions based on the developments in the realm of memorialization during the last decades are laid out in a number of analytical documents prepared for the United Nations (see, for instance, Special Report of the United Nations Human Rights Council presented on the United Nations General Assembly in January 2014). In view of the themes proposed by the Concept (in no small measure driven by the history and representation of the Holocaust), a special importance for the realization of the Concept is accorded to the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, endorsed in January 2000.

Memorial processes are a part of the question about the recognition of sufferings, which, aside from an investigation, the verification of facts, and trial, should also include a public apology and recognition of liability; victims must be recognized and honored, as described in a series of analytical documents prepared for the United Nations. In this respect, the Charter recommends to place a historical experience into a wider context without minimizing people's personal sufferings and present information about complex historical events in such a manner that they evoked empathy to victims without provoking feelings of revenge, hostility, and offense. It also calls for presenting different sides of a conflict without demonizing the perpetrators, while at the same time explain as much as possible the ideology, motives, biographies, and social mechanisms that stood behind the actions of "antiheroes."

Memorials have both private/reflective and public/educational functions. They refer us not only to the past (memories of events, the recognition and honoring of the victims), but also to the present (the elimination of trauma and differences, restoration of trust between communities) and to the future (education to prevent further violence).

It is inappropriate to use the commemoration to promote contemporary political goals by imposing definitions of "criminals" and "heroes" / "martyrs," or establishing categories of victims. It is equally inappropriate to use memorials to serve propaganda that manipulates symbolism and restores the pathos of the past when a memory of humiliation stirs hunger for revenge and is used to justify further aggression based on historical law or the right of ancestors.

The most important political issue after the conflict is over is to decide who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. Since the perpetuation of memory goes along with battles between different interpretations of the past, it is important to avoid ultimate definitions. Often, groups of victims include individuals who disagree with others, especially in those cases where groups of victims also had to kill each other. In addition, many historical sites have virtually no information about those who committed the crimes.

Problems are caused by such commemorative processes where only one group is recognized as victims, while serious crimes against other parties are silenced. In fact, the Charter places an emphasis on the importance of the coexistence of different commemorative imperatives directed at pluralistic cultures of memory and positive values as they are mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

One of the current trends is the creation of documentation centers near memorials to provide additional information or to let victims disclose their own vision of events and historical documents.

Main issues that arise when creating a memorial or a museum are: What specific goals are pursued when creating a memorial? Who is it created for? What will be the sociopolitical influence of the memorial? Who is involved in its creation, including the design? Does it reflect different interpretations of historical events?

There is an increase in the number of initiators of memorial creation and a reduction in the time period between the traumatic event and its memorialization. The system of building memorials with state support is competing with non-state local and international initiatives. Internationalization can lead to different results – from bringing or even imposing certain interpretations of historical events by influential external players to implementing initiatives that help marginalized groups preserve their history.

The most important condition for commemoration is an interaction between the authorities of the country and its civil society, first of all, with representatives of the victims. The authorities have a key role to play: they are responsible for the rational use of public space and have the ability to maintain monuments and museums, and to develop long-term national strategies, taking into account a wide range of interpretations of events. Civil society is able to mobilize various groups, provide support, and hold public debates. It is difficult to achieve mutual complementarity. However, the interaction between different participants is absolutely necessary to stimulate debate on how to present the past. It is also important for long-term reconciliation.

Memorial practice includes finding a balance between personal emotions that resurrect the memory of the past and the objective interpretation of historical events. No matter how difficult it is to combine the emotional component and the abstract analysis, it has to be done. A report on tragic events that does not carry an emotional charge is unlikely to have a significant

effect; and the risk is great to “victimize” all memory when the need to prevent further violence is ignored. To achieve such a balance we must not only pay attention to the emotional component but also base ourselves on the results of thorough historical research. Likewise, the Charter provisions a scholarly approach to representing traumatic themes in the institutions of memory and recommends that they make important decisions on the content and design of expositions, educational programs, and publications “by way of an open non-hierarchical pluralistic discussion with witnesses, scholars, educators, politicians, and the concerned social groups.”

The Special Report of the Human Rights Council, presented to the United Nations General Assembly in January 2014, encourages governments and other parties to support victims of massive human rights violations or traumatic events and their families in an effort to preserve the memory of the past. In commemoration processes victims should be given an opportunity to present their vision of events.

Governments and other parties should refrain from using commemoration for their own political ends and ensure that the commemorative policy contributes to:

- overcoming the denial of the memory of certain groups, which generates hatred, hostility, and violence;
- providing reparations of symbolic nature and public recognition of victims in such a manner that it meets the needs of all former victims and facilitates their rehabilitation;
- development of a policy of reconciliation between groups that opposed each other during conflicts through formal and public recognition of crimes committed;
- prevention policies through educational, cultural, and artistic activities in order to reduce the risk of further violence between groups that opposed each other in the past;
- rethinking national identity on the basis of a policy of pluralism that pays due attention to different communities and that recognizes crimes committed by all parties;
- encouragement of public activism, critical reflection, and stimulation of discussions devoted to the presentation of the past, as well as to solving today’s problems of social hatred and violence.

3.5. Memory Conflicts and Possible Resolution

Historical memory or memory of the past, in particular of events of the Second World War in Ukrainian territories, the crimes of two totalitarian regimes (national-socialist and communist), the Holocaust, the Holodomor, and other acts of genocide became topics of study of contemporary Ukrainian historical scholarship.

Among the many aspects of this historical memory is the “conflict of memories” or “war of memories.” In a broader sense, it is a matter of different interpretations of memory of the same historical events, even the plurality of memories, in particular of the German occupation of Ukraine, Babyn Yar, and other episodes. During the reign of Soviet totalitarianism in Ukraine,

the conflict of memories of the Second World War and the Nazi occupation regime ran between official or state policy of memory and personal/family memories. In the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the post-communist regime followed a tight policy of memory of the “Great Patriotic War.” The authorities clearly outlined the form and the content of such memory, determining what and how society ought to remember about the war. For example, “the prominent role of the party in defeating the enemy,” “the heroic role of the Red Army, the communist underground and dedicated work in the rear” (again, “under the leadership of the party”) were the main components of such a totally controlled memory. The Soviet memory model had no room for entire groups of population who survived/did not survive the war and the occupation. In fact, the fate of prisoners of war, forced laborers, Jews, Roma, the Ukrainian nationalist underground, and others were forbidden to even be mentioned. The carriers of these segments of memory, prohibited by the Soviet regime, kept (often in secret) their individual (personal) memories or family memories that were significantly different from the memory model proposed by the state. Obviously, these memory models were in antagonism. For example, concerning the history of Babyn Yar, the Soviet authorities forbade, in particular, any mention of Jewish victims and prohibited the formation of a memorial space around the mass burial sites on this territory.

After the proclamation of independence of Ukraine, the focus of the conflict of memories shifted. The antagonistic asymmetry between the state memory policy and personal/family memory gradually ceased to exist, in particular concerning the events and victims of the Second World War on the territory of Ukraine. Research and commemoration of various victims of National Socialism (prisoners of war, forced laborers), and of the Holocaust and Roma genocides were launched, as was the study of the complicated and ambiguous history of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement during the war. Meanwhile, the process of the creation of commemorative practices to honor the memory of the victims of Nazism was initiated. At the same time, a new conflict of memories sprouted in independent Ukraine: every community or group considers the memory of “its” victims more important, its own pain comes to the fore. Such a conflict of memories is clearly demonstrated by the situation concerning the commemoration and honoring of the memory of Babyn Yar victims. Obviously, this kind of “competition” of memories is hampering the creation of a holistic memorial space here today.

The main problems that determined the current state of Babyn Yar as a historical place are related to the attitudes of different parties involved in the process of its memorization.

On behalf of the state and a larger part of civil society, these are:

- the lack of a sense of one’s own historical responsibility for the memory of Babyn Yar as a symbolic space of memory at the all-Ukrainian level and worldwide;
- the lack of an integral approach to commemoration and arrangement of the memorial space;
- viewing Babyn Yar as a place of exclusive tragedy of ethnic minorities, first of all, of the Jews;

- attempts of marginal political groups to deny the Babyn Yar tragedy, first of all, its Jewish component.

On the behalf of the Jewish community, these include:

- striving for exclusive memory of the tragedy of Babyn Yar as a response to the Soviet policy of silencing the Jewish tragedy;
- cultivation of the memory of Babyn Yar and Holocaust, first of all, through imposing guilt upon other nations, among them Ukrainians, as a way of preventing anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism;
- striving for symbolic privatization of this memorial space through building large-scale community structures as a way of demonstrating historical triumph over Nazism and anti-Semitism.

On behalf of larger parts of other communities, first of all, Ukrainians, the Roma, Kyivites, and Orthodox Christians, these are:

- striving to separate exclusive memories of their own tragedies during the war in the context of memory competition.

On behalf of all the parties concerned, these reflect:

- the absence of an internal need to create an inclusive model of a common memory, even while sincerely willing to honor the memory of the “alien” tragedies;
- a total failure to realize the absolute moral inadmissibility of any construction work in the territory where shootings and burials took place.

One of the most difficult and most sensitive modern conflicts of memories in the context of not only Babyn Yar but also of the formation of adequate historical memory of the history of the Second World War in Ukrainian territory is manifested through the conflict between the commemoration of the victims of the Holocaust and Ukrainian nationalists. In Soviet times, both these segments of memory were tabooed by the state. In sovereign Ukraine, the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and representatives of the Ukrainian nationalist movement is honored. However, there is latent as well as an open conflict of memories associated with the complicity of individual representatives of the radical wing of the national-liberation movement, namely the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, in the crimes of the National Socialists against the Jews.

In the case of the conflict of memory (or competition of memories) it is worth taking into account the concepts of British political scientist Rogers Brubaker concerning the “nationalizing state” and his thesis about “nationalism reframed.” Ukraine can be viewed through the prism of his concepts as a country whose ethnonational politics are not fully formed yet and whose model of remembering/forgetting contains elements of the nationalizing memory.

There is obviously a need for an open historical discussion on this topic to result in reconciliation with the difficult past and the search for consensus, as well as formation of a common memory (in particular and first of all, in the memorial territories of Babyn Yar). The only instrument of overcoming the conflicts of memory is the proposal of a somewhat constructed model of memory, which is the subject of the Concept. Otherwise, Babyn Yar will continue to be a site of experiments and mnemonic battles of particular groups.

4. Social Context

4.1. The Ukrainian Political Nation

Among the inherent features of Ukrainian political nation-building was a rapid, at times discrete, character of this process related to the long period of statelessness, the rule of the Soviet totalitarian regime, and finally the emergence of independent Ukraine. Ukraine is a multiethnic state. At the same time, the number of ethnic Ukrainians has been on the increase since 1991. According to the census of 1989 Ukrainians comprised 72 percent of inhabitants, in 2001 their share grew to 78 percent, while based on the most recent opinion polls ethnic Ukrainians made up 83 percent in 2013 and 89 percent in 2016. Meanwhile, the proportion of Russians has continuously decreased from 22 percent in 1989 to 17 percent in 2001, to 11 percent in 2013 and 6 percent in 2016 (although the last opinion poll was not conducted in Donbas and Crimea). It should be noted that today 95 percent of citizens profess a political rather than ethnic self-identification.

These processes had the following manifestations:

- the Ukrainian revival of the 19th century was replaced by a brief period of political stratification of society and the formation of the first political parties in Ukrainian territories (Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, etc.); it lasted until the revolutionary outbreak of 1917;
- rise of state formations (the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian State, the West Ukrainian People's Republic), which at its time became the highest point of the battle against Russian imperial domination;
- physical, cultural, intellectual suppression and destruction of non-Russian ethnic groups in Ukrainian territories under the USSR (a short experiment with “korenizatsiia” (indigenization), “Ukrainianization,” and the creation of national districts ended in mass repressions);
- a humanitarian crisis caused by the Kremlin policy, which assumed the form of the Holodomor (genocide);
- the creation of a quasi-state formation fully integrated into the Soviet (Bolshevik) state structure – the USSR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) where the “state” attributes were of a purely declarative theatrical nature completely deprived of autonomy and subordinated to the center (Moscow);

- the Great Terror as a total preventive “purge” of the society, during which a significant and most active part of various ethnic groups (scientists, artists, production managers, administrators, military officers, etc.) perished;
- the rise of the fight for Ukrainian statehood during the Second World War and for more than a decade following it (the creation of Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1939, proclamation of the Ukrainian State in June 1941), accompanied by emergence of national-liberation armed units (the Carpathian Sich, the Polissian Sich, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), self-defense detachments, etc.);
- the Kremlin’s assimilation policy, the Russification of the cultural, linguistic, and mental space, attempts to form a “new historical community – the Soviet people”;
- a policy of militant atheism, a systemic persecution of national churches and other denominations in Ukraine (among them the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church); persecution and murder of priests; an institutional split within Orthodoxy instigated by security forces; confiscation of church property; closing down churches and monasteries of all denominations, which caused the formation of a mono-confessional space and the dominant status of a single church recognized by the Kremlin – Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the exclusion of religious experience, worldview, ethics, and morals from the everyday spiritual practices;
- the dissident movement, which was the embodiment of an orientation towards universal values and human rights;
- the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of a sovereign Ukrainian state and a multi-party system, the strengthening of democratic tendencies, enshrinement in the Constitution of the orientation towards Europe and of the rights and freedoms of citizens, attempts by pro-Russian political technologists to divide the Ukrainian population, and later – consolidation in the face of the Russian Federation aggression against Ukraine.

The projection of phenomena of the Holocaust and Roma genocide along with the broad context of the Second World War on the process of formation of a united Ukrainian political nation gives grounds for the following statements:

- consistent efforts of the Russian Federation leadership to retain control over the post-Soviet states manifested themselves in political technologies aimed at splintering Ukraine on regional, linguistic, religious, cultural, and ethnic grounds. Particularly intensifying during election campaigns, these efforts contributed to a split in Ukrainian society, which gave grounds for asserting that the hope for the formation of a fully-fledged political nation and Ukrainian state is slim;
- the building of a political Ukrainian nation takes place around the “titular ethnic group” (“ethnic core”), which is the Ukrainians. Other ethnic groups are consolidated in the orbit of this core into a civilian community – a political nation. In this manner, the ethnic and civil components are to be harmonized;

- in the context of constructing a model of historical memory of the modern Ukrainian political nation, this process from the very beginning was dominated by markers related to the restoration of historical justice primarily in relation to the titular nation, while the trials that befell other ethnic groups (Jews, Roma, Crimean Tatars, Poles, etc.), were brought up with considerable difficulties and delay;
- the Soviet tradition of silencing the Holocaust evolved into a kind of hierarchy of victimhood, in which the Shoah failed to find its proper place, and considerate understanding of this problem was hampered by what could be called the “rivalry of ethnic and national tragedies”;
- the social and scholarly memorialization of the Holocaust has not acquired a systemic character, which can be illustrated by the absence of the Babyn Yar National Preserve and museums of Babyn Yar and the Holocaust;
- it must be acknowledged that the political establishment and the state lack awareness even in the third decade of Ukraine's independence of the fact that the perpetuation of the memory of victims of the Nazi “final solution to the Jewish question” policy and practice should become one of the components of the state's commemoration policy, rather than a zone for sporadic or populist projects, or the initiatives of Jewish or other public associations;
- the existence of a developed civil society and political nation in Ukraine shall be evidenced by the consolidated proactive participation – motivated by civilizational and humanistic factors – of representatives of various social strata in all activities in this area.

Therefore, the responsibility of state organs for historical memory and the memorialization of Babyn Yar and other tragic pages of history should be emphasized. This does not mean that the narrative should be formed once and for ever, but rather that the state should take upon itself the mission of safeguarding mnemonic measures and their comprehensive realization.

A balanced, systemic, and scholarly commemorative politics of the Ukrainian state in the realm of historical tragedies will facilitate the building of a Ukrainian political nation and the unity of a multinational society. A dignified commemoration of the victims of totalitarian regimes corresponds with the long-term interests of the Ukrainian political nation and state.

4.2. The Peoples of Ukraine and Ethnonational Politics

When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, a series of normative and legal acts were implemented to regulating ethnic politics and various aspects of relations between ethnonational communities.

For instance, The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (July 1990) proclaimed that the state “guarantees to all nationalities living in the territory of the Republic the right to free national and cultural development.”

The Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine (November 1991) stated that representatives of more than 100 nationalities living in the territory of the country are “guaranteed equal political, economic, social and cultural rights: the right to free use of native languages in all spheres of social life including education, production, acquisition, and distribution of information; the right to profess their religion, to use national symbols, to celebrate national holidays, to participate in traditional ceremonies of their peoples; the right to create cultural centers, societies, communities, and associations that can take measures aimed at the development of their national culture, to hold mass events in the manner prescribed by law, to promote creation of national newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, museums, art groups, theaters, film studios.”

The Constitution of Ukraine, Article 11, proclaims that the state “shall promote consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, as well as development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.”

However, some of the principles of ethnic politics formulated in the 1990s have not been reflected in subsequent legal acts (in particular, the Concept of state ethnonational politics), while other principles have become outdated and do not fit with new realities. The necessity of overcoming post-Communist and postcolonial vestiges in Ukraine makes it more urgent to build on main uniting and identifying factors – a common history, language, and culture.

The long-term processes of the deliberate deprivation of Ukraine of its subjectivity in international relations and world history, the marginalization of the Ukrainian language, and cultural assimilation have led to a situation in which it is not only national minorities but also an ethnic majority – the Ukrainians – that need protection and favorable conditions for a harmonious development. The situation discussed above makes the relationship between an ethnic majority and ethnic minorities in today’s Ukraine considerably more complicated, even atypical, compared to the majority of European states. Therefore, ethnic politics in Ukraine should take into account these peculiarities.

The ethnonational life in Ukraine in the context of this problem is characterized by the following features:

- the lengthy period of russification of Ukraine resulted in numerous post-imperial manifestations, such as the domination of the Russian language in the media, cultural and artistic space, and everyday communication. The extension of the post-imperial model over Ukraine is evidenced by attempts at codifying the status of Russian as the second national language and all kinds of resistance to the introduction of the Ukrainian language in Donbass, the Crimea, and in the southern region;
- religion remains one of the most effective means of keeping Ukrainian citizens in the orbit of Russian influences. Speculations around canonical issues were aimed at

discrediting Ukrainian denominations. Currently, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) consistently support the project of the “Russian world,” which has become the ideological weapon of the aggressive attitude of Moscow towards Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) professes the line of the Russian Orthodox Church in its attitude to the local Orthodox Church of Ukraine;

- there are concurrently radical changes in relations between big Orthodox denominations. The granting of a *tomos* of autocephaly (self-government) by the Universal Patriarch Bartholomew in Constantinople to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and its subsequent recognition by other Orthodox churches demonstrates a noted diminishing of external influences on the religious life in Ukraine. Religion has ceased to be an instrument of political and socioeconomic destabilization of Ukraine and a factor igniting conflicts between different nationalities. All religious organizations of Ukraine, regardless of their confessional loyalty, including their clergy and believers, should become the conduits of the ideas of peace, understanding, and unity between peoples and facilitate the memorialization of the tragic events of a common history;
- external forces do not abandon their attempts at undermining the credibility of Ukrainian democratic policies in the ethnonational, cultural, linguistic, and educational spheres in the eyes of the global community. Such instigations are intended to deprive Ukraine of the sovereign right to resolve issues related to its state security and national interests, especially in the southeastern and southwestern regions of Ukraine where the issues of interethnic relations are artificially inflated and separatist sentiments are fomented;
- the armed aggression of Russian Federation against Ukraine, the hybrid methods of war, including provocations in the realm of interethnic relations; massive human rights violations (specifically based on ethnic identity) on the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts;
- despite the existing legal basis for healthy development of all ethnic groups, the confrontation of various political forces – some of which followed the scenarios mapped out in other countries – resulted in the failure to pass the points of no return in the process of societal consolidation, which fact was used for destructive external influences;
- there is no consensus in society on how to implement commemoration projects concerning national and ethnic tragedies;
- separate political and oligarchic groups, public leaders, and organizations stage competitions in the field of collective historical memory, resorting to misleading formulations, provocative statements, and initiatives;
- the Jewish civil movement itself has not reached a consolidated position on the forms and means of the memorialization of the Holocaust;
- while in the educational and museum spheres the issue of the Holocaust and Roma genocide sounds like a civilizational and humanitarian problem and generally reflects the state approach to the commemoration policy in this segment, the multicultural space lacks reflection and articulation of the proper content, quality and depth.

In the complex situation of today's Ukraine, the government must find the balanced principles of ethnic politics and consistently implement them. The government should prioritize the following tasks and directions:

- create conditions for equal and harmonious relations between the representatives of the Ukrainian ethnic nation, indigenous peoples, and national minorities residing in Ukraine;
- form a climate of interethnic unity and tolerance, preventing racial, national, and religious hatred;
- improve the legal basis required to regulate ethnonational relations and facilitate the unity of Ukrainian society, taking into account international legislation and contemporary practice;
- create conditions for an active and efficient participation of all ethnic communities in developing and realizing state policies aimed at the development of culture of the Ukrainian political nation, ethnic Ukrainians, indigenous peoples, and national minorities;
- take measures to develop the historical consciousness, traditions, ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity of ethnic Ukrainians, indigenous peoples, and national minorities;
- facilitate the formation of a common historical memory of the Ukrainian political nation on the basis of respect for the historical memory of the Ukrainian ethnic nation, indigenous peoples, and national minorities;
- satisfy the cultural and religious needs of Ukrainians and citizens of Ukraine of other nationalities abroad, engaging their civil groups in the initiatives that will promote Ukraine's international image;
- promote the coverage in mass media of a history of Ukraine and its nation-building, and the development of national relations. The rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine to their history, culture, and traditions should also be emphasized.

4.3. Mending Interethnic Relations

Historical memory and interethnic relations are always in the process of a complex interaction and mutual influence:

- on the one hand, a positive or negative image of a neighboring nation or state, which for some reason has been engraved in historical memory, promotes or, accordingly, prevents building fruitful interethnic relations in the present;
- on the other hand, today's desire for interaction or conflict between peoples or states positively or, accordingly, adversely affects changes in the memory of the history of interethnic relations;
- finally, the process of overcoming, or vice versa, cultivating historical grudges and conflicts in the field of historical memory can become one of the most influential factors in the formation of modern relations between neighboring peoples or states.

The peculiar feature of the historical memory conflicts surrounding Babyn Yar is that they resonate far beyond Ukraine. One should realize that although the actual agents in the process of memorialization are state institutions and NGOs, they reflect the dominant positions of entire communities. Understandably, this is above all the Jewish community, for which Babyn Yar is one of the main symbols of the Holocaust. By contrast, the Ukrainians are much less concerned with this issue, as their memory of the war is still in the making. The activities of other groups – the Roma, the Orthodox, the Kyivites – are limited to local commemorations of victims belonging to their own communities. This presents a challenge, but at the same time an opportunity for a breakthrough in the global repair of Ukrainian-Jewish relationships and a radical change in the negative paradigms of historical memory. However, this requires the overcoming of negative attitudes of the different parties involved, which show no desire for unity and generally do not even coordinate their actions.

From the Ukrainian side these are:

- the state that in the person of its supreme leaders only in recent years has come to realize the need for an active independent commemoration policy in matters related to the tragedies of other peoples living within the territory of Ukraine;
- the city of Kyiv, represented by its leaders, who in recent years have also been active in the issues of Babyn Yar memorialization, but prefer to uncritically support the initiatives of international Jewish organizations in these matters;
- Ukrainian and foreign nationalist organizations that cultivate a heroic paradigm of the memory of the Second World War and seek only to memorialize those Babyn Yar victims that represented the Ukrainian nationalist movement;
- international and Ukrainian liberal non-governmental organizations that prefer to support Jewish initiatives in the issues of honoring the Holocaust victims, including those of Babyn Yar.

From the Jewish side these are:

- the State of Israel, which avoids direct interference in the dispute over the Babyn Yar memorialization, but generally adheres to the exclusive victim paradigm of commemoration, which includes allegations of involvement in the Nazi crimes of all European peoples in whose lands the Holocaust took place;
- foreign (first of all, American) and international secular Jewish organizations, which predominantly follow the radical anti-Ukrainian paradigm of the Holocaust commemoration;
- foreign and international religious Jewish organizations, which are primarily concerned with the preservation of Jewish cemeteries and mass graves, including those in Babyn Yar and around it;
- Ukrainian Jewish organizations, among which there is a recent trend to seek middle ground on issues of historical memory of the Holocaust.

A separate problem is the Ukrainian-Roma and Jewish-Roma relations in issues of historical memory. Here, the main problems include:

- the negative attitude of Ukrainian society towards Roma community;
- the inactivity of the Ukrainian state and civil society in matters of Roma historical memory;
- the craving of the Jewish community for exclusivity in the issues of Nazi genocide victims;
- the closed nature of the Roma community and its unwillingness to cooperate, in particular, in matters of historical memory.

The situation described is complicated, but not hopeless. The solution to these problems lies in developing a holistic state ethno-national policy, which among other things would take into account the issue of historical memory. Such an ethnic policy shall be aimed at building an inclusive society where Ukrainian culture and historical memory would prevail but still leave a wide space for the development of culture and historical memory of ethnic minorities. At the same time, the state shall focus attention on the integration and harmonization of the historical memory of the Ukrainian people and that of ethnic minorities, first and foremost, with regard to the complex, conflictual, and controversial pages of our common history. Civic organizations acting on behalf of ethnic minorities or civil society in general and seeking interethnic understanding, reconciliation, and cooperation shall become a natural partner of the state in this process. It is such civic organizations that should become the connecting link between Ukraine, foreign civic organizations, and other states.

4.4. Current Civic and State Activity

Despite the fact that, unlike in the Soviet era, Babyn Yar seems to have been recognized as a memorial site in independent Ukraine, the current state, communal and civic activities in the memorial space are absolutely chaotic and, to a large extent, inappropriate. This is also explained by the fact that the status of adjoining cemeteries remains uncertain and they are viewed primarily as promising urban development sites. The following types of activity can be observed:

- commercial development (completed projects: Dorohozhychi metro station, second phase of the Kyiv Oblast State Archives complex project, Herzen Park residential complex; uncompleted projects: residential complex in Olena Teliha Street, Babyn Yar Hotel construction project, and Avanhard Sports Complex reconstruction project);
- community and memorial development projects (Heritage Jewish Community and Cultural Center, projects of the museum and memorial complexes initiated by the Babyn Yar Memorial Fund and the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center Charity Fund);
- state museum projects (Larysa Skoryk's Babyn Yar Museum construction project, the Babyn Yar Victims Memorial Museum – part of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve – in the former Jewish Cemetery administration building);

- uncoordinated (chaotic) installation of numerous monuments;
- projects of comprehensive or partial organization of the memorial space (the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve territory organization plan, the Babyn Yar Memorial Park project, the projects for creation of the Alley of the Righteous, the Alley of the Martyrs, the Alley of Sorrow);
- state and community ceremonies to commemorate the Babyn Yar victims, which take place on different commemorative dates and at different locations (state – near the monument to the Soviet prisoners of war and civilians, Jewish community – near the Menorah, Ukrainian nationalists – near the Cross to the executed members of the OUN, Roma community – near the memorial plaque to the victims of the Roma genocide, and in the last three years – near the Romani Caravan, etc.).

Some of the most odious projects (the Heritage Jewish Community and Cultural Center, the residential complex in Olena Teliha Street, the Babyn Yar Hotel) have been stopped due to public protests. Others, however, have been implemented, and more are in the active planning stage (reconstruction of the Avanhard Sports Complex, the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center).

This totally disorderly and chaotic activity is the result of the lack of a conceptual approach on the part of the state and society to create a single national memorial space in this territory. Only when the efforts of the state and society to commemorate the victims of Babyn Yar become systematic and responsible, will there appear the prospect for creating a true Memorial Complex. In the long run, civic and state activity in the Babyn Yar memorial space shall depend on qualified and professional efforts to create awareness about this phenomenon among the political class and society. Therefore, educational activity shall become one of the main and most promising components of future activities of the Memorial Complex. This will greatly depend on the efforts of educators, school and university teachers, as well as the efforts of non-governmental research and educational organizations working in the field of non-formal education on issues pertaining to studying and teaching the history of the Second World War in Ukraine. For the management and staff of the Memorial Complex, these groups shall be among the main audiences of the activities of the museums and the Memorial in general. It is also important to organize continuous tour work and to train college and high school students as guides in the museums and the Memorial Park. This is also contingent upon the cooperation of the Memorial Complex with specialized research and educational institutions.

Such cooperation will create conditions for continuous organized and coordinated state and public activities within the memorial space. At the same time, these activities shall not concentrate solely on commemorating the dates of executions and official remembrance days, but shall be conducted on a permanent basis. In addition to the official days of remembrance of the various groups of Babyn Yar victims, other important dates shall be marked in the modern Ukrainian historical and socio-political calendar that are relevant to the history and memory of Babyn Yar and the Holocaust. Among these can be the Human Rights Days, the Days of

Tolerance, the Day of Liberation of Prisoners of Concentration Camps, etc. Such a calendar should also include the dates associated with the struggle for the commemoration of Babyn Yar victims during the postwar period.

4.5. Social Solidarity and Cooperation

One of the key problems that hinders any comprehensive Babyn Yar memorialization projects is the lack of trust, mutual respect, experience, and desire for real cooperation between government institutions, civic organizations, academic circles, and the business world.

Despite the established view of civic organizations and civic society as a whole as the ones to offer solid advantages and act as the only driving force for progressive transformations, the real history of the Babyn Yar memorialization demonstrates an entire range of disadvantages inherent in this group. It cannot be denied that the civic organizations of ethnic communities (Jewish, Ukrainian, Roma) have always been and remain the main interested parties in all of the memorial initiatives. At the same time, they repeatedly demonstrate significant negative qualities that paradoxically become an obstacle to the very memorization they aim for. Among these are:

- ethnic selfishness (the memorial shall be created only for “us”);
- subjectivism (the memorial shall reflect only “our” vision);
- lack of tolerance, distrust (the memorial shall be created only by “us”)
- lack of consensus, disunity (competition between organizations and individual activists even within each ethnic group).

It is necessary to understand that these drawbacks are inherent not only to civic organizations, but also to ethnic communities as such, and on a broader scale reflect the state of the Ukrainian society. The consequences of this approach are:

- a radical narrowing of the potential target groups of the memorial with a tendency towards their complete disappearance;
- an alienation between different ethnic communities with a tendency to increased confrontation between them;
- the struggle for domination between different ethnic groups and public organizations with a tendency to monopolize the right to the memorial space;
- lack of cooperation between different ethnic groups and public organizations with a tendency to grow into an open battle – “memory wars”.

The solution to this situation lies in the development of a fundamentally new model of cooperation that will become a constructive platform for solving controversial and conflictual problems of national memory and of the country's development in general. The main feature of this model is the professional allocation of functions and organized cooperation at each stage of the project implementation:

- the state in the person of its top leadership shall become the patron of the entire process and assume the functions of the organizer and the arbitrator;
- civic organizations, primarily those acting on behalf of various groups of Babyn Yar victims, shall remain the initiators of memorialization processes and provide public monitoring and discussion of the projects by civic interest groups;
- academic and museum institutions shall provide professional development and testing of the concepts of all memorial projects, cooperation with foreign specialists, and continuous participation in and control over the process of the implementation of projects approved;
- the responsible state structures at the government and municipal levels shall provide for the implementation of memorialization projects by allocating land plots, establishing state museums and other memorial objects, and regularly financing their activities;
- the business environment, charity foundations, and individual sponsors shall financially support the creation and further operation of museums and memorial objects on partnership terms with the state;
- at each stage of the process, participation of foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, research institutions, and charity foundations shall be welcomed, subject to their adoption of the abovementioned game rules;
- mandatory acknowledgement that the modern narrative of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar tragedies shall be based solely on the principles of academic knowledge and historicism, and renounce any political or opportunistic interpretations that simplify the problem and create another myth that is far from historical realities.

The proposed model will help eliminate competition in favor of cooperation, provide a professional and responsible level of jointly adopted decisions, and enlist the Ukrainian state as a real stakeholder in the process of the memorialization of Babyn Yar.

5. Civilizational Context

5.1. The History of Ukraine

Ukraine throughout most of its history was deprived of an independent political existence. However, the problem is not limited to this factor, as even during periods of independence and prosperity in the Middle Ages, Ukraine remained in a zone of clashing civilizations. Thus, the matter was not just in the political domination over Ukrainian lands by certain states, but in radically different responses to the fundamental questions of human existence: God and man, state and freedom, justice and responsibility, life and property. A brief synopsis of this inter-civilizational story looks like this:

1. Religious civilizations:
 - by the end of the 10th century – paganism (Kyivan Rus) – Orthodoxy (Byzantium) - Judaism (Khazaria);

- from the end of the 10th to the middle of the 13th century – Orthodoxy (Kyivan Rus, Byzantium) – paganism (Pechenegs, Polovtsi, etc.);
- from the middle of the 13th to the beginning of the 14th century – paganism (Mongols) – Orthodoxy (Rus principalities, Byzantium) – Catholicism (Crusaders, Poland, Lithuania);
- from the beginning of the 14th to the end of the 15th century – Catholicism (Lithuania, Poland, Austria) – Islam (the Golden Horde, Crimea, Turkey) – Orthodoxy (Rus principalities, Byzantium);
- from the end of the 15th to the end of the 18th century – Catholicism (Poland, Austria) – Islam (Turkey, Crimea) – Orthodoxy (Muscovy/Russia);
- from the end of the 18th to the beginning of the 20th century – Orthodoxy (Russia) – Catholicism (Austro-Hungary, Kingdom of Poland) / Union of Brest (Western Ukraine).

2. Post-Christian civilizations:

- from the middle of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century – Pan-Slavism (Russia) – liberation nationalism (Eastern Europe);
- first half of the 20th century – Communism (the USSR) – Nazism (the Third Reich);
- authoritarian or democratic chauvinistic nationalism (Eastern Europe);
- second half of the 20th century – socialism (the USSR) – liberalism (Western world).

In the context of the history of the Second World War, the Holocaust, and Babyn Yar, it is noteworthy that Ukraine almost throughout the entire 20th century was not only outside the boundaries but also outside any direct contact with liberal civilization. Instead, in the middle of the 20th century, she turned into the “bloodlands” – a territory that witnessed the collision of two of the most powerful totalitarian regimes of modern times, who tested their most terrible methods of mass extermination of entire peoples and social groups here.

The period of independence did not only fail to relieve Ukraine of the problem of civilizational choice but aggravated it. Ukrainians after all turned into a subject of a historical process and now they have to make this choice themselves. This is particularly difficult after centuries of unstable existence that taught Ukrainians to passively embrace and adjust to externally imposed paradigms of civilization. Today, the civilizational confrontation that continues in Ukrainian territory between Russia and the West is characterized by the opposition of these values:

- the “Russian world,” “the Third Rome,” tsarist-Soviet nostalgia (Russia) – left liberal democracy, multiculturalism, the Islamic threat (West);
- the last empire of Europe (Russia) – globalization and unification of independent states (European Union);
- authoritarianism (Russia) – democracy (West);
- paternalism (Russia) – personal responsibility (West);
- external aggression (Russia) – foreign political pragmatism (West).

As is the case throughout the entire contemporary world, Ukraine is currently choosing between two civilizations that are in a state of dynamic change based on a conflict between supranational and national ideas. The difference lies in the fact that, in accordance with its fundamental values, Russia responds to the collapse of the empire and the crisis of the imperial idea with increased external aggression and internal political repression, while Europe responds to the crisis of a united left-liberal project with increased centrifugal, nationalist, and populist forces.

5.2. History and Historical Memory

Today, national historical memory and history of the mid-20th century in Ukraine are equally defined both by ideologies and living experience – personal and that of groups. At the same time, for objective reasons, with the change of generations, the factor of personal and, to a certain extent, collective experience shifts into the background, which makes it possible to construct historical memory and history writing more independently, according to certain ideological models. Such models of memory and history writing are closely related to the basic civilizational models that have been fighting for domination in the Ukrainian lands since the first half of the 20th century. So today, we are dealing with three traditional “classical” and three derivative combined models that have already been formed in independent Ukraine.

Traditional models of historical memory and history writing in Ukraine:

- Soviet – historically the most widespread, created and officially legitimized in the USSR. The central events it was formed around are the “Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917,” the “Great Patriotic War” and the “Great Victory” in it, and, more broadly, the “victory of socialism” in the USSR.
- Ukrainian nationalistic – formed in the Ukrainian emigration with a dominating narrative featuring the OUN leader Stepan Bandera. The central event is the UPA's national-liberation struggle against the “communist, Nazi, and Polish invaders,” more broadly – the entire history of the struggle for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state in the 20th century, as well as the Holodomor as the most vivid embodiment of communist terror against Ukrainians.
- Liberal – historically the least widespread, initiated among the Soviet dissident intelligentsia. Its central events are the “Great Terror” as the personification of Stalin repressions as well as the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Khrushchev “thaw,” the Sixties and the dissident movement.

Although these models of historical memory and history writing are still widespread, new synthetic models are gradually emerging in an independent Ukraine:

- Soviet-liberal – based on compassion for the communist idea, a recognition of the Red Army's liberation mission, along with the condemnation of the Holodomor and Stalinist repressions, as well as commemoration of victims of terror among ethnic minorities,

including the Holocaust, the deportation of Crimean Tatars, the Volhynian tragedy, and the genocide of the Roma.

- Soviet-national – prefers to adapt the classical Soviet model to new political realities, in particular, it considers Ukraine a full participant and winner in the Second World War; views the “Ukrainian” fronts of the Red Army as the Ukrainian army, and clarifies the role of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic in the creation of the United Nations.
- Liberal-national – emphasizes the unceasing tradition of the Ukrainian people’s fight for the establishment of an independent democratic state (from the Ukrainian People’s Republic to Soviet dissidents) in the 20th century, considers the OUN and UPA bearers of the democratic liberation idea and fighters for the liberation of all the enslaved peoples of the USSR. This model can be viewed as the continuation of the national-statist school of Ukrainian historiography personified by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and Viacheslav Lypynskyi.

At the same time, certain ethnic communities have their own models of memory and history writing. Understandably, in today’s world of free self-identification and a lengthy destruction of traditional closed, in particular ethnic, communities, one can speak about ethnic models of memory only with some reservations. Here are the following models of memory characteristic of certain ethnic communities:

- The models of historical memory of ethnic Ukrainians generally coincide with general national models, with a certain bias towards different nationalist-Ukrainian versions; the distribution of dominant models largely coincides with the regional distribution of political preferences.
- Among the Russians, the classical Soviet model of memory prevails; among the intellectual circles – the Soviet-liberal one, but both of them remain nostalgic for the lost “common great power.”
- The models of historical memory of the Jews are synthetic in nature: their dominant model is based on the classical Soviet variant, while among some of the intellectual circles – the Soviet-liberal one. However, both of them contain a powerful Jewish nationalist component, which positions pogroms during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, the Holocaust, and the creation of the State of Israel as the central events of the history of the 20th century.

The development of Ukrainian historical memory today is considerably influenced by the memory politics of several states that deliberately promote abroad their own national models of memory. It is easy to notice that such a memory expansion vis-à-vis Ukraine is particularly aggressive, partly due to the fact that Ukrainian national memory is not fully formed and partly because of a generally condescending attitude towards Ukraine and Ukrainians:

- In today’s Russia the Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War is considered not only as a central event of modern history, but also as a kind of cargo-cult, as if practicing it could

restore the former imperial might. The use of the victory as a justification for Soviet terror before the war and postwar scarcity presents a real danger to the reformation of the Russian state, and to its neighbors. It also leads to the lack of a desire to rethink and repent for the crimes of the Soviet past.

- For Israel the memory of the Holocaust has both an internal and external sense. In the internal sense, this memory is used to strengthen the importance of the state as a refuge for all Jews in case of any persecutions. In the external sense, it is an instrument of ideological and political protection in the conditions of a permanent conflict with the Arabic and Islamic world for the very survival of the Jewish state. While Israel extensively commemorates the Righteous of the World, it also consistently reminds all European states and peoples about their complicity in the Nazi crimes against the Jews.
- Germany has traveled a long path to rethink the war, from de-Nazification to the cultivation of guilt for the Holocaust. At the same time, a guilt before Russia and the Russian people is especially cultivated. It is casual in Germany to identify the former USSR with Russia and Russians, despite the extensive German studies of Stalin's crimes. Another trend is to share the responsibility with other nations that found themselves under Nazi occupation.
- Poland has been commemorating the victims of the Nazis, including the Holocaust, continuously since the late 1940s. At the same time, a situation occasionally arises of competition between Polish and Jewish victims. A significant part of the Polish political class promotes the vision of Poland as one of the biggest victims of the Second World War. One of the trends of this policy is an attempt first to de-heroize the Ukrainian national movement and, secondly, deny many millions of Ukrainian (non-Jewish) civilian victims of the Nazis.

5.3. History and Memory of the Holocaust

Historical memory and the historiography of the Holocaust history today are largely determined by the general civilizational contexts of history and historical memory. In each of them, the memory of the Holocaust and the motives for remembering/forgetting it depend on the complex of values declared dominant, as well as on the content that fills such phenomena as the "Jew," "Jewry," "anti-Semitism," the "Holocaust," etc. They also depend on how far these contents are embedded or stay in conflict with the proposed vision of a successful future.

- The Soviet model leans towards ignoring the Holocaust and, accordingly, dissolving its memory into corresponding memorial ceremonies, such as a broader narrative of the "Soviet citizens" who committed "heroic resistance to the Nazi invaders under the leadership of the Communist Party." The sacrifice of ordinary people is ignored or reformulated into an act of pathos of resistance and only in this way has a chance for representation. The stability of this model is due to the general ignorance of the Soviet citizens of the national-socialist ideology, so that communist propaganda managed to impose a myth about the same fatal threat from the Nazi regime to all the peoples of the

USSR, mobilizing them in support of the authorities. An important ideological argument of this model was the social-class nature of a conspiracy of the “Zionist exploiters” with the “fascists” to exterminate the “working-class Jews,” which was intended to mobilize additional Jewry in support of Soviet ideology and was in line with the current task of combating Zionism.

- The Ukrainian nationalist model treats the Holocaust and the memory of it as a separate and alien phenomenon that has nothing to do with the decisive processes of struggle for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state in the 20th century. In plans for the development of a future state project based on nationalist principles, Jews are seen as supporters of the “Moscow imperial” project and hence as “alien elements.” However, these views shifted in the context of contemporary events, when the Jewish community demonstrated significant support for the Revolution of Dignity. This model takes defensive position in attempts to accuse the Ukrainian national-liberation movement of anti-Semitic ideological views and active participation in the Holocaust. Instead, it stresses an inclusive attitude towards persecuted Jews, demonstrating examples of their involvement in the OUN structures and UPA units, as well as examples of Jewish people rescued during the occupation. In radical manifestations, some representatives tend to directly or indirectly justify the Holocaust with historical facts about active participation of activists of Jewish descent in the processes of Sovietization and political repressions of by Soviet power, in particular, in the organization of the Holodomor of 1932–1933, which is one of the central symbols of Ukrainian historical memory. At the same time, it should be stressed that there is an inclusive model of memory of the Holocaust developing in today’s Ukraine, which presents the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine and the fate of Ukrainian Jews as an organic part of the national history of Ukraine during the Second World War.
- The Western liberal model is based on the principles of “culture of repentance.” It is conditioned by West Germany’s gradual post-war recognition of the racial-ideological basis of the national-socialist persecution of the Jews and other groups that were considered “unneeded” or “undesirable” within this ideology. As a result of consistent and focused political and educational efforts in German society and the corresponding policy of memory, it is now dominant. The Holocaust became the cornerstone and one of the central events of history, while awareness of it has led to the evolution of international law and the superiority of democratic norms.
- In the East-Central European model in the countries of the former “socialist camp,” the Holocaust was pushed to the periphery of historical consciousness. Along with the collapse of the USSR and the communist ideology and practice, they faced the prospect of joining the European Union (which came soon) and the concurrent need to find unity

with the Western European understanding of the past and the corresponding commemoration practices. While some of the residents of this area agree with making the memory of the Holocaust part of their local memorial space, others insist on the symbolic significance (and some – on the superiority) of the communist totalitarian experience and compete for the right to be considered the main victims of the past decades, which is especially noticeable in recent years against the backdrop of the increasing popularity of nationalist and populist parties and movements that peddle this argument.

- The modern Russian generally reproduces some of the basic principles of the Soviet model. The modern Russian political elite lack state ideology, so they somewhat transformed it (for example, by pushing back the thesis of the “leading role of the Communist Party” and increasing the weight of Russian nationalism in the form of “patriotism”). Therefore, some also call it “post- Soviet,” and some the “neo-Soviet” model of the historical past. In particular, they returned to the above-mentioned Soviet perception of the Great Patriotic War as the central event of Soviet history, to imperialist and nationalist values, cultivating the feelings of unity and readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of the needs of a group or the state. In the framework of such an ideological concept, the Holocaust can hardly take any space in the Russian collective consciousness, with the exception of its use in only one dimension: an appeal to the Holocaust in the context of an open demand for the Jews to express gratitude to the Red Army for their rescue from inevitable death under the Nazi rule. Thus, they model conscious loyalty of the Jews to the USSR and its successor, modern Russia. The perception of Russia's victory (as the successor to the USSR) is growing steadily and even becoming central to historical views. This “victorious” memory is combined with the feeling of unprecedented “heroism” inherent to “us” only and thus it becomes a demarcation line between “us” and “them,” strengthening “us,” that is, the modern mass Russian identity. The Holocaust (according to Boris Dubin) as a universal symbol is unnecessary in such a system of coordinates because official Russian ideology today does not need (or does not want) anything that can unite the Russian cultural space with the European one.

5.4. Ukraine’s Civilizational Choice

The problem of a civilizational choice that Ukraine is still facing is closely linked to the choice of a model of historical memory in general and of the tragic events of the Second World War in particular. In fact, given the Soviet-era inheritance of the war as the “Great Patriotic” and the Ukrainian emigration’s view of it as the “UPA's liberation struggle,” one can definitely argue that the ultimate civilizational choice of Ukraine will primarily effect the memory of the Second World War.

This choice will run into objective obstacles inherited from previous centuries. The main problem is the civilizational divide among ethnic Ukrainians that form the basis of a modern Ukrainian civil nation in the process of active formation. This divide takes place between the

Soviet-Russian imperial identity and various options for national-Ukrainian identity (from inclusive liberal to exclusively nationalist).

The preservation of an imperial identity by a significant part of ethnic Ukrainians is due to the following factors:

- ethno-racial – the myth of three “brotherly” Eastern Slavic nations originating from a “single root” and supposedly forming a “united people”;
- linguistic – the closeness of the Eastern Slavic languages that feeds the myth of “one Russian language” with mere regional dialects;
- religious – adherence to one Orthodox faith that became the main factor in choosing an alliance with Moscow in the middle of the 17th century;
- historical – a long history in one Moscow-Russian empire with significant experience of successful integration, obtaining a higher socio-political status in comparison with surrounding peoples (first of all, the Poles and Jews), participation in significant historical events (primarily wars).

Meanwhile, similar factors contribute to a rise of ethnonational identity, namely:

- ethnic – the desire to preserve Ukrainian identity under assimilatory pressure from Russia;
- linguistic – attempts to preserve the Ukrainian language from marginalization and russification;
- religious – striving to revive an independent Orthodox Church, which was historically the mother church to the branch in Moscow;
- historical – the long history of fighting for independence from the Russian Empire/the USSR, the experience of a genocide from the USSR in the 20th century, the struggle for the right to claim the heritage of Kyivan Rus.

Apart from the problems of ethnic Ukrainians, there are problems involved in the preferences of a number of ethnic minorities, such as:

- an unconquered imperial syndrome towards Ukrainians (by Russians, Hungarians, and Romanians);
- dual state loyalty (the same communities);
- the Russification and Sovietization of practically every diaspora minority (with the exception of the Poles).

All of the above hinders their approval of the general national project that is based on the Ukrainian ethno-cultural factor.

One more general factor should be taken into account, which considerably complicates the choice by Ukraine of the classical European path of development. This is an absence of an any

more or less lasting historical experience of its own democratic state or even an existence in a liberal-democratic society in a foreign state. In fact, Ukraine only today is acquiring such an experience.

Today, Ukraine is facing powerful internal and external challenges. Overcoming them will demonstrate her readiness to develop a modern state and society. Factors playing a role include:

- the requirement to build a successful modern state, which calls for an urgent need to overcome the long negative experience of state-building and form new practices of interethnic coexistence;
- military, economic, and ideological Russian aggression, which is a powerful factor for nation-wide consolidation;
- in the absence of a strong democratic tradition, only new ideas based on the principles of European humanism can ensure the unification of the Ukrainian nation and the preservation of the Ukrainian state and its definitive choice of European civilization;
- due to a serious crisis of ideas in Russia, new Ukrainian ideas can become a fundamental weapon in the Russian-Ukrainian war;
- in the context of the crisis of the left-liberal model in Western Europe, Ukraine can propose ideas that will become the basis for the renewal of a united Europe.

Meeting these challenges while making a general civilizational choice is inseparable from meeting the challenges of historical memory. Providing meaningful answers to the latter means taking a significant step towards the building of a modern and self-sufficient Ukraine.

PART III. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE REALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT

1. City-Planning context

1.1. Historical topography

Objects of Nature Preserve Fund

The territory of the memorial space is associated with such natural topographical formations as Babyn Yar, Repiakhiv Yar, Kyrylivskyi Grove and Kyrylivskyi Heights.

Babyn Yar and Repiakhiv Yar comprise a 2.5 km long network of deep ravines and cloughs running from Kyrylivskyi Heights towards the Dnieper Valley. The bottom of Babyn Yar was once the bed of the Kyrylivskyi Stream, which flows into the Pochaina River. The Kyrylivskyi Heights are the western spurs between Babyn Yar, Repiakhiv Yar, and Kurenivka. In pre-Christian times, there was a fairly large burial ground (necropolis) here, discovered and researched in the 20th century. The so-called Kyrylivskyi Caves, presumably habitable in prehistoric times, have also been found on the mountain.

As legend has it, the name Babyn Yar (also known as Urochyshche Bisova Baba or Shalena Baba [literally “Mad Woman’s Ravine”]) derives from the story that the owner of this land, a female tavern keeper, sold the land plot to the Dominican Monastery (first mentioned in 1401). In our times, this name is primarily associated with the tragic events of massacres and burials in this area during the Second World War. As a result of those and later events, as well as massive urban development transformations and technological disasters (Kurenivska mudslide), the topography and natural landscape of the place has been substantially changed. Part of it has been converted into a city park, and the rest has been developed with buildings of various purposes.

Repiakhiv Yar, on the other hand, has preserved its natural landscape and vegetation. The name of this ravine comes from the thickets of burdock (“repiakhy” in Ukrainian). Since the end of the nineteenth century, this territory started being settled with varying intensity. Streets and lanes were laid out, the most important of them being Vrubelivsky Descent (formerly Repiakhiv Yar Alley) and Herzen Street. Today, the Kyrylivskyi Grove Landscape Park is in the territory of Repiakhiv Yar. The territory belongs to the nature preserve fund and has the total area of 11.65 hectares.

Historical Zoning

The oldest name of the area, which includes the memorial space, is Dorohozhychi. Today, there is no reliable explanation of the origin of this name. Later on, the territory was

divided into two areas – Lukianivka (in the east, closer to the city center) and Syrets (in the west).

Lukianivka is a historic area, located between Dehtiarivska, Bahhovutivska and Hlybochytska streets, as well as Babyn Yar and Mount Yurkovytsia. Its center is Lukianivska Square and the market. The main street of the district is Iurii Illienko street. As early as in the 18th and throughout the 19th centuries, a number of cemeteries appeared along the western end of the street on the upper reaches of Babyn Yar (see p. 4, Cemeteries below). The territories of these cemeteries are a part of the memorial space.

Syrets is a historic area to the west of Lukianivka, the boundaries of which go along Dekhtiarivska, Syretska, and Olena Teliha streets. The name comes from the river of the same name. From the 14th to the early 19th century, Syrets was a separate village, which later was incorporated into Kyiv. Syrets is (or was) the place of such importance for the memorial complex sites as the Syrets Concentration Camp during the German occupation, the cemetery of the German prisoners of war (not far from the modern Syrets metro station), and Petrovsky Brick Factories from where loam pulp was poured into Babyn Yar in the 1950s, and subsequently caused the Kurenivska mudslide tragedy (13 March 1961).

Today, the above area is included into the Shevchenkivskyi District of Kyiv officially created in 1937 (then was called Molotov, after Viacheslav Molotov). Its total area is 2.7 thousand hectares, and it is home to 233,500 people (as of 1 January 2019).

Historical toponyms

– *Iurii Illienko Street* is the main street of Lukianivka running from Lukianivska Square to Olena Teliha Street. Former names include: Zhytomyrska, Velyka Dorohozhytska, Melnikova. Its western end runs through the territory of Babyn Yar and the memorial space. It was along this street that on 29 September 1941 the Jews were marched from the collection point at Lukianivska Square almost to the very location of the mass shooting.

– *Dorohozhytska Street* is the southern branch of Iurii Illienko Street, which then merges into Ryzka Street. Former names include: Laherna, Mototsykletna. This street forms the southern boundary of the memorial space territory. Before Babyn Yar was filled up, Dorohozhytska and Iurii Illienko streets had been the main road in this direction. The Jews walked along Dorohozhytska Street for the final portion of their journey to the place of the execution.

– *Olena Teliha Street* is a section of the inner ring road of Kyiv between Dehtiarivska Street and Stepan Bandera Avenue. It originated in the 1950s when, along with the modern Dovzhenka Street, and was laid as a part of Novookruzhna Street. Novookruzhna itself lay somewhat off to the southwest from today's Olena Teliha Street. Its former name is Demian Korotchenko Street. The dam, whose failure caused the Kurenivska mudslide in 1961, was situated in this street. Today, this street forms the western boundary of the most part of the memorial space.

– *Simi Khokhlovykh* (The Khokhlov Family) Street (former names – Seredniozagorodnia, Kahatna) is a connecting strip between Dorohozhytska and Iurii Illienko streets. It used to be the eastern boundary of the Bratske Cemetery, the territory of which included small sections of the Mariavitske and Evangelical Cemeteries. Kahatna Street comprised part of the path of the Jews to the place of their execution. Today Simi Khokhlovykh Street forms the eastern boundary of the Military Cemetery.

– *Oranzhereina Street* is the western connecting strip between Iurii Illienko and Dorohozhytska streets. It was built in the postwar years and today it separates Babyn Yar Park from the grounds of the television tower. At the corner of Dorohozhytska and Oranzhereina streets the path of the Jews on 29 September 1941 turned to Babyn Yar.

– *Shchusieva Street* is the continuation of Iurii Illienko Street in the western direction that connects Olena Teliha Street with the Ring Road. It runs through the territory of the former Syrets Concentration Camp (later a camp for German prisoners of war). The boundaries of the concentration camp itself were today's Ryzka Street (in the south), Oleh Olzhych Street (in the north) and Akademika Hrekova Street (in the west).

Cemeteries

– *Kyrylivskyi Cemetery* appeared at the time when the Kyrylivskyi Monastery was closed down, and its buildings were used as an almshouse and a hospital. The cemetery filled in rather quickly, and in 1871, it was allotted a new plot in Kyrylivskyi Grove. By the time it closed down in 1929, the cemetery occupied the area of 9.7 hectares. The cemetery had been gradually damaged during the Second World War and the Soviet era. Today, almost all gravestones and sepulchral vaults in the territory of Kyrylivskyi Orthodox Cemetery have been destroyed.

– *Lukianivskyi Cemetery* was officially founded in 1878 in the territory of some ancient city burial sites and survives to our time. In 1887, a chapel was built in its territory, and in 1911, it was rebuilt into a church. Today, the cemetery is located to the south of Dorohozhytska Street. The territory of the cemetery gradually expanded during the first half of the 20th century. The name of the cemetery changed multiple times – it used to be called Novo-Lukianivskyi, Central City Cemetery, Ioanivske, Armiyske, Lukianivskyi Russian Cemetery, and Starobratske. It became Lukianivskyi Civilian Cemetery in 1945. People were buried in the cemetery until 1962. In 1970, a considerable part of its territory was withdrawn for construction, and in 1972, the church was demolished. Since 2001, Lukianivskyi Cemetery has the status of a historical and memorial preserve.

– *The Jewish Cemetery* was founded in 1888. However, it didn't open until 1894. At that time, it was empty land outside the Lukianivskyi district, the home to a sizable Jewish community. The cemetery was furnished with service buildings and the cemetery administration building, which has survived to this day. Before the Second World War, the Jewish Cemetery occupied an area of about 25 hectares. During the occupation, the cemetery was severely damaged. Burials continued

in the cemetery until the end of 1940s. However, the General City Development Plan of Kyiv provided for the construction of a new park area with a sports complex (Avanhard) in the place of all the Lukianivka cemeteries. Therefore, the city council decided to close the cemetery and to relocate the graves to the Kurenivka Jewish Cemetery. Ultimately, the Jewish Cemetery was liquidated according to the decision in 1962. Over the following decades, a significant part of the cemetery was built up. In 1980s, there arose a number of public buildings, such as the Television Center, the state archive, and residential buildings. Today, the erstwhile existence of the Jewish Cemetery is evidenced by the commemorative bronze menorah in its northwestern part, which was installed in 1991. In the 2000's, this menorah became the endpoint of the memorial path laid from Iurii Illienko Street past the cemetery administration building. In 2017, gravestones from the former Jewish Cemetery, which until that time had been dumped in the ravine behind the Television Center, were laid along this memorial path. The cemetery administration building itself was built in 1899 and is an architectural monument of local significance. In 2016, it was transferred to the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve (NHMP Babyn Yar) to house the newly created Memorial Museum of Babyn Yar Victims.

– *The Karaite Cemetery and the Muslim Cemetery* were founded simultaneously with the Jewish one, and were located to the west from the latter. However, they started operating only in 1902. The Muslim Cemetery was allocated 0.9 hectares and the Karaite Cemetery – 0.14 hectares. Burials in these cemeteries were carried out until the 1960s. In 1962, they were liquidated by a decision of the city council. Their former territory has been built up, and the remnants of graves have not been preserved.

– *The Military Cemetery* is one of the few that have survived to this day. It is located between modern Iurii Illienko and Dorohozhytska streets. The cemetery emerged around the lower ranks burial place of the First World War era as a wing of Lukianivskyi Cemetery. The present necropolis was founded in 1943. In the 1950s, the cemetery was enclosed with a permanent fence with the front entrance from Simi Khokhlovykh Street. The cemetery has been closed for new burials since 1988.

– *The cemetery of German prisoners of war* is situated at the end of Ryzka and Shchusieva streets near the Syrets metro station. The cemetery was the burial place of German prisoners of war held in the Syrets camp in 1944–49. The cemetery was reconstructed at the expense of the German Embassy in 1999.

Historical Buildings and Other Landmarks

– *Kyrylivskyi (St. Cyril) Monastery and Kyrylivska (St. Cyril) Church* are architectural monuments of Kyivan Rus era. They were built in the 12th century as a cathedral, an ancestral monastery and a sepulcher of the Olgovichi dynasty of Chernihiv princes. The church has been rebuilt multiple times and acquired its present-day appearance in the middle of the 18th century. In 1786, the Kyrylivskyi Monastery was closed down and converted into Kyrylivskyi Hospital.

In the 1950s, the walls of the church cracked. Its dungeon was then treated with concrete to save the architectural ensemble. This accident revealed the interesting discovery that the Kyrylivska Church has the deepest foundation in the world due to the dungeons under it. Today the church borders the territory of the Pavlov Psychoneurological Hospital and is part of the Sofia of Kyiv National Historical and Architectural Sanctuary. Kyrylivska Church has the status of an architectural monument of national significance, protection No. 30/1. The church operates as a museum. Worship services are held here on weekends.

– *Pavlov Psychoneurological Hospital* (presently Pavlov Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1, formerly Kyrylivskyi Hospital) is situated at the foot of Babyn Yar. The Vrubelivskyi Descent and Herzen Street lead to it. The hospital was launched after the conversion of the Kyrylivskyi Monastery into a home for the disabled and an almshouse. In 1803, a mental asylum was transferred to the monastery. Over the course of the 19th century, the hospital gradually expanded and turned into a multifunctional medical institution. During World War II, the patients of the hospital were executed and buried in Babyn Yar. In the 1960s, the hospital was reorganized once again and converted into a purely psychiatric institution.

– *Syrets military camps, Syrets Concentration Camp, the camp for German prisoners of war are part of Syrets territory* (enclosed by modern Olena Teliha, Oleh Olzhych, Ryzka, and Akademika Hrekova streets), which today is the eponymous residential area. Before the Second World War, the territory was used for military training camps of the Kyiv Military District. From the spring of 1942 through the spring of 1943, it was turned into a camp for Soviet prisoners of war, and later into the “Kiew-West” Nazi concentration camp. The territory of the camp was surrounded with three rows of barbed wire. The camp consisted of two land plots almost rectangular in plan. One of them (between Ryzka and Shchusieva streets) housed barracks, the other – sixteen dugouts where prisoners were held. About five thousand prisoners of that camp were executed or died because of inhumane treatment and were buried in Babyn Yar or in the pits within the territory of the camp. The camp was used for the detention of German prisoners of war from 1944 to 1949. The cemetery, where about 250 of those prisoners of war were buried, is located near the Syrets metro station.

– *Start Stadium*, formerly *Zenit Stadium*, is located next to Lukianivska Square. During the Second World War, there was a special division of the camp for Soviet prisoners of war in its territory, in Kerosynna Street (today’s Sholudenka Street), where they held Jews, Communists, and political officials before taking them to Babyn Yar for execution.

– Landmarks associated with the mass execution of Jews on 23 September 1941, when Nazis gathered columns of Jews from all parts of the city in Lukianivska Square and drove them along Iurii Illienko Street to Babyn Yar. Behind the intersection of Iurii Illienko and the modern Akademika Romodanova Street, there was an anti-tank ditch and a German outpost. Their further trek went along today’s Iurii Illienko, Simi Khokhlovykh and Dorohozhytska streets to the intersection with Oranzhereina Street. From the field right next to the ravine, the people were

forwarded to the execution. After the shooting, the Germans blew up the slopes of the ravine. Those not shot due to the late hour were locked up for the night in the garages of the tank repair facility on the corner of Iurii Illienko and Dorohozhytska streets. The path the Jews walked on 29 September 1941 became the Kyiv Via Dolorosa – the Way of Suffering, which should be marked on the city map and staked out in the urban street design.

1.2. Current Status

Location and Boundaries

The territory of the memorial space is located between the historic areas of Syrets in the west and Lukianivka in the east. In the north, in the Dnieper Valley, there is the historic area of Kurenivka. In the west, the territory adjoins Olena Teliha Street. The following sites and facilities currently operate within the territory of the memorial space, namely:

- the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve;
- the Lukianivka State Historical Memorial Preserve (Lukianivskyi Cemetery);
- the Kyrylivskyi Hai memorial park of landscape art;
- Babyn Yar Park of Shevchenkivskyi District;
- the Repiakhiv Yar Nature Preserve Fund Site;
- Dorohozhychi metro station;
- the Kyiv Television Tower;
- the Kyiv Television Center;
- Avanhard Sports Complex;
- a park for decommissioned buses;
- a gas station;
- the buildings of Kyivzelenbud Public Utility Company;
- the Herzen Park Residential Complex;
- the Kyrylivskyi Hai Residential Complex;
- a set of buildings of the State Archive for Kyiv Oblast;
- a set of buildings of the State Territorial Labor Inspectorate for Kyiv Oblast;
- the Military Cemetery.

All these facilities are governed by different economic entities. Therefore, the further harmonious development of the territory of the memorial space shall take into account the peculiarities of operation of each of the above-named facilities. Accordingly, these listed economic entities are direct stakeholders in the development of the memorial space. For this reason, their position shall be carefully taken into account.

City Context: Housing Stock

The typology of residential development is formed predominantly by blocks of five-story brick buildings built in the 1960s. They make up 80 percent of all the housing in the district. In

addition, there are blocks of two-story brick houses nearby built by German prisoners of war that were held in the territory of the former Syrets Camp.

In the late 1970s, several high-rise residential buildings were erected in the former private housing territory. The Herzen Park high-rise residential complex is situated between Herzen and Iurii Illienko streets, next to the Kyiv Television Center. Apart from these and several other occasional high-rise buildings, the neighborhoods of the memorial space remain mid-rise with a moderate population density.

City Context: Recreation

Green areas and parks surround Syrets from all sides. The very territory of the memorial space has a huge recreational significance. In addition to it, the Syrets City Park with a children's railway, Dubki Park, and Syrets Landscape Park are nearby.

Spacious courtyards, a large number of old yet well-preserved sports grounds, and numerous green areas contribute to pleasant outdoor leisure. There are several cycling routes marked in Dubki Park. Kyrilivskyi Grove is also often used for cycling and jogging.

Young city-dwellers walk their dogs, play sports, and picnic; senior citizens play chess and discuss the latest news. Babyn Yar Park is a popular place for various informal practices among teenagers, students, and representatives of different subcultures. Such behavior can be jarring and goes against the spirit of this place and its historical background. In order to remedy the situation, measures must be taken within the memorial space for informing city dwellers of its history and encouraging respectful behavior.

City Context: Public Infrastructure

There are four hospitals in Dorohozhychi: Clinical Hospital No. 9 in Ryzka Street, a small Children's Hospital No. 2 in Olzhicha Street and Kyiv Regional Clinical Hospital No. 1 in the east on the Lukianivka side, as well as specialized Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1 named after I.P. Pavlov, which is located near Kyrilivskyi Grove.

The district has several kindergartens and schools, including a boarding school, technical lyceums, and an industrial college. There are also special educational institutions: a choreographic school in Kuzminska Street and a state art school.

The only institutions of higher education in the vicinity of the project site are branches of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University (Institute of Journalism and Institute of International Relations). The University buildings are situated in the east, along Iurii Illienko Street. Gagarin Cinema has been converted into an indoor market over the course of time. There are two teenage clubs and two libraries. There is a large restaurant in Stetsenka Street, near Syrets metro station in Dubki Park.

City Context: “Anchor” Objects

The main “anchor” object in the territory of the memorial space is the Dorohozhychi metro station built in 2000. Its average daily passenger traffic is 15,900 people. Most of commercial infrastructure objects in the area are clustered around the metro station. It takes ten to fifteen minutes to get to the city center as well as to other parts of the city from here.

The dominant structure within the territory of the memorial space is the 380 m high spire of the main television tower of the country, which is located between Babyn Yar Park and the Military Cemetery. The high-rise building of the Television Center (commonly called the Pencil) is nearby, across Iurii Illienko Street.

The main religious building in the neighborhood is Kyrylivska Church, which is situated near the lower end of Babyn Yar, next to Pavlov Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1. It is a cultural monument dating from the 12th century, which nowadays functions predominantly as a museum. Worship services are held here only on weekends and on religious holidays.

City Context: Landforms and Geology

The present-day topography of the memorial space territory is a landscape primarily represented by a system of natural ravines (Babyn Yar and Repiakhiv Yar) which run into the Dnieper Valley. It has been substantially transformed as a result of human interference (Babyn Yar fill in) and the laying of streets (Olena Teliha and Iurii Illienko).

Repiakhiv Yar has been transformed by the placement of Vrubelivskyi Descent and Herzen Street in its lower reaches. Topographically, the terrain can be conveniently divided into the upper part – the plateau that has been filled in and developed – and the slope (ravines, cloughs), which remains a natural difficult-to-access landscape with rugged topography.

Babyn Yar is 2.6 km long and has many branches. It crosses forest, forest sands, moraines, and clay, merging into a valley in the area of Syretsky Clough. Repiakhiv Yar, which is 32 m deep and 1.5 km long, runs into the Dnieper Valley further to the south. Its steep slopes are only partially developed and covered with landslide deposits and wood.

The territory of Babyn Yar and Repiakhiv Yar ravines belongs to a landslide and flood hazard zone (according to the 2020 General City Development Plan of Kyiv).

City Context: Commuting and Transport

The area has a convenient location within the city's transport system. The territory of the memorial space can be accessed by public transport (metro, trolleybus, bus) from all parts of Kyiv.

Olena Teliha Street is an important traffic artery of the city, which serves as an inner-city ring road. It intersects another radial thoroughfare – Iurii Illienko Street – right next to the territory of the memorial space. Dorohozhychi metro station is situated at this intersection.

Iurii Illienko Street divides the territory of the memorial space into two parts. They are connected only by the underground passage of the Dorohozhychi metro station.

There are almost no transit driveways within the territory of the memorial space. This creates a true pedestrian zone conducive to walks and relaxation. The only driveway is Herzen Street, which serves as the access road to Pavlov Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1.

The pedestrian paths in the upper part of the territory evoke the feel of a city park, while some of the ravines have the appearance of pristine nature.

City Context: Planning Limitations

In accordance with the 2020 General City Development Plan of Kyiv, the following city development and planning restrictions apply to the project site:

1. *The territory of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve.* The boundaries of the Preserve are determined by land management documentation based on Decision No. NQ 204/5016 of the Kyiv City Council dated 28 October 2010. The territory of the Preserve houses protected monuments, cultural heritage objects and other landmarks, landscape formations, and valuable elements of environment improvement. Any restoration, construction, excavation, and other works in this territory provided for by the site management plan are allowable only if authorized by city development documentation approved by the central executive body responsible for cultural heritage protection.

The territory of the National Preserve shall be provided with:

- the monitoring of its memorial objects;
- archaeological supervision during earthworks;
- the possibility to mark memorial places and lost memorial objects;
- the monitoring of geological and hydrological situations, engineering protection of the territory, occupational and fire safety, protection against dynamic loads.

Within the territory of the National Preserve, it is allowable to:

- conserve, restore, recover, and museumify memorial objects;
- relocate, as well as replace (if necessary) memorial signs, install new memorial objects and information stands explaining the historical and cultural value of the territory;

- install ceremonial (religious) objects, museums, museum expositions, book and artwork stalls, information and navigational stands and signs, engineering and technical infrastructure objects, and landscape beautifications necessary for servicing the territory of the National Preserve and determined by the site management plan;
- reorganize landscape and shade gardening in the territory;
- reorganize the existing and build new pedestrian paths, including over-the-ground pedestrian crossings, in accordance with the site management plan.

Within the territory of the National Preserve, it is prohibited to:

- construct objects unrelated to ensuring the functioning of the National Preserve and its memorial complex;
 - carry out earthworks, lay transportation lines or utility networks unrelated to ensuring the functioning of the National Preserve and its memorial complex, as well as in the event that such works disrupt the hydrological regime of the territory;
 - arrange playgrounds, children's play areas, and facilities for outdoor activities;
 - install overhead power transmission lines, ground transformer houses.
2. *The protective zone of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve* with the total area of 46.9 hectares establishes a special regime, according to which all the city-planning documentation prepared for this territory or its part thereof is subject to approval by the central executive body responsible for cultural heritage protection upon consultation with the National Preserve management. The protective zone shall provide:
- preservation of the view of the National Preserve territory;
 - free access to the National Preserve territory;
 - preservation of the landscape and valuable environment improvement elements;
 - the possibility to mark the places of lost memorial objects;
 - archaeological supervision over execution of earthworks;
 - the removal of disharmonious buildings and structures, as well as vegetation which creates visual barriers in front of the memorial objects;
 - keeping the undeveloped territories free of permanent structures (except in cases provided for by the National Preserve improvement plan);
 - monitoring of the geological and hydrological situation, engineering protection of the territory, occupational, and fire safety, protection against dynamic loads.

Within the territory of the protective zone, it is allowable to:

- restore, recover, and adapt historical buildings, according to the National Preserve improvement plan;
- reconstruct or construct (in certain cases) new custom-tailored objects (including those provided for by the National Preserve improvement plan), the height of which does not exceed 9 m from the ground surface and does not spoil the view of the National Preserve territory;
- carry out an integrated improvement of the territory with landscape reorganization;
- carry out works on laying of new or reconstruction of the existing utility networks required by the modern city functioning needs.

Within the territory of the protective zone, it is prohibited to:

- construct new buildings and structures within the land plots reserved for the improvement of the National Preserve;
- accommodate the property of residential, entertainment, industrial, storehouse, and public utilities designation, as well as arrange large open car parks that spoil the general perception of the National Preserve territory.

3. *Development control zone.* This zone with the total area of 24.12 hectares is assigned a special regime, according to which new construction, as well as reconstruction of the existing facilities, is regulated according to their functional purpose, location, height, scale, and development footprint. Construction, reconstruction, earth, and other works can be carried out only under projects approved by the central executive body responsible for cultural heritage protection upon consultation with the National Preserve management. Within the territory of the development control zone, it is prohibited to:

- dismantle elements of historic development;
- construct high-rise buildings and structures;
- accommodate industrial enterprises, transport, warehouse, and other infrastructure that create significant freight traffic, air pollution, fire and explosion hazard, as well as those that are not in harmony with the protected environment;
- construct traffic interchanges and overpasses that will negatively influence the landscape structure of the territory;
- block the view of the National Preserve memorial objects with new buildings and plantations.

4. The territory of the Military and Lukianivskyi cemeteries is surrounded by a 200 m wide sanitary protection zone.

5. The Television Tower is surrounded by a 500 m radius zone, in which development is restricted on the grounds of electromagnetic field intensity.
6. The limited land use zone around the Antonov Plant aerodrome covers the entire territory of the memorial space – the limitation of the height of buildings is 50 to 150 m (228.88 - 328.88 m according to the Baltic system of elevations).
7. Kyrylivskiy Grove is a territory of the nature Preserve fund, as well as a landslide hazard area.
8. In the lower part of Kyrylivskiy Grove, there is a small area of cesium-contaminated soils.

In the presence of these restrictions, any architectural and building activity within this territory must comply with the current legislation, approved city development documentation and local development standards, while earthworks and construction works must be preliminary approved by the Department for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments and Historical Environment.

1.3. City-Planning projects

2020 general plan of Kyiv

According to the current General City Development Plan, the following functional areas are defined within the territory of the memorial complex:

1. Public green spaces
2. An Object of the nature preserve fund (Kyrylivskiy Grove)
3. Motor transport grounds/structures
4. Social infrastructure
5. Sports facilities
6. Cemeteries
7. Cultural and information institutions
8. A medical institution.

Accordingly, any city development or architectural projects within this territory shall correspond to this designated purpose. Changes to the designated purpose of the territory shall be approved by decision of a city council session with due account for the regime of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve operation, its protection zone and the development control zone.

DTPs in the Area of the Project

There are two detailed territory plans (DTPs) developed for the territories adjacent to the territory of the project. These two adjacent territories are located to the south of it and include the following sites:

1. Within the boundaries of Peremohy Avenue, Laherna and Aviakonstruktor Igor Sikorsky streets, railway tracks, Parkovo-Syretska, Dorohozhytska, Olena Teliha and Oleksandr Dovzhenko streets. The main decision of this DTP, which will impact the memorial space, is densification of residential development. This will increase pressure on the technical and social infrastructure of the district. On the other hand, it has the potential to bring in more permanent visitors and users of the memorial space territory.
2. Within the boundaries of Dorohozhytska, Iurii Illienko, Derevlianska and Simi Khokhlovykh streets. According to this DTP, the territory of the Kyiv Motorcycle Plant is to be converted into the Unit City Industrial Park. This will also increase the number of daily users of the memorial space territory, especially during work hours throughout the week, as well as diversify their social composition.

Unit City

This is a large-scale investment project for construction of an industrial park in the territory of the former Kyiv Motorcycle Plant. The project site is situated to the south of the memorial complex territory. In the future, Unit City is expected to become a major center of business and social activity. The plan envisages both conversion of existing buildings and construction of new ones. To date, Unit City infrastructure includes:

- offices, co-working spaces, and small laboratories;
- two conference halls accommodating 50 and 150 persons;
- two cafes/restaurants;
- sports complex;
- open-air recreational areas and areas for mass events.

In future, it is planned to transform the plant's territory into a multifunctional complex to include different types of offices and new enterprises, residential space, educational, sports and entertainment establishments.

Today, Unit City site has limited visitor access. Its target audience consists of representatives of IT companies and startups in the field of advanced technology and design. It is this social stratum that will potentially become the new users of the memorial space territory in addition to its present-day ones.

Melnykova Smart Street

This is the concept of reconstruction of today's Illienko Street initiated by the Kyiv Smart City Public Utility Company.

The project proposes the implementation of the latest international trends. Among its key provisions are the narrowing of the roadway, a separate lane for public transport, parking pockets, cycle tracks, barrier-free pedestrian crossings, and safety islands. Particular attention is given to energy-saving street lighting and small architectural forms.

Among the new technology elements are benches with smartphone chargers, bus stops with solar panels, pedestrian crossing lighting and traffic offence recording systems, as well as special equipment for people with reduced mobility and vision impairments.

After development of the concept, the project did not advance to its following stages.

Avanhard Sports Complex

The complex was built in the early 1970's in the territory of the former Muslim, Karaite, and Jewish cemeteries. Today it houses an ice arena, basketball and football halls, and a school of acrobatics.

In 2017, the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and the Kyiv City Administration announced preparations for the reconstruction and development of the sports complex. In addition to repairs, the project provides for construction of a sports and rehabilitation center and a 50-meter long Olympic swimming pool. Reconstruction is planned to be carried out in three stages over the period of six years.

Construction of this sports facility is ethically inconsistent with the nature of the memorial space in whose territory it is located. On the one hand, active engagement in sports attracts additional audience to the memorial space themes. On the other hand, there exists danger of incompatibility of the modes of their use (the sports complex can house noisy mass sport events and that goes against the principles of behavior in a memorial space).

Start Stadium

The stadium is located in Sholudenka Street, away from the main territory of the memorial complex. During the Second World War, it was called Zenit Stadium.

Today, the stadium is one of the major public gathering spaces in Lukianivka. During the day, people engage in sports here (jogging, football, rollerblading, cycling), and in the evenings, there are cinema screenings in the open air. After the failed intentions to build up the stadium, the local community actively protects this place, and recently the city and district administration have started developing a project to renovate the sports facility.

Babyn Yar – Dorohozhychi Necropolis Architectural Competition

In 2016, an open international architectural competition for a comprehensive organization and improvement of the Babyn Yar – Dorohozhychi Necropolis historical and memorial zone took place. Its goal was to create a clearly demarcated space, where those deliberately coming to honor the memory of the dead and other local residents or students of the nearby educational institutions would immediately feel connected to the tragic history of this place. The goal of the competition was to create in a spatial sense a modern holistic public memorial complex, integrated into the city structure by means of landscape design.

The subject matter of the competition comprised the territories that historically included:

- Babyn Yar – the place of mass executions and burials during the Nazi occupation of Kyiv;
- a historical multi-religious necropolis, which arose over the centuries and included Orthodox, Jewish, Karaite, Muslim, military and other cemeteries;
- the area of the man-made 1961 Kurenivska mudslide disaster.

Following the results of the competition, none of the projects was awarded the first prize. Two second place prizes were awarded to two projects that best addressed the key issues outlined in the competition assignment. The materials of the architectural competition and project proposals are included in this Concept of the memorial space.

Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center

The project initiated by the eponymous charity fund is a conceptual alternative to this Concept and is aimed at highlighting the tragic events that took place in Babyn Yar in September 1941. The central theme of the center is the Holocaust in the territory of the former USSR.

In December 2018, an architectural competition for the development of the memorial center project was announced. The construction site is almost completely located in the territory of the memorial space, namely in the territory of the Jewish and Kyrylivskyi cemeteries.

The results of the competition are to be announced in August 2019, and construction is scheduled for the period of 2020–2022. The opening of the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center is to be launched in 2023.

Kyrylivskyi Grove residential complex

Six high-rise (16-, 23-, and 25-story) residential buildings are being constructed in the territory of Kyrylivskyi Grove, at the end of Bahhovutivska Street, near Oblast Hospital No. 1. In addition to residential space, it is going to house commercial and public premises, as well as automobile parking space. The land plot with the area of 2.29 hectares belongs to the nature reserve fund. However, the developer claims that it has all the necessary permits for this

construction. Despite the scheduled completion date (end of 2018), construction is still in progress.

The territory of this residential complex development penetrates the boundary of Kyrylivskyi Grove, which contravenes regulations on use of environmentally protected sites. A settlement of this situation requires detailed study and implementation of appropriate measures.

Land Plots Unoccupied by Burials Outside the Memorial Space

Around the territory of the memorial space, there are areas suitable for new construction or reconstruction of existing structures with their subsequent adaptation for the needs of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar museums:

1. the building of the former Gagarin Cinema Theater at 5 Shchusieva Street and the adjoining garages (in the territory of the former Syrets Concentration Camp). The building is currently used as a market.
2. the site of the frozen swimming-pool construction at 2 Parkovo-Syretska Street;
3. the territory of the Motozavodets-1 Garage Cooperative at 8a Simi Khokhlovykh Street;
4. the unfinished construction in the territory of the Lukianivskyi Cemetery (intersection of Dorohozhytska and Simi Khokhlovykh streets);
5. the unfinished construction site on the corner of Iurii Illienko and Dorohozhytska streets.

1.4. The Functional Load

Babyn Yar as a Part of the Urban Space

Today the territory of the memorial space is a complex multi-layered and multifunctional city-development formation. The components of the memorial complex can be classified into internal components – those situated within its territory, and external – those outside its borders. The former includes:

- the territory of the existing and destroyed cemeteries with historical buildings: Kyrylivskyi Orthodox, Lukianivskyi, Jewish, Muslim, Karaite, Bratske, and Military cemeteries;
- the site of executions that took place during the Nazi occupation, which is directly adjacent to Olena Teliha Street and occupies most of the filled-in part of Babyn Yar.

The external components include:

- the territory of the part of the Soviet prisoners of war camp that was located at the Zenit Stadium (today the Start Stadium) where Jews, Communists, and political workers were imprisoned;
- the path the Jewish people took to the place of their execution on 29 September 1941;

- former garages of the tank-repair facility where victims were held the night before execution;
- the territory of former Syrets Concentration Camp / German prisoners of war camp and the German prisoners of war cemetery;
- the territory and historical buildings of Pavlov Psychiatric Hospital (today the Pavlov Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital No.1);
- the area of the Kurenivska mudslide on 13 March 1961 in Babyn Yar and in the territory of Krasin Tram Depot (Podil Tram Depot).

In addition to that, the territory of the memorial space and its components is closely connected with the urban environment and infrastructure located both in the territory of the memorial space itself, in its neighborhood, and in the citywide context.

As a result of this set of interconnected elements and functional layers, the memorial complex project is tasked with supplementing and revealing the historical significance of this territory and at the same time functionally integrating it into the rhythm of the city life.

The Area of Mass Shootings and Burials

Today the territory where during the Second World War mass shootings occurred does not fully reflect the essence and significance of those events for the world and Ukrainian history. This area is situated to the east of Olena Teliha Street and is crossed by Iurii Illienko Street, which divides the territory in half.

The southern part that is officially called Babyn Yar Park serves today as a meeting place for students and youth subcultures. The northern section has the appearance of a park, and residents of nearby buildings use it as a place for walks and a pedestrian shortcut to the metro station. Another section of the execution site is situated across the street, on the other side of Olena Teliha Street, between buildings No. 23 and No. 27. At this place, a construction of a residential building was started in the 2000s, and subsequently frozen in 2008.

This territory is “invisible” today in the context of the tragic events that took place here. The former ravine was completely filled in during the Soviet era. Today, almost nothing bears evidence to its past dramatic topography. The Concept of the memorial space is intended to determine the city development and architectural measures to mark places associated with various historical events within the territory of the memorial complex. Accordingly, the designation of this space imposes certain limitations on the processes that can take place here. There shall be no noisy mass events and daily activities shall be conducted in keeping with the spirit of memory and respect for the history and people associated with it.

The territory of the historical cemeteries, both existing and ruined, also requires a respectful and careful attitude. The radical development of former cemeteries in the second half of the twentieth century can be perceived as barbaric. On the other hand, public ignorance of the

history of this place leads to an unconscious disregard for the latter in further development of the territory. The evidence of the former existence of many cemeteries of various religious communities of Kyiv has been almost obliterated. The only exception is the placement of gravestones along the memorial alley leading to the bronze Menorah. This Concept intends, in particular, to halt further development of the historical cemeteries through public information campaigns informing citizens about the history of the area.

The Memorial Space

The tragic events of the past are marked by a number of unrelated and uncoordinated monuments, memorial signs, and crosses. This state of memorialization gives no idea of the complete picture of historical events. Our Concept is designed to holistically reflect the objective past in the physical space of the territory.

The memorial space shall function as a tourist zone with a unified navigation system. The provision of information about this space shall be systemic and follow a single coherent narrative. To this end, it is proposed to develop a single visual code and characteristics of urban design elements:

- a system of marking borders of different territories (cemeteries, historical places, nature preserves);
- a system of navigation and thematic trails within the territory;
- a unified design of street furniture and infrastructure elements;
- strict regulation of new construction and land use.

Parkland

Kyrylivskiy Grove in the territory of Repiakhiv Yar is one of the few places in contemporary Kyiv that have preserved their natural landscape and unique vegetation. Among the tree species growing here are linden, oak, birch, aspen, and elm. There are oak trees up to 200 years old. The undergrowth is formed by hazelnut, warty bark, euonymus, and spindle. Among grasses, one can still find relic great horsetail. The availability of such a biodiversity resource and a corner of pristine nature is of great value to the city and its inhabitants. The location of this territory of the nature preserve fund near the memorial space and its inclusion into the general Concept has a mutually reinforcing effect.

Recreational Space

The entire territory of the memorial space is actively used for recreation: from daily walks by residents of all age groups to active sports (both individual and team-based). In Soviet times, many open-air sports facilities were built in the parkland part of Babyn Yar for broad public use (football fields, sports and playgrounds, marked running tracks, etc.). In the 1970s, the Avanhard Sports Complex was built in the territory of the former Karaite and Jewish cemeteries;

this sports complex is still in operation. Mass events and sports competitions are sometimes held in Kyrylivskyi Grove.

The existing infrastructure is currently in decline, so recreation activities are reduced to passive outdoor leisure and individual sports in the open air. The Concept provides for the preservation of certain recreational practices to combine them with memorialization ones. On the other hand, in the future it will be necessary to determine the list of undesirable recreational practices, for example, mass events of marked entertainment nature or with high noise levels, individual leisure with cooking food and drinking alcohol, etc.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The new memorial space shall develop in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved by the United Nations in 2015 and adapted by the government of Ukraine. The provisions among them shall be highlighted that may correspond to and influence the goals of the memorial space development.

Quality Education (SDG-4): “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.”

The memorial complex has a significant potential for education – both formal and informal. Its intended role is to give a better understanding of past historical events in a broad worldwide context and to reflect them in the physical space. The core aspects of the educational component of the memorial space can include education in sustainable development and sustainable lifestyle, human rights, gender equality, promoting a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and building awareness of the value of cultural diversity and the contribution of culture to sustainable development.

The memorial space Concept can build upon or influence the curricula of secondary and higher educational establishments in order to take into account the interests of children, needs of people with disabilities and gender aspects, and to ensure safe, violence-free and social barrier-free effective learning environment for all.

Gender Equality (SDG-5): “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.” This goal can be realized within the framework of SDG-5, as well as through research projects devoted to gender and the role of women in events related to the history of the memorial complex (e.g. Olena Teliha, Tetiana Markus). A separate aspect of educational activity of the memorial space shall be promotion of women's empowerment and equal leadership opportunities for women at all levels of political, economic and public life.

Clean Water and Sanitation (SDG-6): The goal to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all is achievable through the arrangement of the memorial space. Most of its territory is generally accessible public space. Such spaces shall be

provided with points of access to drinking water and sanitation facilities, such as public toilets. The arrangement of baby care rooms with access to clean water also meets the requirements of SDG-5.

Affordable and Clean Energy (SDG-7): “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.”

All new elements of the memorial space infrastructure shall be equipped in accordance with the “green energy” concept.

Work and Economic Growth (SDG-8): The memorial space will generate additional service business in tourism. This will attract additional attention and improve the image of Kyiv as an open tourist city.

Innovation and Infrastructure (SDG-9): The memorial space Concept has a considerable potential to open up new opportunities for innovative research at the intersection of humanitarian, political, technical, and media industries. This aspect will help attract the attention of highly skilled young people and the general public to the topics that will be brought up in the context of the memorial space activity.

Reducing Inequalities (SDG-10): The memorial space shall in every way counteract the expression of any form of inequality or privilege of one social group over another. Accordingly, all public parts of the space shall be equally accessible and convenient for all social, age, ethnic, and religious groups. The same applies to ensuring equal access to information about the past and present of the memorial space or parts thereof.

The educational and exhibition program of the future museums shall demonstrate the negative and tragic consequences of systematic implementation of inequality, both at the individual, national, or global level.

Sustainable Cities (SDG-11): “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.”

The ideal object of study in this context can be the history of the 1961 Kurenivska mudslide. This goal can be achieved by closely integrating and coordinating the planning of the memorial space territory with city development projects within and in close proximity to its territory. Such integration shall adhere to the following principles:

- complex and sustainable planning with wide involvement of stakeholders;
- protection and preservation of historical, cultural and natural heritage;
- general access to and ensuring safety of all green areas and public places, especially for women, children, elderly people and people with disabilities.

The most fundamental solution could be the proclamation of the memorial park and the adjacent territory a kind of eco-museum. The concept of the eco-museum will create conditions for the protection of not only the memorial park and commemorative objects, but also the interests of the adjacent city community that looks forward to certain benefits from the development and improvement of the neighborhood.

Life on Land (SDG-15): “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.”

These are the goals whose achievement can be significantly influenced by the memorial space development. Park and nature preserve areas in its territory are of great importance for the city. Regulation and sustainable use of this resource is one of the tasks of this Concept.

Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions (SDG-16): “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

This is one of the most important tasks of the memorial space. Educational and public programs of the space shall teach from mistakes of the past. Within this framework, the memorial space can contribute to fulfilling the following tasks:

- reduce the incidence of all forms of violence and the rates of mortality caused thereby;
- put an end to exploitation, human trafficking, and all forms of violence and child abuse;
- promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, ensure equal access to justice;
- ensure public access to information, protect fundamental freedoms.

Partnerships for Sustainable Development (SDG-17): The memorial space shall be planned and developed in broad partnership with different sectors of social work, stakeholders and communities, as well as international organizations. Such involvement is required by the complexity and multiplicity of contents concentrated within the territory of the memorial space.

2. Legal Context

2.1. Legal grounds

By Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 447 “On Designation of the Complex of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Lukianivskyi Civilian Cemetery in Kyiv as a State Historical and Memorial Preserve” dated 1 July 1994, the Lukianivka State Historical and Memorial Preserve was created on the basis of the mentioned cemetery.

On 27 December 2001, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Resolution No. 1761 “On Entry of Historical and Archeological Monuments and Works of Monumental Art of

National Importance into the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine,” according to which the complex of monuments at the site of the mass murder of civilians and prisoners of war in Babyn Yar ravine during the Nazi occupation was included into the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine as a historical monument of national significance.

On 1 March 2007, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved Resolution No. 308 “On Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve,” according to which the complex of monuments in Babyn Yar ravine in Kyiv was given the status of the Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve and included into the management domain of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine. The costs of maintaining the Preserve were to be funded from the state budget resources allocated to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine for the specified purposes.

In 2010, by resolution of President of Ukraine Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve was granted the status of national institution and renamed into Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve.

On 20 October 2017, the President of Ukraine issued Decree No. 331/2017 “On Additional Measures for Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve,” which provided for the establishment of the Organizing Committee on the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve and approved the composition thereof.

On 26 July 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Decree No. 542-p “On Approval of the Plan of Measures for the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve,” which stipulated in particular the necessity of conducting an international contest of the Babyn Yar NHMP memorial complex projects, the completion of works on defining the boundaries and protection zones of the complex and review of whether such boundaries and zones can be expanded, as well as clarification of the list of monuments and other objects located in the territory of the Babyn Yar NHMP, approval of the Concept of Babyn Yar complex development with the expansion of the boundaries of the Preserve and the Concept of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum, the development and approval of the thematic and exposition plan of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum and creation of its exposition, as well as coordination with the Organizing Committee on the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar NHMP of measures to perpetuate the memory of Babyn Yar victims that shall be carried out by the relevant initiative groups.

The optimal “road map” of the realization of the Concept should be:

- a resolution by the President of Ukraine, which would put the cabinet of ministers in charge of a comprehensive memorialization of Babyn Yar;
- a confirmation of the Concept and Plan of its realization by a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;

- further resolutions of respective state organs of concrete normative acts according to the Plan of the realization of the Concept.

2.2. Existing Memorial Institutions

There are to date in Ukraine several institutions of various subordination and forms of ownership that are interested in the complex memorialization of Babyn Yar. Among them the leading roles are played by:

1. The Organizing Committee on the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, created by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 331/2017 “On Additional Measures for Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve” of 20 October 2017, with changes added by the decree of the president of Ukraine “On the Measures in connection with the 80th anniversary of the Babyn Yar tragedy and additional measures for the subsequent development of National Historical Memorial Preserve” of 15 December 2020. The co-chairmen of the Committee are the Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. The Cabinet of Ministers is in charge of drafting a plan of events in connection with the 80th anniversary of the Babyn Yar tragedy, including measures for the expansion of the protected zone of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve; realization on its territory of the projects of memorialization and museumification; completion of the memorial museum commemorating the victims of Babyn Yar in the building on Illienka Street 44; enabling the search for additional funds for the activities of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve; and a comprehensive improvement of the preserve with the help of charitable organizations.
2. The Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the main body in the system of the central executive authorities that among other things ensures development and implementation of state policy in the fields of cultural heritage protection, restoration, and preservation of national memory. The Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve is included into the management domain of the Ministry.
3. The Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve. The complex of monuments on the site of the eponymous ravine in the city of Kyiv was designated the Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve and included into the management domain of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 308 “On Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve” dated 1 March 2007. By Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 877-p of 25 June 2008, the Babyn Yar SHMR was transferred to the management domain of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance. In 2010, by the Decree of the President of Ukraine, the Babyn Yar State Historical Memorial Preserve was assigned national status and renamed the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve. By Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of

Ukraine No.133-p dated 14 February 2011, the Babyn Yar NHMP was again included into the management domain of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine. In accordance with its status of preserve, confirmed by Order of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine No. 445 dated 7 May 2012, the main tasks of the Babyn Yar NHMP is the preservation and perpetuation of the memory of the victims of the Holocaust, Nazi terror and political repressions, the implementation of measures for discovery, study, registration, protection, preservation, proper maintenance, proper use, conservation, restoration, rehabilitation and museumification of cultural heritage objects, associated territories, and movable objects; as well as conducting research, scientific, methodological, museum, exhibition, excursion, cultural and educational work aimed at informing citizens of the tragic events of the Nazi massacre of Kyiv residents and prisoners of war in Babyn Yar, and of political repressions, development of the sense of patriotism and historical consciousness, and spiritual enrichment of citizens.

4. The Lukianivka State Historical and Memorial Preserve created on the basis of the complex of historical and cultural monuments of Lukianivskyi Civilian Cemetery by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.447 “On Designation of the Complex of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Lukianivskyi Civilian Cemetery in Kyiv as a State Historical and Memorial Preserve” of 1 July 1994. The mission of the Preserve is to ensure continuous preservation of historical and cultural monuments, scientific research, and restoration of sepulchral structures. The Preserve is a scientific and cultural organization and is subordinate to the Department of Housing and Utilities Infrastructure of the Kyiv City State Administration. The property of the Preserve is the communal property of the Kyiv City Territorial Community.
5. The Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Charity Fund is a non-governmental organization that aims to build a center for education, documentation, and memory of the tragic events of September 1941. On 16 March 2018, the Fund, together with the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, the executive body of the Kyiv City Council (Kyiv City State Administration) and the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, signed a memorandum of cooperation with a view to creating a memorial complex in Kyiv devoted to the Holocaust and the Babyn Yar tragedy (the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center). In order to meet this objective, the charity has undertaken to hold an architectural contest for the creation of the Memorial Center and to organize the development and approval of the scientific and architectural concept and design documentation of the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center in accordance with the established procedures, to act as the founder, or to involve a construction project owner in accordance with the established procedure to create (build) the Memorial Center.

6. The Babyn Yar Memorial Fund Charitable Organization, whose founder since 28 March 2018 is the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Charity Fund. In 2009, the Kyiv City Council signed an agreement with the Babyn Yar Memorial Fund on the lease of the land plot at 48 Melnikova Street (currently – Iurii Illienko Street) in Shevchenkivskyi District of Kyiv (cadastral number 8000000000:91:105:0005) for construction, operation, and maintenance of the memorial complex buildings and structures including religious and social facilities, additional premises, and a parking lot. The term of the lease agreement is 25 years.
7. The Babyn Yar International Memorial Charity Fund. In accordance with the memorandum on cooperation between the Fund, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, and the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve signed on 14 August 2017, the Fund shall direct its efforts towards facilitating the creation of the Babyn Yar Victims Memorial Museum.
8. The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance is the central executive body whose activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the Minister of Culture and which implements state policy in regard to restoration and preservation of national memory of the Ukrainian people. In accordance with its assigned mission, the Institute ensures keeping records, regulation and conservation of the places of burial of political repression and war victims; initiates construction of monuments, memorial signs (in particular, within the framework of implementation of international treaties to which Ukraine is a signatory); facilitates the search for, keeping records, arrangement, preservation, and maintenance of the places of burial of war participants, victims of political repressions, etc. From 2008 to 2011, the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve had been operating under the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (in 2011, by Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.133-p dated February 14, 2011, the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve was transferred into the management domain of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.).
9. The Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is a state budgetary nonprofit institution based on state ownership and operating under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The principal tasks of the Institute include the provision of scientific services and conducting expert examinations. On 15 November 15 2017, pursuant to Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 331/2017 “On Additional Measures for Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve” dated 20 October 2017, a working group on Development of the Babyn Yar Memorialization Concept was created at the Institute. The working group consists of specialists from the Institute of History of Ukraine of the NAS of Ukraine, the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, the Taras Shevchenko

National University of Kyiv, the Borys Hrinchenko Kyiv University, the Kyiv History Museum, the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, and the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies. Based on the application of the Ministry of Culture dated 13 November 2017 and the agreement between the Institute of History of Ukraine of the NAS of Ukraine and the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, this working group has developed the Concept of the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum. In 2019, pursuant to the Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 542-p “On Approval of the Plan of Measures for the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve” and on the basis of the agreement between the Institute of History of Ukraine of the NAS of Ukraine and the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, the working group developed the Concept of Comprehensive Memorialization of Babyn Yar with an expansion of the Preserve boundaries.

2.3. Cooperation Between State and Non-State Parties

After Ukraine adopted the policy of European integration and alignment with the standards of Western democracies, the issue of cooperation between state and non-state parties became particularly acute. The importance of interaction between governmental authorities and the public in resolving various problems faced by modern society is universally recognized in almost every democratic country. The use of civic consultation in decision making or activity planning, involving the public in the process of drafting regulations and implementing plans, and inviting specialists from the expert community to improve the proposed solutions are signs of a developed democratic state.

In view of the above, there is the challenge of finding the most effective way of involving the broad public into the process of developing and implementing the Concept of Comprehensive Memorialization of Babyn Yar with expansion of the Preserve boundaries. Various representatives of the social sector that are interested in the project can be involved in the work on the Concept only if directly asked by state-run institutions. Thus, the Organizing Committee on the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve created to submit proposals on the long-term development of the Babyn Yar NHMP to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and to co-ordinate measures aimed at perpetuating the memory of Babyn Yar victims was created by the decree of the President of Ukraine to this effect. The same document imperatively appointed members of the said Organizing Committee. The right to change the composition of members, to set up ad hoc groups to ensure operation, and to involve representatives of scientific institutions, civic associations and experts in the work of the Committee in accordance with the established procedure was given exclusively to its co-chairmen, both of whom are representatives of the state authorities – the Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. Therefore, the possibility of participation of civic society representatives in such a socially important project is determined

solely by state authorities. This limits civic initiative and the ability of the public to influence the process of the comprehensive memorialization of Babyn Yar.

Another problem related to the necessity of interaction between state and non-state parties is the presence of several independent parties that use or own the land plots where the future Babyn Yar memorial complex is to be built. These are first of all the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, the Lukianivka State Historical and Memorial Preserve (subordinate to the Department of Housing and Utilities Infrastructure of the Kyiv City State Administration and the property of which is the communal property of the Kyiv City Territorial Community), and the Babyn Yar Memorial Fund. All these actors are active in the commemoration of the tragic history of Babyn Yar and the preservation of memory of this place for future generations, but each of them sees the methods and means of developing the Babyn Yar Complex in its own way. Thus, it is necessary to combine their efforts and engage them in productive cooperation for the sake of the common good. Doing this requires a conscious answer to a number of questions, namely: What type of ownership (state, communal, or private) will characterize the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex? Under what type of ownership will fall the land plots housing the Complex? On what legal grounds (ownership, tenure, etc.) will the relevant land plots be transferred for accommodation of the Complex? How will the construction and operation of the Complex be financed? Which research and expert institutions will be involved in the comprehensive memorialization of Babyn Yar and on what legal grounds?

One more problem is the need to take into account the interests of individuals, who under the right of ownership or use possess land plots or other real estate property items located within or along the planned boundaries of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex. Although preserving and commemorating Babyn Yar history is an issue of international importance, the respect for private property and the rights and interests of individuals is one of the determinant attributes of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

2.4. Prospects and Mechanisms for Solving Legal Issues

The Memorial Complex shall be created on the basis of the existing legal entity (Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve). In view of this, the Babyn Yar Historical and Cultural Preserve Territory should be created, while its maintenance will be in the competence of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve. In such a case, there is no need to transfer all land plots the memorial park will be located on to the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve. At the same time, this will enable the arrangement and maintenance of the preserve according to a single project, which will also allow to create an integral memorial park.

Such a decision is quite feasible in the presence of the will of the state and of the governing bodies of the city of Kyiv, reinforced by their direct actions to cooperate in order to fulfill the goal – the creation of a single Babyn Yar Memorial Complex.

Concerning the problem of effective involvement of the public into the process of developing and implementing the Concept of Comprehensive Memorialization of Babyn Yar with expansion of the Preserve boundaries, it seems that the best possible option is to create under the legal entity that will take care of the creation and further operation of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex a single civic council, which should include representatives of: a) executive bodies and local self-government authorities; b) expert and scientific organizations; c) Ukrainian and international charitable foundations and private sponsors; d) religious and civic associations. Each of the four specified groups of participants shall have an equal number of representatives in the council. Moreover, representatives of civic associations shall be selected to participate in the council on a competitive basis and under the principle of rotation. The right to be elected to the council shall be granted to representatives of civic associations, which actually and for a long period of time conduct activities related to the operation of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex, and the articles of association of which reflect the respective goals and objectives. A civic association shall be able to nominate no more than one candidate to participate in the competition.

Such a council shall function as a single consultative and advisory body on issues pertaining to the creation of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex and shall carry out its activities solely on a self-regulatory and self-government basis. This means that the civic council shall be able to independently decide on the schedule and forms of its work, the procedures for approval of the council's decisions, admission to and exclusion from membership of the council, etc. Moreover, upon creation of the civic council, the Organizing Committee on the Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve and other similar instrumentalities, the purpose of which is to involve the public in the decision-making process, but in which state authorities play a leading role, shall be eliminated, and the civil society representatives involved in such instrumentalities shall be integrated into the newly formed council. At the same time, the bodies of state power and/or local self-government authorities that are to directly approve and implement the Concept of Comprehensive Memorialization of Babyn Yar with expansion of the Preserve boundaries shall be obligated to consider and, if possible, to take into account the recommendations of the council when making relevant decisions, and in case they reject such a recommendation – to provide a detailed justification of such rejection.

It is also necessary to emphasize the importance of resolving all controversial issues arising in the context of the comprehensive memorialization of Babyn Yar through negotiation, compromise, and fair compensation for material and non-pecuniary damages that may be caused by the expansion of the preserve boundaries, with due consideration of the interests of private individuals. This is especially true with regard to the private individuals who possess the right of ownership or use of the land plots or other real estate property items located within the planned boundaries of the Babyn Yar Memorial Complex or adjoining the specified boundaries. The wide use of open, democratic, and transparent solutions and efforts to achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable compromise on potentially conflictual issues, as well as respect for private property

manifested in a readiness for constructive negotiations and adequate compensation for possible losses, will promote the recognition of the importance of the Babyn Yar comprehensive memorialization project by society and the state and enhance the international prestige of the project.

3. Administrative and Financial Aspects

3.1. Institutional support

The primary institution to actually implement the Concept shall be the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, provided that it is conferred additional functions and brought to a fundamentally different professional level of activity.

The Babyn Yar NHMP shall become a powerful and authoritative research, cultural, educational, scientific, and methodological institution of the national level. This requirement follows from the pressing need of society for the memorialization of Babyn Yar; goals and objectives of the Concept, from the number of measures already taken by the state for comprehensive preservation and modern interpretation of national memory in this territory, as well as from the importance and urgency of solving a number of complex issues of a political, historical, legal, proprietorial, financial, memorial, administrative, and organizational nature related to Babyn Yar memorialization.

Considering the particular significance of the complex of historical and cultural monuments within the Babyn Yar territory, its special role in world and national history, in the formation and implementation of the state policy of remembrance and protection of historical and cultural heritage, in the revitalization of the processes of restoring historical memory, justice, and responsibility, and in the formation of an open and democratic society in Ukraine, the state shall play a leading role in the future development and operation of the Babyn Yar NHMP. The latter shall be primarily financed from the state budget with the possibility of attracting extra-budgetary resources.

Based on the Concept, the Preserve shall perform the following activities and necessary functions:

- the preservation and perpetuation of the memory of the Holocaust victims, as well as victims of the Nazi terror and Communist political repressions; use of museum means to provide objective, balanced, and systematic coverage of the history and tragedy of Babyn Yar, their place in the memory of individual people, communities, Ukrainian society, and mankind at large;
- conducting activities on discovery, study, record-keeping, protection, preservation, maintenance, proper use, conservation, restoration, rehabilitation, and museumification of cultural and historical heritage sites, associated territories and movable objects;

performance of scholarly, methodological, excursion, cultural, educational, and information work.

The Babyn Yar NHMP manages the territory of the preserve consisting of the plots, which, according to this Concept, should become a part of the Memorial park. The territory of the Babyn Yar NHMP consists of land plots that have been or are going to be transferred by buy-out or free transfer in accordance with the established procedure to the assets of the Reserve on the basis of ownership or perpetual use for the purpose of maintaining the Reserve activity. Taking into account the fact that currently the land plots of the potential Babyn Yar NHMP have different forms of ownership (state, communal, private) and different city development and monument protection status and purpose, it is expedient to determine the designated purpose of these land plots (for construction, reconstruction, improvement, maintenance, and operation) in accordance with this Concept and to implement measures for their transfer into state ownership under the current legislation and for their allocation and transfer to the assets of the Babyn Yar NHMP.

The Babyn Yar NHMP shall use the allotted land plots and bear responsibility for compliance with the requirements concerning their protection and sustainable land use in accordance with the current legislation.

The following zones can be allotted within the territory of the Babyn Yar NHMP:

- protected (architectural and memorial conservation area) – historical and architectural monuments and sites, areas for conservation and protection of valuable historical and memorial artifacts;
- ceremonial – space for carrying out commemoration ceremonies;
- expository – for housing permanent and thematic exhibitions;
- scholarly – a sector for conducting all kinds of scientific activities;
- recreational – space for reflection, recreation, servicing visitors;
- cultural and educational – space for the implementation of scheduled cultural and educational programs, including those for children;
- utility – an area for housing administrative and auxiliary utility and technical services that ensure the vital activity of the Babyn Yar NHMP.

The organizational and functional structure of the Babyn Yar NHMP shall provide for the following major components:

1. The Babyn Yar Memorial Park
2. Ukraine's Holocaust Museum
3. The Babyn Yar Memorial Museum.

To ensure its effective management, the Babyn Yar NHMP shall be provided with a modern administration system that is guided first of all by Western models of cultural institution management, including in particular the competitive selection of the chief executive officer based on his/her clear development strategy, high professional competencies, proven track record, and established authority in the professional and target environment; recruitment of staff based on their level of education, professional qualities, employment history, individual traits and motivation; the introduction of long-term planning and public reporting; ensuring vigorous program activity, extensive involvement of volunteers, members of advisory boards, and friends of the Babyn Yar NHMP, the implementation of innovative methods of running the institution, and the creation of a stable system of financial support of its activities.

The management of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP shall implement an effective administration system, in particular by means of:

- the generation of a strategic *Babyn Yar* NHMP development plan on the basis of this Concept, the long-term development plan, and the conducted analysis of the environment (SWOT-analysis);
- the definition of priority areas of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP activity;
- the introduction of the latest technologies and practices of modern management;
- the development and further improvement of an organizational and functional structure and an optimal schedule of positions and salaries;
- ensuring sustainable development of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP through an integrated system of state and extra-budgetary financing and extensive involvement of benefactors and volunteers;
- the building of a professional team of employees on the basis of competitions to fill the vacancies;
- the creation of advisory bodies, namely a supervisory board, a civic council, and a development council;
- the development of internal and external communication strategies;
- the implementation of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP performance appraisal and public reporting systems;
- the creation of a comfortable environment for the monuments, collections and visitors by means of an appropriately developed infrastructure;
- social partnership networking on the levels of the territorial community and target groups.

In order to ensure proper conditions for its activities and to achieve its objectives, as well as to effectively involve interested parties from different sectors of the state and society, the *Babyn Yar* NHMP may create consultative and advisory bodies entitled to involve interdisciplinary specialists and members of the public in their activities, including without limitation:

- **supervisory board** (functions: representative capacity, assistance in ensuring administrative, legal and strategic functioning of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP, and control over its activities); creation of a supervisory board is legally compulsory for institutions of national significance. It is expedient that representatives of international professional and civic communities be included on the board;
- **civic council** (functions: effective involvement of the public in the process of this Concept development and implementation, civic oversight over the institution activities, resolution of controversial issues and conflicts, the coordination of a balanced involvement of all stakeholders in the project); for principles of formation and functioning of the council see Section 8 “Legal context”;
- **development council** (functions: promotion, facilitation of formation and operation of the charitable fund, search for additional sources and methods of financing to support the *Babyn Yar* NHMP activities on the principal directions of its development and its sustainable growth);
- **scholarly council / scholarly and methodological council** (functions: organization of scientific research and other scientific and methodological activities, elaboration and approbation of proposals on the main directions of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP strategic development);
- **restoration council** (functions: ensuring the proper condition, storage and display of units of storage of the repository collection);
- **collection procurement commission** (functions: ensuring replenishment of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP repository collection);
- **attestation commission** (functions: control of proper professional levels of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP employees and qualitative performance of their employment duties).

The creation of such organs as consultative and advisory is in accordance with the laws of Ukraine “On Museums and Museum Work,” “On Culture,” the Statute on the national institution, and the statute of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP. Functional work of these councils is legalized by separate regulations.

These consultative and advisory bodies are to be formed in such a way that their functions do not duplicate each other, and that their composition includes the optimum number of motivated and competent members that shall ensure active and effective functioning of the advisory bodies and balanced participation of various categories of their members: government employees, civic society figures, scholars, and sponsors – in order to promptly and efficiently adopt objective, constructive, and unbiased joint decisions.

The personal composition of the supervisory board shall be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine upon recommendation of the property management body. The procedure for formation and operation of the supervisory board shall be determined by the Regulation on the Supervisory Board, which shall be approved by the property management body. The procedure for formation, operation, and responsibilities of other advisory bodies shall be

determined by the Babyn Yar NHMP in its statute and regulations on these advisory bodies and approved by the Babyn Yar NHMP management body.

Decisions on the vital issues of approval and implementation of this Concept shall be taken by the Organizing Committee on Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve, created by Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 331/2017 “On Additional Measures for Prospective Development of the Babyn Yar National Historical Memorial Preserve” dated 20 October 2017.

3.2. Management and Staffing

The ability of an institution to fulfill its mission is determined by its labor resources; the know-how or skills possessed by these labor resources; the quality of the strategy designed to integrate and strengthen these skills; resources acquired as a result of its activity; and the viability of all these elements.

Therefore, the selection of personnel, unlocking their skills, the implementation of the available professional experience in everyday work, and the attainment of the optimum number of staff positions are important components of the personnel policy and success factors in managing the Babyn Yar NHMP. Vacancies shall be filled chiefly on the basis of open competition, which shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements to the implementation of work tasks. It is necessary to develop practices of collective decision-making, as well as the participation of the entire staff in the life and activities of the Babyn Yar NHMP and in extra-museum, particularly volunteering, activities.

To this end, the management and administration of the Babyn Yar NHMP shall carry out the following measures:

- the of the organizational structure;
- increasing the number of staff members as required by the challenges and needs of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP;
- the development and implementation of the basic principles of teambuilding;
- the improvement of working conditions and social protection of employees;
- the introduction of motivational stimulation of labor;
- maximum unlocking of staff skills, implementation of the available professional experience;
- regular upgrade training and certification of employees;
- the systematic study of the needs and requests of staff (comprehensive questionnaires, open discussions, internal conferences);
- the monitoring of performance and motivation results;
- providing opportunities for sharing thoughts and new ideas, and coordination of joint activities of the employees.

Management at the Project Implementation Stage

To launch the process of the project implementation, it is first necessary to take the following steps:

- to secure approval of the Concept of Comprehensive Memorialization of Babyn Yar;
- to grant land plots the status of protected territory and its subordination to the *Babyn Yar* NHMP as an institution in charge for observing the regime of a protected territory;
- to restore the building at 44 Iurii Illienko Street with allocation of working premises for the employees of the Babyn Yar NHMP;
- to start the process of land plots consolidation for the creation of the memorial park;
- to start the process of land allocation for construction of the museum complex.

Coordination of Management at the Operation Stage

Coordination and interaction of the various structural components of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Concept, the Statute of the Babyn Yar NHMP, the laws of Ukraine “On Protection of Cultural Heritage” and “On Museums and Museum Affairs,” and other legislative acts.

The Memorial Park, the Ukrainian Holocaust Museum, the Babyn Yar Memorial Museum, and other possible units shall become structural divisions of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP acting as its subsidiaries or departments.

3.3. Financial Support

The *Babyn Yar* NHMP is a budgetary non-profit organization (cultural institution).

The *Babyn Yar* NHMP owns separate property, acts as an independent accounting entity, and is entitled to perform transactions, own and acquire property and personal non-property rights, and bear corresponding responsibilities on its own behalf. The institution has the right to independently carry out foreign economic activity in accordance with the procedure established by the legislation of Ukraine.

The institution shall be funded from the state budget of Ukraine against the approved estimate and in other ways outlined by the legislation. The received funds shall be used by the *Babyn Yar* NHMP for their intended purpose.

The main source of the financing for the *Babyn Yar* NHMP shall be the state budget. Additional sources of extra-budgetary financing shall include target charitable contributions, raising funds from revenues from the charitable fund, from the network of friends, grants, corporate, and individual donations, as well as ticket sales, guided tours, the shop (printed materials, souvenirs), the art-cafe, the restaurant, and the rent of premises for cultural, educational, and commemorative events related to the Babyn Yar topics. A special role shall be

assigned to the supervisory board, the civic council, and the council for the *Babyn Yar* NHMP development, in particular in ensuring the participation of sponsors, in the process of determining the areas for development, and in controlling the expenditures of the provided resources. At the same time, it is crucially important to ensure institutional, financial, and legal independence and impartiality of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP in making important decisions concerning the implementation of its statutory objectives.

The top-priority measures for organization of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP financing include:

- the development of an effective fundraising plan based on the *Babyn Yar* NHMP strategic development plan and the long-term operation plan;
- estimation of its activity costs;
- the introduction of marketing planning and of an assertive marketing policy;
- improving the quality and scope of paid services;
- the formation of the supervisory board and the trustee council (development council), stepping up of their activities;
- the engagement of investors, philanthropists, and sponsors to the *Babyn Yar* NHMP activities that shall take place in accordance with the *Babyn Yar* NHMP Statute and the Regulation on Public-Private Partnerships through the *Babyn Yar* NHMP civic and development councils.

To ensure the development of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP, it is especially important to draw up a financial plan (for three to five years) that will help to identify priorities and prospects. Financial planning involves:

- the estimation of expenses for the operation of the institution within the scope of its planned activities;
- the estimation of the expected proceeds of its activity (by category of income, including donations, entrance fees, tuition fees, membership fees, other income items);
- the difference between expenses and income, which shows the need for additional funds;
- the planning of expansion and additions to the existing activities.

3.4. Informational Support

Activities of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP call for a high level of publicity, transparency, openness, a critical approach, and extensive expert and public discussion. This is mandated by the historical, political, and social significance of the project, as well as the potential for conflict on the conceptual issues of its creation and operation in view of the fundamentally different visions of the symbolism of the space, which manifest themselves in the form of controversial variants for the memorialization of *Babyn Yar* suggested by various political, ideological, scientific, cultural, and social groups.

The essential components of this process require active informational coverage, broad public and expert involvement, public discussion and joint decision-making by the stakeholders of the project, and achievement of the national and international public consensus.

Gaining public support for the project requires the creation of a positive image, a high-quality brand, and a strong reputation of the institution, and ensuring wide public support of its activities through a proper communication strategy and program activities.

The main task of the public relations program is to provide actual and true information about the *Babyn Yar* NHMP, to provide new knowledge and experience to its visitors, to convince them of the importance of the project and to raise interest in the activities of the institution that will cause involvement and comprehensive support. This program shall reflect the conceptual ideas of the project, the strategy of their implementation and the daily activities of the institution, stimulate its further development, and broaden the circle of stakeholders, friends, partners, philanthropists, and various audiences.

Programmatic and Institutional Marketing Shall Become Important Tools of Effective Civic Support of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP. Programmatic marketing of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP shall be primarily based on the tools and strategies used to create audiences in support of its activities, educational programs, lectures, exhibitions, etc. It shall use both the traditional media – printed products, radio and television media, mail, telemarketing, community-based partnerships, special incentives, discounts and networks – as well as electronic media, social and mobile media, and its own media channels. Those include informational and promotional announcements, emails, brochures, radio shows, social networks, online events, and more.

Effective programmatic marketing shall develop long-term multi-level relationships with visitors and stakeholders of the project. This requires the *Babyn Yar* NHMP to identify its target audiences and produce a powerful message that shall be actively promoted through the appropriate channels in order to gain visibility of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP, to create a context and conduct educational work around it, to guarantee the quality of the historical and cultural product and experience received, as well as to lay the foundations for development of attachment to the institution.

Institutional marketing is aimed at creating an understanding and commitment to the identity and activities of the institution. It shall utilize all of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP assets – physical (first of all its territory, buildings, monuments, and memorial signs, etc.), human (internal or external), and its own expertise and practices (commemorative ceremonies, artistic processes, cultural and educational events, special excursions, etc.) – for gaining commitment and support of potential visitors, sympathizers, investors, donors, members of councils, partners, and volunteers.

The creative use of the institution's assets to enhance understanding, commitment, and enthusiasm around it shall begin with activities that disseminate information about the idea,

people, processes, and other institutional assets, encourage critical (re)consideration of important pages of our complex and traumatic history, engage everyone in open and constructive discussion of controversial issues, resolve conflicts, overcome the struggle for remembrance between different groups, and adopt joint decisions.

- to ensure the effective formation and functioning of the civic council;
- to develop the *Babyn Yar* NHMP communication strategy and public relations programs and to actively implement them;
- to create and develop the identity of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP, particularly through its brand book, mission, active and democratic communication policy, unique programs, and projects;
- to modernize and actively operate the *Babyn Yar* NHMP website and social networking pages;
- to create its own media channels (electronic publications, portals, blogs, online documentary radio and television channels);
- to develop a program for expanding the circle of the project stakeholders, partners, friends, sympathizers, donors, investors, and philanthropists;
- to intensify the relevant interinstitutional/inter-museum cooperation;
- to ensure international individual, institutional, and expert support for the *Babyn Yar* NHMP (membership in ICOM, ICOMOS, the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, thematic international Holocaust remembrance organizations, etc.);
- to actively study international experience, to critically analyze possible prototypes and counterparts of the *Babyn Yar* NHMP in the world, and to involve world-class experts in its activities;
- to engage a wide range of volunteers in the *Babyn Yar* NHMP activities;
- to form the *Babyn Yar* NHMP membership and the circle of friends;
- to set up and implement programs for audience development and strengthening of the institutional brand.

**Appendix 1: THEMATIC PLAN OF THE BABYN YAR MEMORIAL MUSEUM—
EXPOSITION THEMATIC PLAN**

DESPAIR (THE CRIME)

Voices of the victims

The beginning of the executions of Jews on September 29–30, 1941

PRE-HISTORY (THE NECROPOLIS)

The Princely Era and the Russian Empire

Babyn Yar before the beginning of the twentieth century

The Ukrainian Revolution

Kyiv during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921

Communism (USSR), Part 1

Communist ideology

Social and political changes in the Soviet society in 1930s

The beginning of the Second World War, the role of the USSR in its unleashing

HISTORY (THE MASSACRE)

Nazism

Racial theory, Nazi ideology

The German attack on the USSR

Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD in the territory of the USSR, Einsatzgruppe C

Defeat of the Red Army near Kyiv, entry of the German troops into the city

Mining, sabotage, and explosions in Khreshchatyk and other locations in Kyiv, detonating the Dormition Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

German occupation administration, formation of civilian authorities from representatives of the local population

Nazi punitive system

Nazi propaganda

Everyday life of Kyiv citizens during the occupation

Deportation of workers to Germany

Fates of the victims

The first executions in Babyn Yar, the Jewish department of the concentration camp in Kerosynna Street

Organization of the “Grossaktion” in Kyiv

Reaction of the Kyiv citizens to the execution of Jews

Stories of the survivors and those who saved them

The fate of Soviet prisoners of war, concentration camps in Kyiv

The executions of Roma in Babyn Yar

The murder of Pavlov Psychiatric Hospital patients

The OUN underground in Kyiv

The Soviet underground in Kyiv

Syrets Concentration Camp

The execution of Dynamo Kyiv football players, the legend of the “Death Match”

Aktion 1005, burning of the corpses in Babyn Yar

POST-WAR HISTORY (THE REMEMBRANCE)

Communism (USSR), part 2

Return of the Soviet government to Kyiv, punishment of war criminals

First media publications about Babyn Yar, investigation of the crimes

Babyn Yar monument project of 1945, the first literary and musical works devoted to the execution of Jews

Stalin’s anti-Semitic campaign, the struggle against “cosmopolitanism” and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”

1961 Kurenivska mudslide, the number of victims

Architectural competitions of 1965

The unauthorized rally on September 29, 1966

Official Babyn Yar commemoration ceremonies during the Era of Stagnation

The Soviet monument of 1976

Informal commemoration of the Babyn Yar victims during the Era of Stagnation, protest acts

Building development of Babyn Yar in Soviet times

Commemoration of the Babyn Yar victims in Perestroika years Ukraine

Building development of Babyn Yar under independent Ukraine

Babyn Yar commemoration ceremonies

“Competition of memory” in Babyn Yar, a patchwork of monuments

Postwar Germany

Investigation of Nazi crimes in Babyn Yar

The cooperation between Soviet and German justice systems in investigating Nazi crimes on the territory of USSR and Ukraine

Testimonials of the survivors during the trials of Nazi criminals

Representation of Nazis and their crimes in the museums of Germany

Independent Ukraine

Redevelopment of Babyn Yar in independent Ukraine

Ceremonies of commemoration of Babyn Yar victims

The competition of memories in Babyn Yar: Mosaics of monuments

HOPE (HUMANITY)

The Righteous of Babyn Yar

Babyn Yar remembrance advocates during Soviet times

PASS-THROUGH SECTIONS

Historical topography of the memorial space

Child victims of Babyn Yar

Appendix 2: UKRAINE’S HOLOCAUST MUSEUM—EXPOSITION THEMATIC PLAN

HOLOCAUST BACKGROUND

Ideology

Western World

Christianity and Christian-Jewish relations

Ideology of the Enlightenment (positive knowledge, social engineering ideas)

Racial theory

Nationalism

Secular anti-Semitism

The crisis of liberalism caused by the First World War and the Great Depression

Germany

Lutheranism and its attitude towards Jews

German nationalism

German anti-Semitism

The ideological crisis in Germany after its defeat in the First World War

Ukraine

Ukrainian churches and their attitude towards Jews

Ukrainian socialism

Bolshevism

The ideological crisis in the Ukrainian national-liberation movement after the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921

Ukrainian nationalism

Jews

The traditional Jewish community and its relationship with the surrounding non-Jewish communities

Assimilation

The spread of liberal ideas

Zionism

The spread of socialist and communist ideas

The crisis of Orthodox Judaism

Politics

Western World

Imperialism and colonialism

Economic and social modernization

Legal emancipation of Jews in the West

Political anti-Semitism from the 19th to early 20th centuries

Germany

The creation of the German Empire

German colonial policy

Modernization in Germany

Jewish policies in the German states from the late 18th to early 20th centuries

Political anti-Semitism in Germany from the 19th to early 20th centuries

Ukraine

Jewish policy in Austria and Austria-Hungary from the late 18th to early 20th centuries

Jewish policy in the Russian empire from the late 18th to early 20th centuries

Jewish policy in the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian State

Jewish policy in Soviet Ukraine and USSR, 1918–1941

Anti-Semitism in the Ukrainian territories from the 17th to the first half of the 20th century

Jews

The integration of Jews into European societies from the late 18th to early 20th centuries

The integration of Jews into German society from the late 18th to early 20th centuries

Jews in the Ukrainian territories from the 17th to early 20th centuries as part of the Eastern European Jewish community

Jews in Austro-Hungarian society

Jews in Russian society

Jews in interwar Soviet society

HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST

Persecution of Jews in the Third Reich

Attitude towards Jews in the ideology of National Socialism

Pre-war persecutions and restrictions imposed on Jews in Germany

Ghettoization of Jews in the occupied Polish territory

Mass executions of Jews in the occupied territories of the USSR and Serbia. The escalation of the persecution policy towards total extermination

Babyn Yar

Murder of Jews in death camps

The Fate of Jews Outside the Territory of the Nazi Rule

Western World

The attitude towards Jews in the ideology and ethnonational policy of the Central European states in the interwar period

Pre-war persecutions and restrictions imposed on Jews in the countries of Central Europe (primarily in Romania and Poland)

Deportation and ghettoization of Jews in Romania and in the territories of the USSR occupied by Romania during the Second World War

Oppression of Jews and their deportations to the Nazi death camps from the Axis countries and the satellites of the Reich (Bulgaria, France, Slovakia, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, and Japan) carried out under the German influence

Persecution and murders of Jews during the Second World War in Croatia

The attitude towards Jews in the ideology and policies of national-liberation movements during the Second World War

Jews and the Lithuanian and Polish independent military forces during and after the Second World War

Persecution of Jews in postwar Poland

The Free World and the Holocaust – politics and propaganda

Ukraine

Deportations of Jews in the USSR from the territories occupied by the USSR in the early years of the Second World War

Attitudes towards Jews in the ideology and policies of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement in 1930s and 1940s.

Jews and Ukrainian independent armed forces during and after the Second World War

The Jewish question in Soviet ideology and propaganda during the Second World War

Jews and the Soviet guerilla movement

Persecution of Jews in the postwar USSR

Jews

Jews in ghettos and labor camps

Jews in concentration and death camps

Jewish resistance

Jews in the military forces of the countries participating in the Second World War, as well as in independent armed forces

Jews in the Red Army

Jews in the Polish Army

Jews in the Wehrmacht

Jews in the Hungarian Army

Jews in Soviet, Polish, and Jewish guerilla groups

Jews in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Social and political activity of Jews during the Holocaust

Jews in the social life of the countries participating in the Second World War

The Holocaust in the Context of History of Violence

The World

The Holocaust in the context of the history of the Second World War

The Holocaust in the context of the history of totalitarianism in the 20th century

The Holocaust and acts of genocide from the 19th to early 21st centuries

The Holocaust in the context of mass violence of the second quarter of the 20th century

Germany

The Holocaust in the context of the German-Soviet War

The Holocaust in the context of the Nazi *Ostpolitik*

The Holocaust in the context of the history of the German occupation regime

The Holocaust in the context of Nazi acts of genocide and mass persecutions

Ukraine

The Holocaust in the context of Soviet forcible modernization, the destruction of traditional society and its fundamental moral standards

The Holocaust in the context of Soviet genocide and mass persecutions

The Holocaust in the context of the national politics of the OUN and ethnic cleansings of UPA

Jews

Ultra-right Jewish movements in the middle of the 20th century

Jewish forced collaboration in the Holocaust: *Judenrats* and Jewish police of order

AFTERMATH OF THE HOLOCAUST

Western World

The effect of the Holocaust on creation of the postmodern left-wing liberal society

The effect of the Holocaust on the post-war processes in Christian denominations

The effect of the Holocaust on the post-war development of international law

The memory of the Holocaust: world experience

Germany

The effect of the Holocaust on the formation of modern German society

The memory of the Holocaust: German experience

Ukraine

The Holocaust in the context of the ethno-national policy, interethnic relations and anti-Semitism in the post-war USSR and Ukraine

The Holocaust in the context of the ethno-national policy, interethnic relations, and anti-Semitism in independent Ukraine

The memory of the Holocaust in Soviet Ukraine

The memory of the Holocaust in independent Ukraine

Jews

The Holocaust and the end of the Eastern European period of the Jewish history

The Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel

The Holocaust in the ideology of the modern Israeli society

The Holocaust factor in the modern Jewish World

The effect of the Holocaust on post-war processes in Judaism

The Holocaust factor in the post-war history of the Jews of the USSR and Ukraine

The Holocaust as a factor in the history of Jews in independent Ukraine

The memory of the Holocaust in Israel

The memory of the Holocaust in the Jewish Diaspora

THE HOLOCAUST AND MORAL CHOICE

The Holocaust as a collision between traditional and modern ethics

The Holocaust and the problem of personal choice and freedom of will

Christian churches during the Holocaust

The position and actions of religious leaders in the Ukrainian territories during the Holocaust

The behavior of the non-Jewish population during the Holocaust: social, political, and personal factors

The behavior of the non-Jewish population of Ukraine during the Holocaust

Appendix 3: KEY TERMS

1. Totalitarianism

By “totalitarianism” the Concept understands an ideology together with political and social practices, whose a long-term deliberate goal is the creation of a society (totalitarian state) or social structures (totalitarian party, totalitarian sect) which are ruled by a centralized, organized, and unified government controlling all mental and physical expressions of life in the entire society, its structural entities, and individual members. The main features of the totalitarian society include:

- a single all-encompassing ideology;
- unified morals, in which the interests of the totalitarian structure are proclaimed the highest value;
- centralized aggressive propaganda;
- a unified system of education;
- a unified historical memory;
- a centralized system of administration, in which an administrative apparatus is subordinate to an ideological leadership belonging to a single ruling party;
- lack of actual democratic process and the division of power;
- a constant systemic deliberate terror against their own citizens on the part of the law enforcement controlled by the ruling party;
- centralized control over economy;

Among the classical examples of totalitarian states are the Nazi Third Reich, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states.

2. Holocaust

Despite the fact that the Holocaust takes an important place in contemporary historical studies (above all Western European and American), world historiography does not give a definite answer to the questions about its content, periodization, and reasons as they depend on the point of view on this historical event. The situation is complicated by the fact that the term “Holocaust” was first used in the 1950s, already after the end of the events it was to describe. However, even those terms that were first used during the war (such as Khurban – the Ruin, or

Shoah – the Catastrophe), just as the Holocaust itself (meaning “total burning”), had not so much rational as emotional overtones which allow for a relatively broad content.

The Concept views the Holocaust, above all, as an ideologically motivated, organized, and deliberate mass murder of the Jews during the Second World War by the Nazi Germany with the help of its allies and accomplices, which resulted in the death of roughly six million Jews.

The Concept applies the term “Holocaust in Ukraine” also with reference to mass murder of Jews by the Nazis on Ukrainian lands. At the same time, the authors do not intend to give the term “Holocaust” an all-encompassing meaning, as it is sometimes used in the phrases like the “Holocaust of the Roma” referring to the genocide of the Roma, or the “Ukrainian Holocaust” referring to the Holodomor. Likewise, the term should not include other instances of mass persecutions and murders committed by the Nazi Germany against other ethnic, religious, or social groups, among them Slavs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, mentally disabled people, and homosexuals.

Such a narrow meaning of the term “Holocaust” is easier to define. Nevertheless, the Concept does not consider the Holocaust a unique historical event, but rather views it, despite its truly unprecedented nature, as a universal symbol of all modern genocides.

3. Genocide

The term “genocide,” just like the Holocaust, is an artificial one, created to refer to a group of events recognized as similar only post factum. In addition, aside from the purely historical, it also has political and legal meanings, which makes it more difficult to use the term correctly with respect to different historical developments. Despite all these difficulties, this term is widely disseminated in social discourse, and therefore its use in the Concept is fully justified.

In understanding genocide, the Concept draws upon the United Nations Convention “On the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide” of 9 December 1948. At the same time, it should be stressed that the initial definition of this phenomenon, as it appeared in the 96th Resolution of the UN General Assembly “The Crime of Genocide” on 11 December 1946 was broader in content. It is widely known that the subsequent limitation of the content occurred exclusively under pressure from political factors. Therefore, the Concept thinks it reasonable to return to the initial understanding of the genocide as an ideologically motivated destruction – partial or complete – of entire communities: national, ethnic, racial, religious, political or other. Such genocidal actions include first of all the murder of the members of these groups and a deliberate creation of living conditions which cause a complete or partial annihilation of a given group.

Considering the significance of the Holocaust for history and historical memory of many countries and peoples, as well as for shaping the modern view of the genocide, the authors of the Concept view the Holocaust as the universal symbol of all genocides.

4. Terror

The Concept considers such related terms as “terror,” “terrorist activity,” and “terrorism” not in criminal and legal terms, but as social and political phenomena that have concrete historical meanings. “Terror” is treated as a policy whose goal is to intimidate a state or a social group into behaving in a certain way, while “terrorist activity” (or “terrorism”) are viewed as concrete steps in implementing this policy.

The instruments of terror are individual or mass murders, repressions, and persecutions, or the threat of such actions, directed at citizens of a state or the representatives of a social group. It is not the actual actions of the victims, but the very fact of their belonging to a certain category that are the motives behind the terror. The subject of terror can be either a state or non-state actors, often supported unofficially by the state.

The terror launched by the state is directed at the intimidation of a population and might include the total extermination of certain groups. Such an extermination usually comprises a separate goal of state politics. The extermination of Jews was a goal of the Nazi politics, but it also served an instrument of intimidation of the Slavic population in occupied territories. The extermination of what were considered well-to-do peasants was a goal of Soviet politics, but it also served as an instrument of intimidation of all peasants.

The terror applied by the state might acquire an inter-state character, as it happened during the mutual bombings of the participants in the Second World War.

The terror by non-state parties might acquire a different character and be used to intimidate a state (its leadership or the entire population) or particular social groups (social or political) defined as hostile by the subjects of terror.

The leftists (anarchists, social-revolutionaries) used social-revolutionary terror against their own states. Nationalist liberation movements used terror against other states and their populations, among them the OUN in interwar Poland, the IRA in Great Britain, as well as the Jewish Zionist terrorist organizations Irgun and Lehi in British Mandate for Palestine. Terrorist elements were part of the struggle of Soviet, Ukrainian, and Polish guerrilla groups against the Nazi and Soviet occupiers during and after the Second World War.

The terror by non-state actors and unorganized groups against the stateless civilians was exemplified by the pogroms against Jews and against noble landowners during the revolutionary upheavals in tsarist Russia; the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Polish Home Army against Polish and Ukrainian civilians respectively during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia; and the actions of the Palestinian terrorists in Israel.

5. Nation and Nationalism

There is a need to define ethnicity as a term when dealing with the memorial complex devoted to mass violence committed based on ethnicity and race. This task gets more complicated in view of the fact that the world is undergoing a second modernization with the result that social groups are getting less stable. If the modern age led to the replacement of identities based on religion and social estate with the ethnonational, the postmodern age aspires for the dominance of a single human community. At the same time, regardless of one's attitude towards social ideals, humanity is still divided by ethnicity (as well as race and religion), and human behavior and collective consciousness are still influenced by this divide. Therefore, while reconstructing various past and present events it is impossible to ignore such a divide without running a risk of distorting the real picture of social life.

The Concept uses the term “nation” in two senses:

- the political nation as a community of all citizens of a given state;
- the ethnic nation as a community of people who self-identify with a particular ethnic group.

On this basis, the Concept views “nationalism” as an ideology that acknowledges the fact that humanity is divided into separate nations, and as a political movement that champions national rights, including the acquisition, building, and empowering its own sovereign nation-state. At the same time, nationalism might have an ethnic or civil character. In the first instance, it is the movement for political self-determination of an ethnic community; in the second instance, it is a movement for self-determination of a territorial community on the basis of a culture native to a numerically or politically dominant ethnic community. Nationalism can be emancipatory or imperialist and prefer different forms of political and economic organization for a state and society, and use different methods of struggle for the reaching its own goals.

6. Ethnic Historical Memory

With respect to the ethnically motivated view of social problems, among them “ethnic historical memory,” the authors of the Concept proceed from the following assumptions:

- first, “ethnic historical memory” concerns a relative majority of people who self-identify with a given ethnic community;
- second, every ethnic community today espouses a variety of models of memory;
- third, certain models of memory about important events, such as the Holocaust, that emerged within an ethnic community, can also be shared by a number of people who do not self-identify with a given community.

There is another question about the formal representation of the views of ethnic communities, especially diasporic minorities. Today, civic organizations speak on behalf of

ethnic minorities, created and based on ethnic characteristics. Usually, it is only a minority of members of such an ethnic community that actively participates in the formation of its social position. There are also differences in the social positions of different organizations. Usually, it is the position of leaders of civic organizations that is identified with the collective position of the entire community in the eyes of the government and society.

For all these reservations, the authors of the Concept think it possible and necessary to regard ethnic communities as collective actors when social and political attitudes or historical memory are concerned.

7. National, Ethnic

In this Concept, the term “national” is used to describe phenomena related to the state and the political (civic) nation. For phenomena related to certain social groups, the terms “ethnic” or “confessional” are used. The term “ethno-national” is used to describe phenomena related to the social life of ethnic communities. The term “nationalist” is used to describe phenomena related to a particular ideology. Below are examples of the use of these terms in relevant contexts:

- state policy – ethno-national
- communities, minorities – ethnic (and religious, where appropriate)
- civic organizations – ethno-national
- culture, life – ethno-national
- relationships – interethnic (and inter-religious, where appropriate)
- state – national
- history – national
- ideology – nationalist
- political movement – national-liberation (content-wise), nationalist (ideology-wise)
- political organizations – nationalist (ideology-wise)
- historical memory – national (at the level of a political nation), ethnic (of a specific ethnic group)
- remembrance policy – national
- remembrance model – national (prevalence-wise), nationalist (content-wise)
- institutions – national

8. Civilization

The Concept considers “civilization” as a cultural unity that is chronologically more long-lasting and geographically wider than an individual culture or state, such as Christian, Western, Classical, Jewish, Islamic, and Enlightened civilizations. There are also lesser civilizations within some of them, including Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, Russian, Hellenic, Ashkenazic, etc.

A civilizational choice is wider than a choice of values, as civilization is based not only on particular civic and moral values, but also on more complex ideas about the world, humanity, and society, which define these values.

At the same time, no nation and no country are doomed to forever remain within a particular civilization. That is why we can pose a question about Ukraine’s civilizational choice.

9. “Soviet” (Ukrainian “radianskyi” or “sovietskyi”)

In the Ukrainian language it is becoming common lately to use the term “sovietskyi” to describe phenomena related to the former USSR. Regardless of one’s attitude to the political regime itself, one must admit that during Soviet rule a full range of terms were established in the Ukrainian language, including that of “radianskyi.” This is different from the situation with the short-term Nazi rule in Ukraine, during which there appeared no established Ukrainian counterparts to German names. For this reason, the Concept consistently uses the term “radianskyi” in the context of the history of the USSR.

10. Collaboration or Cooperation

In the Soviet historical and political literature, the term “accomplices” was used to describe organizations or individuals who, in some manner or other, cooperated with the Nazis during the Second World War. In the literature of independent Ukraine, the term “collaboration” is gradually becoming more common in this context. The authors of this Concept proceed from the premise that, first, the term “complicity” under Soviet times was applied to a too wide range of actions, including normal means of survival under occupation, and second, this term had a pronounced judgmental connotation and was associated with treason. As regards the term “collaboration,” it is also associated with the concept of treason against the state. However, since neither before nor during nor after the Second World War Ukraine had any true statehood and its lands were successively captured by and forcibly incorporated into other states, it is not possible to speak about the treason of Ukrainian citizens against the state in the first place. The authors of the Concept believe that “cooperation” is the most appropriate term for describing the behavior of certain organizations and individuals under the Soviet, Polish, Nazi, and other regimes. Whether it had a criminal character, depends on particular actions and not on the fact of cooperation as such.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that under totalitarian rule, which applied systemic mass persecutions and murders based on subjective (group) characteristics and deliberately destroyed all structures of civil society, everybody was forced to choose one's own strategy of survival. Meanwhile, the totalitarian regimes tried deliberately to discredit and destroy any universal moral norms and values as a means of an organized ideological manipulation of the population they ruled. In such circumstances, it was exceedingly hard for an individual not to overstep the line that separated a desire to survive from becoming an accomplice in crimes against humanity.

11. The Righteous or Rescuers

The title "Righteous Among the Nations" was introduced by Yad Vashem in 1953. It is given to non-Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. One of the requirements of receiving the title is a confirmation of the act of rescue by personal testimonies of those rescued. Only in rare cases is the evidence of documents confirming the rescue taken into account.

Considering the fact that in Ukraine, as elsewhere in the former USSR, the Holocaust was a forbidden topic, the search for rescuers started only after 1991. During the decades that passed since the end of the war many rescued and rescuers passed away. Therefore, it is often near impossible to meet the requirement of a personal testimony of a rescued individual, while there are only a few archival documents preserved. In order to correct the situation and honor the rescuers who do not meet the strict criteria by Yad Vashem, the Ukrainian foundation "Memory of Babyn Yar" in 1989 established the honorary title "the Righteous of Babyn Yar," later followed by the "Righteous of Ukraine" and "Children of the Righteous."

However, in view of the fact that these honorary titles have been given by an individual decision of the foundation's founder and president Illia Levitas, not every scholar and civic activist recognizes the fairness of such decisions.

On the other hand, during the Second World War, especially in Ukraine, not only Jews were rescued, but also representatives of other groups that were systematically persecuted by the Nazis. Taking into account this circumstance, it seems reasonable to use the term "rescuers," broader in meaning than the term "righteous." This will also allow us to move beyond the history of the Nazi persecutions and use a more general image of all those who rescued victims of genocides and mass persecutions in modern times.

12. Resistance Movements

During the Second World War, the following Resistance movements were operating in the territory of Ukraine:

- Ukrainian, *either* national *or* nationalist
- Soviet or communist

– Polish

– Jewish

As for the first two, the question of their correct name remains open.

If we proceed from the ideology of these movements, there arise certain problems. Not all branches of the Ukrainian resistance movement embraced the classical nationalist ideology. This also applies to the forces headed at different times by Taras Bulba-Borovets and the forces created by Stepan Bandera's OUN at the later stage of their activity. Similarly, the Soviet resistance movement was entirely under the leadership of party structures only nominally. In fact, much of the self-organized underground, and to a lesser extent the guerilla movement, though remaining loyal to the Soviet regime, did not profess communist ideology.

The authors of this Concept believe that in this case it is necessary to proceed from the political goals of these movements. They shall be called "Ukrainian" and "Soviet" because they sought, respectively, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state or the restoration of the Soviet state. The purpose of the Polish resistance movement was to restore the independent Polish state within its prewar borders, and that of the Jewish resistance movement was to save the Jews, which were persecuted and killed by the Nazis.

The question of whether it is better to call the Ukrainian resistance movement "national" is of ideological rather than substantive nature. For, when giving it such a name, we emphasize that the Polish and Soviet resistance movements were not national from the Ukrainian point of view since they represented other states. However, during the Second World War, neither a generally recognized Ukrainian state nor, accordingly, the Ukrainian political nation, existed. Furthermore, only parts of the Ukrainian resistance movement associated themselves with the state formations that had been/remained declared at the time (the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Hetmanate, the Ukrainian State of Yaroslav Stetsko's government). Thus, applying the term "national" to the Ukrainian resistance movement of the Second World War is largely retrospective and ideological.